Gasoline is way more complicated than most people know or want to know or need to know. Best people to talk to on this topic are the people actually in the business at the wholesale level; buy the guy a couple of drinks and he'll probably tell you a tale of woe (related to boutique blends) and way more than you wanted to know. What I find fascinating is the way prices are set in reality--and it has almost nothing to do with what is written in economics textbooks that are regarded as gospel truth by undergraduates.

Volatility matters since the evaporated portion contains a lot of VOCs (volatile organic compounds) that contribute to air pollution, and thus are controlled in most locations. Volatility is why most pumps now have the hood on the nozzle to capture the vapors as you fill the tank.

The Federal blend formula requires 7 RVP in summer and 13 RVP in winter, but most states set their own blend constraints, sometimes county to county depending on the air pollution situation. In California, we have the California Air Resources Board (CARB) formula requiring 7 RVP in summer and 10 RVP in winter (because of our mild winters and bad air pollution).

Blending to RVP (and octane, and sulfur, and all the other simultaneous requirements of final gasoline) is tricky. For example, butane gives you a very high octane rating so is good for the octane target, but it is very volatile, so it is bad for the RVP. Refiners have to change their blending recipe between summer and winter to achieve these targets, sometimes creating shortages or surpluses of particular fractions (such as pentanes) in the refinery.

As might be expected you get a lot more naphtha from the distillation process than you can possibly use. In Saudi Arabia they use it, occasionally, as boiler fuel. I worked for awhile at the Gazland Power Plant, just about five miles west of Ras Tanura, in Saudi Arabia. About once a month, for a day or so we would use naphtha as a fuel. Occasionally we would use raw crude as well but most of the time we used natural gas. The plant had both gas and oil burners or injectors in the same boilers and you could switch from one to the other without ever losing your flame.

However in Saudi Arabia today, most of the naphtha is simply injected back into the wells to help keep the pressure up. At least that is what my son tells me. He has been in Saudi, working for Aramco, since 1991.

Note: Technically gasoline is sometimes considered naphtha, however as the term is normally used, it is the light colorless fluid that dry-cleaners and Zippo lighters used. It is also used in many manufacturing processes as well, blending naphtha with heavier compounds to make various household compounds. Gasoline has 7 to 9 carbon atoms and anything from 6 to 11 carbon atoms is considered naphtha.
http://www.gcsechemistry.com/o5.htm

But not very good either.  That amounts to a capital cost of $3,500 per kilowatt capacity.  A big coal or nuke should cost less that $2,000 per kW.  

The capacity factor for solar is rarely 20% while the nuclear industry is averaging over 90% so a kW of nuclear capacity produces 4.5X the kW-hours of a kW of solar PV.

Adding fuel and O&M for nuclear of 1.5 cents per kW-hr and ignoring PV maintenance makes solar PV electricity about 7 times more expensive than nuclear power.....IF this claim is true and comes to eventual realization.

But this is at current electric rates I presume -- it will go up as rates go up.

ONLINE NEWS REPORT (ONR)

A Service of the Public Relations Dept., Saudi Aramco, Dhahran

Friday, March 10, 2006

CURRENT EVENTS:

1. Saudi Arabia: Al-Qaeda vows more attacks - Aramco, Abqaiq, Yanbu' cited; Ali Al-Naimi quoted (Energy Compass)

1. ENERGY COMPASS, March 10, 2006:

It's a nightmare scenario: A successful attack on a giant oil facility that cripples oil exports, sends oil prices soaring and damages the world economy. Such a nightmare was averted last month, when Saudi security forces foiled an attack on Abqaiq, the massive complex that processes 6 million-7 million barrels per day of Saudi Arabia's oil output, but it may have been a much closer shave than initial reports suggested (EC Mar.3,p8). Moreover, such is the determination of a small group of Islamic extremists to create havoc in the world's largest oil exporter and strike at the heart of the Saudi ruling family that the audacious suicide mission may well be repeated. "We expected something like this to happen," a Western executive in Riyadh said, "and we expect something similar to happen again."

