World Oil Exports: A Comprehensive Projection
Posted by Prof. Goose on October 10, 2006 - 10:13am
This article is a first simplistic (but comprehensive) assessment of World Oil Exports, here defined has the total amount of liquid hydrocarbons that are surpluses in producing countries. This assessment is made by projecting in to the future fixed change rates that reflect current trends in liquids production and consumption in countries where presently the difference between the two is positive. The outcome of this assessment is worrisome.
Introduction
Although the debate is growing around the point in time when global oil production starts to decline permanently, for countries or regions where oil production is null or very low, the amount of oil available for trade in the market is a much more relevant issue. Such is the case of the European Union; with oil consumption topping 14.5 Mb/d, only two of its member states figure in the exporting countries list, and both with marginal numbers. More than worrying with a Peak Oil date, importing countries should worry on the future availability of tradable oil.
It is therefore of the highest importance for importing countries to know in advance the amount of oil available to the market, and from which countries/regions it may come, in order to prepare correctly for the future.
This assessment uses as data sources the Statistical Review of World Energy, published yearly by BP, and the monthly newsletter published by ASPO, where assessments for future oil production are available for more than 40 individual countries. Future oil consumption and production is projected using static change rates for the period starting in 2006 and finishing in 2020. These rates are determined by current trends and by reserves/future discovery assessments made by Colin Campbell and published in the ASPO's newsletters.
In this text the word "oil" is used for simplicity as synonym of liquid hydrocarbons, for the past data on consumption and production used includes Liquefied Natural Gas (LNG).
Oil Exporters
Oil exporting countries are defined as having in 2005 an oil production greater than oil consumption, thus resulting in a surplus. Using the data published by BP on its Statistical Review of World Energy of 2006, the following countries are identified: Saudi Arabia,
Former Soviet Union (where individual data is available for Russia, Kazakhstan and Azerbaijan), Norway, Venezuela, Iran, United Arab Emirates, Kuwait, México, Algeria, Qatar, Canada, Malaysia, Ecuador, Argentina, Colombia, Denmark, Egypt and United Kingdom.
Due to lack of data for consumption, Angola, Nigeria and Iraq are left out of this first assessment. This issue will be revisited in the concluding stages of this article.
Figure 1 shows how these exporting countries rank in the world oil market.
Figure 1 - Oil producing countries identified for 2005. The "Others" slot contains all countries producing less than 400 Kb/d.
The statistical review contains historical data from 1965 to present, which is worth observing:
Figure 2 - Past oil exports from countries where data on consumption is also available.
The well know energy crisis of the past appear in an interesting fashion: the major declines in exports come after the events that generated it. Such might be a sign of a market ruled more from the Demand side than from the Supply side. That situation is likely to reverse as the peak in world oil production is approached.
The early 1980s are years of marked difficulties for exporters, on both wealthy sides of the Atlantic internal production backed off demand (Alaska and North Sea). Exporting numbers of the 1970s are only surpassed in the mid 1990s. This fall on oil demand can be a reasonable explanation for the collapse of the Soviet Union.
Future Oil Production
Future oil production is projected applying the decline/growth rates identified by Colin Campbell to the data published by BP. In most cases the numbers of each source for daily production do not match, Campbell's assessments focus on Conventional Oil, while BP's historical data on "All Liquids" (a somewhat loose definition which includes Liquefied Natural Gas and other non-specified liquids). Still these differences are usually small, requiring special treatment only in three cases.
Following is a list of the countries assessed. Next to the country name is the year of original assessment by Colin Campbell and in quote the author's view at the time. A brief explanation of the rate used for projection then follows.
Saudi Arabia - 2006
Production stands at 9 Mb/d giving a low depletion rate of 1.9%,, which itself is reason to doubt the higher official reserve estimates The country is endeavouring to offset the natural decline of its aging fields by infill drilling as well as advanced horizontal drilling to tap the less productive zones in the reservoir. A tar-seal on the eastern flank of Ghawar, deprives it of a natural water drive, meaning that massive amounts of water have to be injected. It is also bringing on new much smaller fields, including offshore extensions. While the country claims to be able to increase production to 12 Mb/d, it is here thought more likely that it will be hard pressed to hold present production, which is here modeled to remain about flat for another twenty years before decline sets in at about 3% a year. It may not be able even to do that.
Sweet Oil production in Saudi Arabia has likely peaked leaving the country in some sort of momentarily difficulties to replace past production rates with sour crude. The declared recoverable reserves stand at 270 Gb, a number hardly with geological meaning, given that original oil in place is declared to be 720 Gb. Including the 105 Gb already produced; that would imply a mean recovery rate of over 50% for the entire country. The current assessment by Colin Campbell stays around 160 Gb, which is probably optimistic for it implies a mean recovery of 37%, roughly meaning the successful application of tertiary recovery methods for the entire country. Still this last estimate is used which make it plausible for Saudi Arabia to continue producing liquid hydrocarbons at rates in excess of 11 Mb/d.
Russian Federation - 2003
Accordingly, we may expect a second peak around 2010.It is clear that the reserve estimates of around 50 Gb as reported by the Oil & Gas Journal were far too low. Exactly how far is difficult to know, but we tentatively favour an figure of about 60 Gb, still giving a fairly low depletion rate of 3%, which is one argument against higher estimates.
Production rose steeply up to 2005 and stalled there after; a peak is still expected circa 2010 at 10 Mb/d.
Kazakhstan - 2005
Insufficient is known about the country to make a very reliable assessment but the indications are that about 37 Gb have been discovered, of which only 6.6 have been produced. Future discovery is here assessed at about 8 Gb, giving a rounded total of 45 Gb. With such substantial reserves, the country has little incentive to explore for more. If this is approximately correct, it might be reasonable to model production rising to about 1.4 Mb/d by 2010 followed by a plateau to the onset of decline around 2030.
This projection is kept without change.
Azerbaijan -2004
Production is currently running at about 300 kb/d at far below capacity pending the construction of the new export pipeline when it may triple. The midpoint of depletion is forecast for around 2015, when production would decline at about 2.5% a year.
This projection is kept without change.
Norway - 2003
Oil production commenced in 1971 and has grown steadily to just over 3 Mb/d. Some 16 Gb have been produced, which is close to half the total discovered. Peak production was passed in 2001 (barring any shortlived surge from new small developments), and will be followed by a relatively high decline of almost 7% a year.
From 2004 to 2005 the depletion rate for Norway was actually 7%.
Venezuela - 2006
On this basis, the depletion rate of Regular Conventional production stands at no more than 2%, suggesting that even the present reserve assessment may be too generous. It is here assumed that production can be held at 1.8 Mb/d until around say 2015 before a gentle decline sets in. As already mentioned, the East Venezuela Basin has substantial reserves of Non-Conventional heavy oil, lying at depths of between 500 and 1500m.(...) Production commenced in 1990 and has risen to about 650 000 kb/d. It is assumed here that production will be flat to 2015 rising thereafter at 3% to peak in 2030 before declining at 2% a year.
This projection is kept without change.
Iran - 2003
(...) production could in resource terms rise to a second peak in 2009 at almost 5 Mb/d before commencing its terminal decline at 2.6% a year, but operational and investment constraints may prevent such a level being reached in practice, with 3-4 Mb/d peak being perhaps more likely .
Production rose to 4 Mb/d in 2004 and stalled beyond that. Based on the same resource base this daily production could be maintained up to 2020. Like Saudi Arabia, Iran's declared recoverable reserves (130 Gb) have been under great criticism. While Colin Campbell's estimates sit around 70 Gb, Samsam Bakhtiari, a retired head-man of the Iranian Oil Company, declared this year that recoverable reserves stay around 40 Gb. The projection here used can be considered fairly optimistic.
Abu Dhabi (UAE) - 2004
Oil production stands at 1.8 Mb/d, and is here assumed to remain flat at that level to the depletionmidpoint in 2026, declining at about 2% a year thereafter to about 1 Mb/d by 2050.
Assessment not available for states other than Abu Dhabi. Production for UAE has in fact been flattening in the last years, making Colin Campbell's assessment quite plausible.
Kuwait - 2004
Kuwait's production is expected to rise from a present 1.8 Mb/d to a second peak (depletion midpoint) at 2.7 Mb/d in 2018, before entering its terminal decline at about 2% a year.
This projection is kept without change.
Mexico - 2003
Mexico is here assessed to be capable of producing a total of 50 Gb to 2075, giving a midpoint ofdepletion in 1999, some fourteen years after what appears to be a premature actual peak in 1985.
Production now stands at about 3.2 Mb/d, being subject to a fairly high depletion rate of 5% a year.
Mexico seems to have peaked only in 2004, but the future decline rate is maintained.
Algeria - 2004
Production is currently running at 1 Mb/d, and is expected to rise to a peak of 1.4 Mb/d by 2006 at the midpoint of depletion, before falling to about 850 kb/d by 2020 and 300 kb/d by 2050.
Algeria produces large amounts of LNG, reaching a total of 1.8 Mb/d for Liquids in 2003 and 2 Mb/d in 2005. Future production is modeled with Colin Campbell's assessment (3% annual decline) for Conventional Oil plus a constant of 0.8 Mb/d for LNG.
Qatar - 2005
Conventional OilProduction 2004 0.78
Forecast 2010 0.53
Forecast 2020 0.27
The country has been exporting Liquefied Natural Gas for some time, and has plans to expand the capacity greatly, such that production is expected to rise to 1.4 Mb/d by 2011, making it the world's largest exporter. Several gas-to-liquids plants are also being developed by Chevron/Sasol, Exxon, Shell and others, which are expected to yield 1 Mb/d in a few years' time. Petrochemical production, including the world's largest ammonia-urea plant providing critical synthetic nutrients for agriculture, is also set to expand.
Productions rises of 9% were experienced in last years, which should continue up to 2011, beyond that an annual increase of 3.5% is used.
Liquids:
2011 1.93
2020 2.67
Canada - 2004
[Tar Sands] production, including derivatives, is here estimated to rise from about 1 Mb/d today to a plateau at 2.6 Mb/d starting in 2020, in a slow, labour- and capital-intensive process, also carrying environmental costs.
Canada seems to produce around 1 Mb/d of LNG, a figure likely to fall due to Natural Gas depletion. Total liquids production is projected increasing around 2% annum to 4.1 Mb/d in 2020.
Malaysia - 2005
Production stands at 855 kb/d, which is believed to be the peak, being set to decline at about 6% ayear, which is typical of an offshore environment. If so, production will have declined to about 570 kb/d in 2010 and 300 kb/d in 2020.
Change rate from 2004 to 2005 was -4.3%; since this was the first decline year, Colin Campbell's 6% seems quite reasonable.
Ecuador - 2003
Production now stands at about 400 kb/d, the capacity of the line. The depletion peak has been accordingly somewhat delayed by the limits to export, not being expected until 2004. Production is likely to have fallen to about 250 kb/d by 2020 and 80 kb/d by 2050.
From 2004 to 2005 production still increased by 1.1%, which indicates a near term peak. A new projection is made with a decline of 4% to a liquids production of 290 kb/d by 2020.
Argentina - 2003
Production peaked in 1998 declining to 750 kb/d in 2002. It means that Argentina will become a net importer by around 2010 assuming no increase in demand, which will no doubt further stress its economy and financial stability.
Decline rates have been erratic since 1998, with a fall of 7% from 2003 to 2004 being the highest. Henceforth decline is modeled at 6% per year decreasing production to 290 Kb/d by 2020.
Colombia - 2006
Production, reflecting the two main discovery cycles, reached a peak of 816 kb/d in 1999 at the midpoint of depletion. It has since declined to 520 kb/d giving a current depletion rate of just under 5% a year.
Projection kept without change.
Denmark - 2004
Indigenous production peaked in 2002 and is set to decline at about 7% a year.
A final peak was set in 2004 at 390 kb/d, with a decline of 3.3% for the next year. The 7% figure is here used for it's a common number for offshore terminal declines.
Egypt - 2003
Production 2002 0.27Forecast 2010 0.17
Forecast 2020 0.09
Current Depletion Rate 5.9%
The country will become a net importer of oil within about five years as domestic production continues to fall.
There's a big gap from Colin Campbell's numbers to BP's, almost 500 kb/d; which most likely is LNG. Depletion rate for Liquids is has been stable around 4%, hence this is the figure used for projection.
United Kingdom - 2006
Current (2005) oil production of 1.8 Mb/d is set to decline at the current depletion rate of 7.5% a year, meaning that it will have halved in ten years.
The days of UK as an oil exporter are already over.
Future Oil Consumption
This is an all but easy assessment, and is performed with some risks. Unlike western importing countries, most of the analyzed countries experienced profound changes in consumption patterns since the turn of the century. Future consumption is mainly obtained by projecting the change rates observed in the last years, especially since 2003 when higher oil prices started being felt. There is a clear pattern in recent years of growing affluence in these exporting countries, which are mostly outside the wealthy importer blocs (Europe, North America, Japan and Oceania). The hardest question to answer is for how long will these countries continue in the soaring consumption growth path.
Saudi Arabia
After a period of slow growth during the years of low oil price, consumption in Saudi Arabia soured above 7% during 2 years to settle down at 4.7% in 2005. Future growth is modeled at 4% annum.
Figure3 - Oil consumption and change rates in Saudi Arabia.
Russian Federation
Oil consumption has been steadily growing around 1.5%/year, with 2004 being the exception with 2.6%. The increasing incomes from oil exports do not seem to affect much the country consumption; the 1.5% figure is kept.
Figure 4 - Oil consumption and change rates in the Russian Federation.
Kazakhstan
Erratic decline/growth through the last years makes projections difficult. It is likely that the 2005 figure will be maintained for some time as the country experiences greater affluence as an oil exporter. Future consumption growth is modeled as slowing down 1% each year from 10% to 5% from which point it settles.
Figure 5 - Oil consumption and change rates in Kazakhstan.
Azerbaijan
After two spectacular declines in 2001 and 2002, the country came back to life the next three years, going above 10% in 2003 and 2005. Future growth is modeled has maintained at
10%/year, for Azerbaijan is currently a somewhat undeveloped country.