For terrorists, Abqaiq is the same kind of "iconic" target as New York's Twin Towers or the Pentagon in Washington, and a successful attack would have inflicted maximum actual and psychological damage on the Saudi leadership, as well as the US. It is one of the world's most important oil installations, processing around two-thirds of the oil output of the world's biggest exporter. According to initial reports, the attack failed because alert security guards prevented the perpetrators getting beyond the first of two gates leading to the crude and gas processing plant, firing on the cars, which then exploded. Observers hailed it as proof the kingdom's oil installations were well protected: The US ambassador to Riyadh, James Oberwetter, said, "when they were needed, the systems worked, and the facility at Abqaiq was fully protected."

People familiar with the events of Feb. 24 tell a slightly different story. They say the two attackers, each driving vehicles packed with 1,000 kilos of explosives and with fake Saudi Aramco markings, managed to get through the outer gate of the complex, which is monitored by the Saudi National Guard. Luckily, security services had changed routes around the outer perimeter to make it harder to navigate. Armed with old maps of the complex, the terrorists are said to have become disoriented, panicked and detonated their devices prematurely, averting substantial damage to pipelines and other facilities.

While the attackers would have been unable to get to the heart of the complex because it was more heavily guarded by Aramco private security, damage to outlying facilities would have been enough to send prices stratospheric: As it was, they shot up $2 per barrel, reflecting the impact of the terrorist threat on the world's largest oil exporter. One of the most worrying aspects, sources say, was the apparent lack of communication between the National Guard, which protects the outer perimeter, and Saudi Aramco security, which is in charge of guarding the inner sanctum. The sources say the National Guard failed to alert their Aramco counterparts after the terrorists crashed through the first gate, which allowed them to drive round the outer perimeter without Aramco guards' knowledge. If the account is true, it undermines the widely held view that Abqaiq is one of the world's best-guarded facilities, and will do little to reassure markets nervous about security of supply.

The assailants came in disguise -- similar to the tactics adopted in a series of terrorist attacks carried out in Riyadh, the oil town of Al-Khobar and Yanbu over the past couple of years. They were dressed in Aramco overalls, which Saudi sources say can be obtained relatively easily. The same method has been used to even more brutal effect in Iraq, where insurgents often dress in military uniforms to get close to their targets. This week in Baghdad, for example, gunmen wearing Iraqi police commando uniforms kidnapped around 50 employees from the offices of a local security company.

Aramco, which has a security force of more than 30,000 people, aerial surveillance and other forms of protection, is taking no chances. Saudi Oil Minister Ali Naimi said this week that security has since been tightened at all Aramco facilities. "Naturally, after something like that security goes up. We have been taking additional measures," he said. Naimi added that the Saudi oil giant has the capability to use surface-to-air missiles to thwart any airborne attack and that the government plans to make more powerful weapons available to security forces. Industry sources in Riyadh say Aramco recently issued a tender to recruit 300 Western specialists to help tighten security at oil installations and train the Aramco security team. While that will make major facilities like Abqaiq more impregnable, pipelines remain an easier terrorist target. The strategy has worked effectively in Iraq, where attacks on the northern pipeline running from Kirkuk to Turkey have effectively rendered it inoperable.

Such measures by Aramco are unlikely to deter extremists, who have vowed to continue attacking oil installations in Saudi Arabia and Iraq. Saudi security forces have been battling supporters of Saudi-born Osama bin Laden for nearly three years and while they can claim some successes, a group calling itself "Al-Qaeda in Saudi Arabia" said it would continue the struggle against the infidels. "We renew our vow to crush the forces of the crusaders and the tyrants and to stop the theft of the wealth of the Muslims," it said.

The Abqaiq attack also sends an ominous message to smaller Gulf producers that, like Saudi Arabia, have close relations with the US and could become targets themselves. "There have been a lot of statements recently by Al-Qaeda members threatening to bomb, sabotage and destroy vital economic installations," Kuwaiti Oil Minister Sheikh Ahmad al-Sabah said days after the Saudi attack, adding he was in "no doubt" that security would be heightened around all oil installations.

By Paul Sampson, London

http://www.energyintel.com/DocumentDetail.asp?document_id=170607

I was surprised when I saw the large naphtha 'cut' in the distillation but have never heard it mentioned.  It would be interesting for the experts here to expand on this some more.