Figure 6 - Oil consumption and change rates in Azerbaijan.
Rest of FSU
Consumption in the remaining countries is modeled as growing 2%/year.
Norway
Consumption history yields years of growth alternating with years of decline; still the mean since 2001 is positive. Future consumption growth is modeled at 1.2%/year.
Figure 7 - Oil consumption and change rates for Norway.
Venezuela
In the last 5 years 2003 was a clear outlier with a decrease of almost 20%; without this year the mean growth stands at 8%/year. 2004 can be argued has a correction year from the previous crisis, but 2001 and 2002 had similar large numbers, thus 8% is the figure used to project future growth.
Figure 8 - Oil consumption and change rates for Venezuela.
Iran
Steady growth since 2000 between 4% and 7% annum with 2001 a clear outlier. The mean of these figures from 2000 to 2005, barring 2001, is 5.75% which seems reasonable to project future growth.
Figure 9 - Oil consumption and change rates for Iran.
UAE
After a long period of decline, consumption growth came back strongly in 2001. From 2003 onwards growth rates are settling on the 5-6% range. The mean of these last 3 years, approximately 5.5%, is thus used.
Figure 10 - Oil consumption and change rates for UAE.
Kuwait
Strong growth in the late nineties was followed by tow years of stillness; from 2002 onwards growth picked up again with rates varying between 5% and 10% annum. The mean rate of these last 4 years, 8% is used for projection.
Figure 11 - Oil consumption and change rates for Kuwait.
Mexico
Since 2000 a trend of erratic slow growth is visible, with 2002 a clear outlier. The mean of these figures since 2000, and excluding 2002, is 1.75% and looks like a reasonable number for future growth.
Figure 12 - Oil consumption and change rates for Mexico.
Algeria
Steady growth in the range of 3% to 6%, with an outlying 11% in 2002. The mean figure since 2000 without 2002, 4%, is thus used for future growth.
Figure 13 - Oil consumption and change rates for Algeria.
Qatar
A nation very hard to model, registering growth rates of 22% for 2001 and 47% for 2002, followed by a 3% decrease in 2003, in turn followed by strong increases in 2004 and 2005. Oil production in the country will increase beyond 2020, hence a high growth rate, circa 10%, is quite probable.
Figure 14 - Oil consumption and change rates for Qatar.
Canada
After 4 years of growth with rates above 2%, 2005 comes as the first year of declining consumption in a long time. The mean figure for the 2001-2004 period is 3.8%, probably a too higher number for a wealthy country. Still oil production is projected to grow beyond 2020, making likely future consumption growth, here set at around half of the 2001 - 2004 period.
Figure 15 - Oil consumption and change rates for Canada.
Malaysia
Growth years alternate with decline years in a nation already on terminal production decline. Future consumption is modeled as decreasing 2%/year; still Malaysia will stop being an exporter before 2020.
Figure 16 - Oil consumption and change rates for Malaysia.
Ecuador
After a decline in 2002, growth came back in the following years staying above 3%. The mean of the last 3 years, approximately 4%, is thus used.
Figure 17 - Oil consumption and change rates for Ecuador.
Argentina
As for many others not so wealthy exporters, a decline period is followed by strong growth from 2003 onwards. Future growth is modeled at 5%, reflecting the last three years.
Figure 18 - Oil consumption and change rates for Argentina.
Colombia
The country experienced shy consumption growth in the last 3 years, in spite of high decline rates in production. Future production is projected as growing 1.5%/year, a number close to the mean of the last 3 years.
Figure 19 - Oil consumption and change rates for Colombia.
Denmark
2005 seems to be an exceptional year for the country, the first where consumption didn't decline since 1996. The good student is projected as keeping up the good work and declining consumption 3%/year, in line with the trend observed in the 2000 -2004 period. Such keeps Denmark as a marginal exporter through out 2020.
Figure 20 - Oil consumption and change rates for Denmark.
Egypt
A country that illustrates perfectly the affluence growth in less wealthy oil exporters. After 3 difficult years of decline, consumption gets back on track toping 8.5% in 2005. The mean of these last 3 years, 5%, is used for 2006; beyond that Egypt's days as an exporter are over, and consumption will probably have to accommodate to the declines in production.
Figure 21 - Oil consumption and change rates for Egypt.
United Kingdom
Although experiencing a period of 3 years in a row with consumption growth above 1%, UK is a card out of the set of exporters.
Figure 22 - Oil consumption and change rates for the United Kingdom.
Future Oil Exports
The final result can be observed in Figure 23, obtained by subtracting the projected consumption from the projected production for each country. Once a country stops being an exporter is thereafter left out of the total. The countries leaving the exporters club are: United Kingdom in 2006, Egypt in 2007, Argentina in 2010, Mexico in 2015, Malaysia in 2019 and Colombia also in 2019.
Figure 23 - Total Oil exports from the assessed countries, including the projections for the 2006 - 2020 period.
The graph in Figure 23 depicts a very clear scenario: total exports from the assessed countries declines from hereafter, never recovering again. The decline rate grows with time, as seen Figure 24:
Figure 24 - Total Oil exports and evolution rates for the assessed countries, including the projections for the 2006 - 2020 period.
The declines rates resulting from the projections made are never higher than those observed during the early 1980s, still in 15 years total oil exports decline almost 40% from 36.2 Mb/d to 22.6 Mb/d. This period ahead might not have much in common with the crisis lived in the 1970s and 1980s, but if economic recession takes over in importing countries, periods of heavy decline might happen, followed by periods of recovery. It's worth looking closely to this period in figure 25.
Figure 25 - Decline rates in total oil exports for the assessed countries during the projected period, 2006 to 2020.
Four different periods can be identified:
. 2006 - 2010 : slow decline below 2%/year;
. 2011 - 2013 : first acceleration to a decline rate close to 4%/year;
. 2014 - 2016 : steady decline at 4%/year;
. 2017 - 2020 : new acceleration up 5%/year.
The first acceleration is probably the most critical period and follows the peak in world oil production. The final years of the 2010s decade will present great challenges for oil importing nations.
Finally is worth mentioning that these four periods seem to fit on Samsam Bakhtiari's Four Transitions of which the first started last year.
Important countries left out
There are three main countries for which consumption data is not available, hence not included in the calculations: Angola, Iraq [ed] and Nigeria. For the last two even if the data existed projection would be difficult. Both countries are experiencing serious social disturbances, Iraq is unfortunately undergoing what is technically a war, and in Nigeria social inequity is leading to rebellion from people to whom oil has only brought disadvantages. Some sort of social transformation is to expect in the following years in these countries, hopefully towards more stable environments.
As for Angola the times of social unrest seem to be gone, although elections are yet to take place, the liberal opposition is now unarmed. In 2003 the 5 million Angolans consumed little over 40 Kb/d. Today that number is unknown but is surely much higher, perhaps several orders of magnitude, due to an explosion in the housing market, an to a sharp increase in population (there are reports of 1 million Chinese living in Luanda alone). The latest assessment made by Colin Campbell pushed the peak in Angola's production back to 2011 (from circa 2018), more inline with other specialists (e.g. Cramez). The adding of future oil exports from Angola would not change much the overall picture, probably softening the decline rates before 2011 and augmenting them thereafter. Still this is an oil exporting country worth assessing if consumption data can be found in the future.
Conclusions
This assessment should be taken "with a grain of salt", it is not to be expected that the future will follow these projections. But looking at these numbers, there some trends that clearly arise, the most important being a decline from 2005 onwards of the amount of oil coming to the market. This situation is a consequence of consumption growth at higher pace than production in most of oil exporting countries.
Once the amount oil available for export becomes lower than the amount required by the importing countries costs start to rise, forcing an abnormal wealth transfer from buyers to sellers. This newly acquired wealth will improve affluence in exporting countries, which in turn drives up internal consumption (better automobiles, better and farther from center houses, more goods imports and transportation, etc). This feedback loop will perpetuate itself until some event or constraint tackles consumption growth in the exporters' side, or until the importers collapse from lack of new wealth to transfer. The former is the most likely scenario.
For oil importing countries like EU these projections bring a worrisome conclusion: mitigation strategies for oil scarcity should have started taking effect in 2005. For this to happen, planning should have started in the late 1980s or early 1990s. Although programs for liquid hydrocarbons replacement exist in the electric generation sector in the EU, US or Australia, none of these countries seems to have prepared to phase out oil in the transportation sector. In the case of the EU it is also important to note the failure to plan an alternative to nuclear electric generation, an important energy source in some member states, since its stalling due to negative public opinion.
Finally another consequence must be observed: unfortunately, as laid down originally by Colin Campbell (and further improved by the folks at PostCarbon and Rich Heinberg), the Oil Depletion Protocol may only function if exporting countries restrain their oil consumption. Up to the Peak Oil epoch the Protocol can work if exporting countries match their consumption growth to the production, freezing the amount of oil coming on market. After Peak Oil these countries would have to decrease their internal consumption in order to mach the decline rate of world production with that of world consumption. It is hard to envision less wealthy countries reducing their consumption in order to provide oil to wealthier countries. Let's just hope for the best.
Acknowledgements
First to the TOD editing team for once more making possible this sharing of ideas.
Secondly and most importantly to Colin Campbell, for his time long work on Peak Oil, of which the invaluable country by country assessments, that made this piece possible, are part of.
Contact
- Content: editors at theoildrum dot com
- Tech support: support at theoildrum dot com
License
This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-Share Alike 3.0 United States License.
There is probably something to be learnt about communication of finite oil concepts by how it is attacked there (they won't hold back).
So far I see appeals to 'cry wolf', appeals to alternative authorities, ideas that peak oil is all the trick of the oil companies, its all fud, its all too far away, future improved extraction techniques increasing reserves and new technology making oil obsolute. A winning argument therefore needs to nail each of these, preferably in a quick and succinct way.
Otherwise, TOD makes a winning argument everyday. Unless someone is willing to put the time in to understand the issues or, at least, they are open-minded, there is no way to persuade them. This is merely denial, which is common enough -- whether it is slashdot or Forbes.
But maybe we'll catch a few fish here, heh?
For the others, I always love it when people who don't know shit tell us we're wrong.
To my reading it is an issue of scalability, timelines and %age rates. The assumption is that time exists for handwaving technology solutions to match the threat of decline, and indeed overtake it so that dependence on imports can be reduced. It is difficult for people to get a handle on how much and how fast change would have to come, let alone something like EROEI.
In reality its less about the specifics of the particular technologies - more about levels and rates. Is there a pithy way of capturing how extensive and quick the expansion in a particular technology would need to be to address the problem? For tar sands its easy timelines and rates make it obvious its an also ran as far as solutions go.
Just how tractable is coal-to-liquid fuel in terms of mines, plant and cost? Can people be given a simple way to understand how much has to be done to make 1 mb of oil per day?
No.
Tell them that one barrel of crude = 25,000 hours of physical labor. One gallon of gasoline = 600 hours of back-breaking labor. Ask them to shovel dirt for 600 hours to 'discover & recover' one gallon for their vehicles: this will hammer home just how rare & precious FFs really are to detritovore existence.
Bob Shaw in Phx,Az Are Humans Smarter than Yeast?
- Electrify US freight railroads, at least the main lines. Add back double & triple tracks torn out in the 1960s, 70s, 80s.
- Put tolls on the Interstate Highways, like that good Republican Eisenhower wanted to.
The worse Peak Oil gets, the more freight ton-miles will flow on non-oil transportation (perhaps still local delivery via truck, but businesses will move onto or build rail spurs for the competitive advantage).Together, heavy trucks and railroads use ~2.5 million barrels/day of diesel. Cut that in half is quite doable. Cut by 3/4 or 80% over time.
Another easy to understand solution. Look at Washington DC Metro. See how much oil it saves (40+% commute by it in DC) and how DC area is beginning to cluster around it. Miami wants to build the same thing (90% of population within 3 miles of a station) bur it will take them 25 years. Build it within 5 years and two dozen more like it within ten years. Streetcars in a hundred US cities & towns, then two hundred.
Save several million more barrels/day.
Simple ?
Best Hopes,
alan
Simple ?
Maybe we could add a check box and line item to form 1040 for those who feel like they want to pay even more taxes. Me - I have had enough of them.
-PoP
God, I'd settle for an ethos of sufficiency rather than excess. Enjoying what you have rather gluttony. The good news (I think) is we are soo wasteful and gluttonous that if we just take was we need it would make a big difference without ever needing to get to sacrifice.
Of cource this doesn't apply to the poor countries which are already in states of deprivation.
I-70 through the mountains of Colorado is approaching gridlock even on non ski weekdays. Something has to give, but it does not seem feasible to expand the highway through the mountains. The economies of all those mountain towns, mostly built up since the introduction of the interstate, are completely dependent upon that highway. In this case, part of the solution has to be interstate specific. If the gas tax is to be relied upon, there is no particular disincentive to get out of your car if your destination is say, Vail, coming from Denver. Since long term solutions like rail won't be available for at least 20 years, wide scale bus transit must occur in order to prevent 24/7, 365 days per year gridlock. Just providing buses, even if subsidized, won't get the job done. Ergo, provide heavily subsidized buses, park and rides, and impose heavy tolls to get people out of their automobiles. There will still remain the problem of truck traffic which will have to wait for diversion to rail.
The purpose of road tolls is to tax congestion, that is to say the cost you put onto other people by jamming up the road, (and they put on you).
On the subject of overall taxation, UK gas prices are roughly twice American, the entire difference being tax.
So say our total tax is $4/gal, and yours is $1/gal.
The estimate is that gas taxes and car taxes are about 1/3rd the total cost to society of driving in the UK: cost of accidents, cost of air pollution (that's not including the cost of global warming).
DC has a population of around 600,000, while the surrounding area of what most people would consider a single region easily has over 2 million inhabitants (Fairfax County alone has more than 1 million inhabitants).
The lack of parking in DC over the years as the open spaces available for offices filled in meant that Metro became more practical. This process is perfectly seen in the L'Enfant Plaza complex, which I sort of grew up with. Originally, parking wasn't hard, access to the interstate system was assured, but as time went on, the density of the government/commercial buildings in the area grew, parking became not only more expensive but also unreliable (and DC's parking enforcers are the one truly efficient branch of that city's government).
However, Metro was also being built, and L'Enfant Plaza plugs into the system very well, and with current plans including tying up with VRE - though the freightyards in Arlington are long gone, to make space for malls, condos, and offices. This meant that many of the federal workers at L'Enfant Plaza could use Metro - however, this did not mean they were using Metro alone.
This is where the 40% number has to be treated with a very skeptical perspective. No hard numbers to contradict it directly, just some comments on how that 40% may have been arrived at, and a data point or two to set against it.
First, DC is no longer the central goal of most federal workers in the region, though federal workers are still the largest single workforce in DC. Second, even Metro's density (apart from new places like the Ballston corridor in Arlington, or old places like Silver Spring, Maryland) is low, and the buses really not that useful. A lot of people drive to parking lots first, then take Metro to DC. When this number of commuter-riders is compared to the population of DC, the number is likely to approach 40%. (The same is definitely true of VRE and MARC and their light rail function.)
Simply look at the number of cars per hour on the Cabin John Bridge (Woodrow Wilson is more distorted by 95 and its north/south traffic) to get a feel of how many people are driving over a single bridge in an hour compared to the capacity of the entire Metro subway system to carry. Then add in a number of other choke points (DC's bridges for Northern Virginia traffic, for example to give a good estimate of commuters compared to Metro riders), and pretty soon, another picture is likely to emerge - that is, the number of cars in Northern Virginia staying within its boundaries is likely larger than the entire number of cars being used by commuters in DC. And of course, road building remains the favored solution to congestion.
The way most people currently live in the DC metro area means a car is essential. A small but growing number of people do live in areas where not having a car makes sense (though these tend to be inadequate places to raise children - no green/open space at all, for example), but in general, most people consider a car indispensable to how the live, and feel that keeping the car is normal, while changing the way they live is unacceptable - this is hard to grasp for someone who lives in a true city, but a lot of people in a place like Northern Virginia feel that life in a city is to be avoided - what I especially liked was how often I heard and read that the suburbs I grew up in (those demographics are for another time) are now becoming too 'ethnic,' so it was good to live even farther away, among people who were just like you, the way it was decades ago. When people drove big cars, and ignored things like conservation or long term planning, becoming increasingly shrill against other viewpoints, while growing silently frantic as their personal economic situation grew increasingly uncertain or threatening. (I'll stop there, though the fact that a major, stupid war is being fought again, in large part in both cases to defend the American Way Of Life, is also striking.)
I have no experience of New Orleans, but only a few cities in America do not think this way. And yes, it is a huge divider.
A new station was added to the old Red Line, and a series of office buildings (some private, also ATF HQ) sprang up for 3 blocks.
Without Metro, GAO said that they would disperse federal office buildings in the suburbs. Figure oil consumption with & without Metro !
DC wants to build 40 miles of streetcars to feed Metro and connect neighborhoods. The Dulles and Purple lines need to be built. Metro is NOT all it could be !
Miami voted a half cent sales tax to expand Miami Metro from 20 miles (memory) to ~103 miles. This suddenly made Metro "Hot" from a real estate POV. During my visit there in 2004, 15 of 23 construction cranes were within three blocks of a Metro station (and signs/excavation for at least two more high rises that I saw).
BTW, anyone been to Miami lately and ridden the Metro ? Is reale state still booming next to the stations (within 3 blocks).
One of the values of New Orleans is that it is a living example of a high quality of urban life coupled with low energy consumption. Check out my comments on the contrast with NYC (another low energy city).
http://nyc.theoildrum.com/story/2006/9/28/124514/971
Peak Oil will be a large and brutal hammer. If there is an escape (urban rail, TOD) then people will flock to it. If there is no escape (typical US post WW II city/suburbs) then people will be beaten down by it.
Best Hopes,
Alan
Not to diss New Orleans, as was, is, or will be,
but
it had one of the highest murder and other crime rates of any US city, was (in)famous for its corruption and civic mismanagement, and some of the poorest urban dwellers in America.
A very special place. A place of music. A place so unlike much of America, where you work to live not just live to work.
But an urban idyll? Hardly. A desparately poor place, whose major industry was providing a glimpse to a past life, for an America that had moved beyond it.
Contrast that to a 'we all love to hate' city. Las Vegas. High average income, high unionisation, a place where ordinary people move to and can enjoy the fruits of the American dream. An invented place, much like America itself. That high average income and benefits and the correlation with unionisation is no accident-- it is unionisation that has always brought those benefits for American workers, and the absence of same that has meant they do not have it. A place where black people move to so they can live like whites-- with a place in the suburbs, a car, a steady job, the things the white middle class used to take for granted. A place where ordinary people who can no longer afford LA, can move to and buy a house.
Now LV doesn't look 'sustainable' to me-- out in the desert, no water, dependent on cars and cheap flights. But there it is, and it works, and it delivers both the dark and the bright side of the American dream.
My own view is that with Global Warming, it is more than likely that the US will abandon NO within this century: perhaps a big dike around the French Quarter and a sort of 'Williamsburg-like' historical district, but much of the city will just not be sustainable with the kinds of storms we are likely to experience by the middle of the century.
Watching Toronto struggle with its problems, and Toronto had one of the best transit systems in North America ('ride the Red Rocket'), now seriously financially troubled, I am not sure light rail/ subways work in the modern urb. A lot depends on whether you can change the zoning, to build the apartments, offices and shopping malls along the streetcar nexuses (nexi?).
But for the 4.5 million people of the Greater Toronto Area (projected to be 8 million before 2050) I think the transit solution will be 'smart car' whether it be minivan taxi systems, road pricing or some combination of car-based measures.
(this written by a man who lives in Europe, and loves Toronto for its old streets and streetcars)
The old City of Toronto worked well and had a density that easily justified that (I think 25k people live within half a mile of Yonge and Eglinton alone).
The TTC always ran well and at a profit in the old Boroughs: Toronto, York, East York. It was never so successful in the post war suburbs (North York, Scarborough, Etobicoke) where the densities are so much lower.
And the suburbs fought against increases in their density-- this is what screwed the Spadina Subway extension (I still remember the bitterly cold day it opened in ?1975?). There just hasn't been that much development at Glencairn and that. With the honourable exception of Mel Lastman when he was Mayor of N. York and NY City Centre.
I wonder if the mistake will be fixed on the Shepherd Subway? Don Mills and that are still pretty low density (condo blocks notwithstanding).
My point remains that though Metro is working well, and is actually a fairly functional system within its fairly narrow confines, it is only a fraction of the total amount of travel in the region, and until that car travel declines, it will remain a significant factor, but lower than 40% of all commuter trips in the region - and using DC in isolation is deceptive in terms of how many Metro riders reach Metro.
As for the Metro being full this summer - yes, it was, more than I expected. On the other hand, I have been informed by people who work regularly at various federal facilities, all parking at such buildings includes under vehicle inspections and various other time consuming security measures - parking in DC is really, really a major hassle even if you have one of the dwindling number of 'free' parking spaces in government buildings (except Congress - the parking near Union Station is just so cute, and I am sure it will expand as required).
The move of the military out of Crystal City is he best externally-initiated thing to happen to Arlington in a while. The majority of the land owners (ie Charles E Smith/Vernado) are chomping at the bit to redevelop the 60's era buildings and re-tenant with commercial enterprises. The tenants-to-be are also clamering to get Crystal City space once the whole area is renewed. It's really quite amazing. We appreciated the Navy folk that were there, but the concrete-canyon decor was not much appreciated (due to lack of sidewalk activation and just plain bad architecture) and that is all being changed for the better. See link for ongoing planning:
http://www.arlingtonvirginiausa.com/index.cfm/11250
And yes, Crystal City is the sort of place which needs some improvement to make it inhabitable. Though what a great example of America's vision of the future, ca. 1960/70 - nothing but glass and concrete and cars.
I would say Crystal City needs improvements to make it beautiful, as it is alread inhabited by over 6000 residents and probably 5 times that many office workers. Quite a bit out of balance for what we like to see at our metro stops, but that is changing. We just approved a project to convert a large office to residential. I was dubious about it, but they are totally reskinning the outside and making it work well with the street, and the apartments inside will have very nice high 12 ft ceilings since it is commercial-grade construction.
Crystal City was named by the majority land-owner after his wife, Crystal so he already thinks it is beautiful - here's his website
http://crystalcity.com/
Of course, I disagree. Although, its not mearly the beige, 60's style architecture, it was the philosophy at the time to seperate the cars and pedestrians so Crstal City was designed with a whole network of human tunnels and shops underground as well as many skywalks. This had the effect of sucking the human life off the street, turning the streets into traffic sewers, and of course as a result they paid little attention to the design of the building at the street level. The street-level makeover is making the biggest difference to the area with shops and restaurants now opening onto the street in places.
Arlington resident, Adrian Cronaur (The Good Morning Vietnam guy) and others actually seem to like the underground shops as he documents here:
http://walkarlington.com/go/crystal.html
I haven't been there in over a year, but I have heard that the transformation is well underway and people who live there seem quite happy with it. It's funny that it is only 2 miles from my house but I haven't been there in so long, but there's plenty to do in my own neighborhood so haven't had the need.
London as well. My father actually helped install flood doors in some of the London Tube lines after the war (they could then double as atomic war shelters, which was a concern at the time).
But the Tube already regularly floods.
Our government is always talking about 'joined up thinking' (ie interdepartmental policy coordination).
However the intention is to put new nuclear reactors on existing, licensed reactor sites. To combat global warming.
It was then pointed out that some of these sites are, on the Environment Department's forecasts, likely to be under water by the middle of the century (at least during a bad storm).
Comments:
Metro has been great in spuring densification near a number of its stops. Part of that is no doubt economic in nature, encouraged on by the local jurisdictions. Many of the inner suburbs are quite urban in feel and car use more of a liability than an asset. However the relative affluence of those areas in conjunction with the extremely dispursed nature of the high paying jobs further out in Tysons, Reston, and across the Potomac along I270 ensure those "urban residents" continued to use their cars. Immigrants, the poor and those working in DC proper would generally use Metro.
Then there is this whole issue with these "high density suburbs" that cluster about the landscape, places with urban levels of population density (residential and office towers) plunked down in a distinctly suburban land use patterns (single use zoning) transportation networks (hierarchical). I blogged that last summer, but my criticism still applies today.
It's an oldie, but goodie introduction to the "sucking chest wound" (as one of my commenters put it) that is metropolitan DC.
http://unplanning.blogspot.com/2005/07/high-rise-suburbia.html
The rest of the DC area beyond the Beltway is your garden variety sprawl with little use for public transportation (beyond subsistance level bus service for the indigent, elderly or immigrant). With the metro "boundaries" reaching to the mountains in the west, the bay in the east and damn near to Fredricksburg in the south, no amount of "public transportation" will rectify this mess. At least here in the West, topography generally has limited the extent of our sprawl. Not so there.
Although I left the area in 92 and the East in 96, my family still lives in NoVA so I get to periodically reaccquaint myself with some of the many reasons I left the area when I go to visit.
It doesn't really work. People seeking fun go downtown by subway or car, and what you have is a long canyon of buildings, boiling in summer, freezing cold in winter, and massive traffic jams. No street life to speak of, no atmosphere.
http://www.globalairphotos.com/large/ON/Toronto/North_York/2002/114/2
It's still got no character, no cover from the icy cold winds or the blazing sun, no sense of the pedestrian. You feel completely marginalised by the traffic. And I've never found a decent restaurant (maybe I am not looking hard enough).
Contrast that to the top of Avenue Road, where you still have the little shops and restaurants along the road and a neighbourhood feel.
Even Bathurst and York Mills has more character, albeit a bit spooky sometimes? My lawyer has his office in a strip mall up there.
The true part of this statement is that the freightyyards are gone. People think I'm strange when I wonder aloud if we will ever need freight yards back some day.
However, the rest of your statement is misleading. Of the 45 acres in the freightyard on the Arlington side (we call it the North Tract), about 28 acres will be devoted to a tremendous open-space recreation area with multiple gardens/parks, soccer fields, a world-class aquatics (swimming etc) facility and other indoor recreation. The exact mix isn't finalized, but the community process and designing is well underway and the funding is already secured through an 80 million dollar bond.
It's true that in the other 18 acres, there will be condo's offices, retail and perhaps some cultural facilities and these will all be connected into the North Tract Rec area as will the rest of Arlington though transit and yes, some parking will be provided.
This link will take you to the Arlington site where another link goes to the PDF task force report for the North Tract
http://tinyurl.com/lrfma
Arlington (which I lived in for a few years) always struck me as one of the hardest to classify areas in Northern Virginia. Alexandria, Fairfax, Prince William / Manassas, Loudoun / Leesburg - not hard to stereotype and fairly easy to predict what they would do. But Arlington? You just never knew - music and art, good food, mixed with fairly poor police and some clear distinctions between north and south.
Not sure what you mean about the police. I was upset when the new chief reduced the bicycle patrols because I thought it made them more approachable and the ones in crusiers tend to speed a bit much. But, they still are not bad at community relations as far as cops go.
Any TOD person should come out for the Clarendon Day party in the Clarendon Neighborhood of Arlington, Oct 21 - one of the many street festivals that Arlington has - food, bands, arts etc
Here are some pictures from last year:
http://www.beyonddc.com/privatesets/ClarendonDay05/
More info at the Alliance
http://www.clarendon.org/index.html
- it was built for commuters as a hub and spoke and now there is MUCH more demand for inter=city travel in DC as almost every neighborhood in DC is, or is becoming a destination where people live,work,shop and play (so there is much more demand to travel between these neighborhoods at non-commute times). This is also very true of the inner suburbs like where I live in Arlington.
- It is busting at the seams in terms of utilization. The off-peak times are where the peak-times were 20 years ago and the peak times are packed to the gills. Unfortunately, they made the decision when they built it to not easily allow for adding parallel track so the remedy is limited to adding longer trains (doable, but limited in effect), and making a spot improvement at the Orange/Blue line crossing at the potomac.
DC and the inner suburbs are adding residents quickly, however the biggest by far land-use problem is the lack of affordable housing. The desire to live in the city and in the close-in, walkable communities is so great that land prices have shot up many-fold over the last 10 years. This also is squeezing out independent retailers that gave the neighborhoods their character, being replaced by more national chains who can afford space renting at 40-60 a square foot when it used to be 4-10 a sq ft.Most of the people swarming back to the city are 20-30 somethings and 50-60 empty-nesters, but there are some with children as well and they are very active in the community. Arlington public schools are among the best in the country and that attracts a lot of people, also you can get a single family withing walking distance of your school, your daycare, the grocery, movie theatres' restaurants, the metro etc - although it will cost you from 800K and up. I live in such a house but it was bought 10 years ago when it was a third the price.
The outer suburbs are a completel different story. Whereas DC and the inner suburbs put land-use and zoning in place when the metro was constructed to turn the areas around the metro into mixed-use villages, the outer suburbs did very little planning and mostly reacted to the increasing number of single family houses that ate up their farmlands by building and widening roads. Their metro stops are basically parking lots. Now Tysons Corner, the most inner of the outer suburbs is trying to become a real downtown since they may get a metro extension, but I'm not too optimistic. They will have lots of office, retail and residential, but the form of the development and street network will not be very urban. The attitude of their community is still focussed on people driving rather than making a great place for people first.
I wrote this fast, so apologies for typos etc.
http://www.fairfaxcounty.gov/dpz/tysonscorner/nofind/Drftgridconcepts.pdf
It remains to be seen how successful this endevor will be. If we maintain a degree of order for another 5-10 years as our energy supplies begin to contract -OR- we begin a wholesale re-engineering of our cities in expectation of said decline, then I think Tysons may be kindof neat a decade from now. Otherwise this planning process will grind on until the collapsing economy kills it off and squatters inhabit the abandoned structures. Who knows. I'm just glad I am not there to witness it.
In anycase, I agree Arlington is an attractive place in general. I've been there a number of times (mostly via Metro) and enjoyed myself. Too bad the rest of the area is not like that or even better, DC proper.
A winning argument is one that convinces people, not one that you think should convince people. Failing to understand that fundamental difference is why normal people write you off...
...no matter how many elitist ad hominems you resort to.
Most of the highly-rated serious comments on Slashdot were of the form "for reason X, I don't think their analysis is correct." If your response to reasonable skepticism is to complain about how stupid Slashdotters must be, then perhaps you have less of an investment in empiricism and more of an investment in faith than you're willing to admit.
If you look at the comments now, they really aren't all that bad. This has to do with the way comments are rated and displayed on the site. If you scroll half-way down the comments, down to where comments with a rating of 1 or 2 start appearing, their will be plenty of chaff with your wheat, but the highly rated comments (which means that Slashdot readers saw their value) really aren't that bad.
Although Slashdot's comment rating scheme is far from perfect, I often wish that TOD had something similar.
It seems like it all comes down to ignorance. Smart people don't like to admit their ignorance any more than anyone else, so they take logical shortcuts that support their gut feelings - whether optimisic or pessimistic.
Myself, I KNOW I'm arguing from a POV of expecting scarcity in a world that says otherwise. For people who expect abundance, there's NO argument that will convince the future will be otherwise. I imagine if every debate could continue in depth, both sides would have to conclude we just don't know exactly what the facts are.
I don't know how to effectively "argue ignorance" to promote concern and defensive responses, but it seems all I can do. Of course the optimists have FAITH the people in-the-know will keep things humming, and give us fair warning if there's a problem. I'm curious about that too, but my explanation is most technical people are not looking at the bigger picture, but only three steps ahead in their little corner.
I think Heinberg, Simmons, and Hirsh are all pretty good at the ignorance argument, while Campbell, and others who try to PREDICT get into more trouble with the "crying wolf" risks, not that prediction is bad, just that it must somehow state every other sentence its limits.
At this point in time it may turn out that peak oil will be simply an interesting transition period. My own country, Australia, cut petrol consumption by 5% in one year of oil prices above $60/barrel. There are numerous technologies and social constructs available to replace Oil for transportation or at least to use it far more efficiently.
I think for the most part the slashdot crowd see Yet Another Set of Profits of Doom and yawn. Been there, down that.
It's not that I don't think we have a problem, I do. I'm just rather optimistic that it will be solved in various reasonably unpainful ways.
They even discredit their fellow geeks (geologists) and won't listen to those in the know. Oh well, when we start having natural gas issues in the US in a few more years, their PCs will be the first to "powerdown."
I guess we know better now, eh? Sad.
The Slashdot posters are in the technofix camp. Because they have grown up with that model "always" working. They live on and off the upper parts of the energy consumption world.
If they can make it work, more power to them, and no skin off my nose.
It is not like the future is cast in stone.
Lets say there is a 'magical working' POOF energy source.
Any highly energetic energy source has a history of being a destructive explosive also.
If the world became awash in excessive energy, will man spend alot of that energy attempting to mittigate environmental damage - or just keep the consumption party going?
The tendency of energy sources to be bombs and the consumption-biosphere degradation cycle still looks to me like a skinned, broken or shot off nose.
FWIW, I think the slashdot crowd might be unschooled on oil depletion, but I think there's something to be said for being open to answers ... whatever they prove to be.
"if energy_crisis, do whatever_works"
Also, while SDers can deliver good commentary on computer related topics, their knowledge (and appreciation) of other fields is not always that deep.
Ironically, Peak Oil is likely to occur also around 2013!
Because if it doesn't the future could really be an abstraction.
We'll make an interesting archaeology Phd thesis for some future visitor from another civilisation.
Oh, and don't take anything personally over there.
No one denies that resources of fossil fuels are finite. Note that resource indicates the total endowment of a mineral (metals, non-metals or energy fuels) on earth, which is clearly finite in a geologically short timespan. The concept of reserves takes a moment longer to understand. Reserves basically represent how much of a particular mineral resource (let's say oil) is known with a degree of certainty, and economically viable to extract at the current price. There are two key elements here...
- that the reserve is known;
- it is economic at current prices.
Reserve data are highly mutable... if the oil price were to drop to US$20/bbl for WTI the world reserve base instantly declines, while a rise in prices achieves the opposite. If oil companies spend more dollars on exploration the known reserve base will also increase as new fields are discovered (e.g. the massive field recently discovered in the Gulf of Mexico, which is only economic at our currently highish price of oil).If one takes a couple minutes perusing the BP oil slides one notices a very interesting one. Despite oil consumption relentlessly increasing over the last few decades, the oil reserves to consumption ratio graph shows that we have had a reserve/production ratio of 40 years for the last two decades. That is to say that we have enough known reserves to supply the world oil needs at current production rates for 40 years. And guess what, at the much lower consumption rates of 20 years ago the picture was exactly the same.
What does this tell you? There is no incentive for oil companies to map out the next 200 years worth of oil reserves. It would be wasted exploration funds that could be better spent elsewhere. They spend the funds to keep the reserve inventory nicely stocked (40 years is a nice comfortable margin) and then attend to spending funds elsewhere.
I haven't even talked about substitution effects here. In my opinion, I think it far more likely that the world will have substituted away from non-renewable fossil fuels due to global warming concerns, long before any threat of Peak Oil rears its ugly head.
Separately, but related, some day the techno-freaks are going to have to come to terms with the un-paid-for costs of technology: water resource damage, loss of biodiversity, etc, etc.
The second piece of evidence that would put the above "40 years supply rule" in question is that every year's oil consumption is only replaced with 1/3 as much reserves addition. I suspect the BP figures may include oil sources that are technologies that will never be brought to market like oil shale. Furthermore, the reserve numbers of nearly every OPEC member has grown by a factor of two in the 1990's without explaination by further exploration or reanalyzing exploration data. This lack of transparency (recently rescinded by Kuwait when they cut their oil reserves in half after reexamining data) shows that current world reserves are questionable.
The last important factor in peak oil is production capability. Saudi Aramco is working like there is no tomorrow to increase capacity from 10 MBPD to 12 MBPD and it will cost many tens of billions of $$$. How are they ever going to reach the 18 MBPD figure the EIA says KSA will have to reach to satisfy world needs by 2025? And I have not even brought up the issue of costs both in environmental remediation and actual dollars to bring any oil shale to market. Most of the oil shale deposits, which many optimists like to count as reserves, will likely remain forever "horizon technologies", never being brought to market because the cost of production continually goes up as fast or faster than the value of the resource.
'Do Reserves Tell Us Anything?'
http://www.theoildrum.com/story/2006/4/26/18109/8251
IMO reserves are at best a SWAG.
Oil has a very low price elasticity of supply. There is very little more oil available at $75/barrel than at $25/barrel.
One example. Compare 1972 Texas with 1982 Texas. Price increased by a factor of 10. Record drilling boom, result 14% more producing wells AND -30% less production.
A decade is "long enough" for any price elasticity effects to take hold. New technology was developed and used.
Today, Texas produces about 25% of what it did in 1972. And $100/barrel will not increase that to 27%. (Natural decline will offset any production increases due to higher prices in any time frame).
Saudi Arabia is VERY close to where Teas was in 1972. They are frantically drilling, on and off-shore. But decreases due to depletion are likely to balance any new wells.
Mexico will produce less next year, and even less in 2008, 2009 ... regardless of price. $300/barrel will not make Mexican oil production in 2009 greater than 2005.
The quantity of oil produced in 2025 is difficult to forecast (lower than today in convential production for sure) but there are uncertainites on what could develop in 18.5 years. OTOH, production in 2013 is not subject to as many uncertainities. Major new projects that will go on-line by then have to be either started by today or in VERY serious planning.
Best Hopes,
alan
However, most (though not all - look at junked tire mounds as left over crude) oil if pumped by the human race is now adding C02 to the atmosphere.
These are not trivial differences, though for a lot people with an economic bent, they don't seem to exist at all.
Roger Bentley: Global Oil and Gas Depletion
...which comes about through using "proven reserves" to represent future ultimate recovery when they absolutely don't show that, their use this way leads to the flawed economic view of oil.
Bulldust, I would be interested to hear you opinions on the Bentley paper.
Personally I would not classify individuals into groups this way for the sake of casually dismissing their arguments holistically (though one might debate I did this with my original post :). Roger points out several flaws with commonly quoted data. Clearly we have an imperfect view of what lies under the surface of the earth. I think we all agree on this point.
The point I was trying to raise is that resources are not known, and there are many factors at play at any given point in time (let alone across several decades of history) that affect what is economically viable to extract (i.e. reserves). The fact that we don't have good data for reserves does not mean that the concept of reserves and resources is a poor one... it just means we have a poor measurement of them.
Given that we have a poor measure of the ultimate potential of the earth to yield any particular resource, is it not virtually impossible to predict with any degree of accuracy when the turning point will eventuate in the production of said resource?
Just some thoughts... I may have to dust off Hubbert for a little review, it's been a while.
PS> Roger Bentley is the Technology Director for Whitfield Solar (http://www.whitfieldsolar.com/).
But what will happen once that threshold is crossed is something one ought to worry about. Because the change will be dramatic.
Is peak oil 2005, 2025 or 2050?
I lean towards the middle date. But that is not a long time to think about alternatives (it's also there or there abouts the point of complete no return on Global Warming-- if we haven't crossed that already).
I see that you have been taken in by the MSM and the 50% owner Chevron. To quote from the 25% owner, Statoil of Norway,
......
Test results are very encouraging and may indicate a significant discovery. The full magnitude of the field's potential is still being defined.
Statoil and its partners plan to drill another appraisal well in the Jack structure in 2007.
and
The partners [Devon, Statoil & Chevron] plan to drill another appraisal well at the site in the Walker Ridge Block in 2007. A decision whether to develop Jack may be made in 2007 or 2008, Statoil's Mellbye said. The [Jack] field would start production in 2013 IF development goes ahead, he said...
My emphasis added
.......
Please note that Statoil is 5/8ths owned by the Kingdom of Norway and they are less interested than Chevron in impacting US public perceptions and elections.
The discovery, a mixture of oil & gas, for the entire field, not just Jack, is 3 to 15 billion barrels of oil EQUILAVENT. This makes it a large but not a massive discovery. A few months of world oil consumption plus a lot of natural gas.
Again it is NOT a "massive" discovery !
Best Hopes,
Alan
This post is not on reserves or resources, it has no pretensions on leading with that, it just projects into the future current trends in consumption and production.
This is a well known phenomenon, in the case of the US, R/P is 10 years since the 1920s, which of course leaves you clueless on the peak in 1970 and the subsequent decline. Considering that consumption is changing globally R/P is quite a valueless measure.
The work of Hubbert allows us today to project in the future the curve of production without knowing the Ultimate Recoverable Reserves. Moreover URR is an output of the Hubbert Method not and input. For more on this please read prof. Deffeyes' "Beyond Oil".
Going back to the 40 years R/P, that assumes an URR of about 1200 Gb for Liquids (Crude + NGPL). Crude Remaining Reserves stand today at 800 Gb, after peaking in 1979 at 1100 Gb. So that leaves you with 400 Gb in Remaining Reserves of NGPL, how plausible is that?
Peak Oil is about Production, not about Reserves. Crude Reserves peaked in 1979; what we are searching here at TOD is the Peak in Crude and Liquids Production.
If you are so interested in reserves I invite you to read Jean Laherrère's "Peak oil and related peaks!":
Part 1
Part 2
I shall skip your insulting insinuation that we don't know what reserves are. Read the Bentley paper that Chris recommends above.
As a mineral economist, you present the oversimplified arguments -- like the IEA -- that oil just magically appears solely as a function of price. You have missed at least four salient points -- there are others, as well --
I could go on, talking about marginal costs because the easy-to-produce oil that built the world you inhabit is gone, etc. For now, just keep these rules of thumb, stated by geologist Greg Croft, in mind
The peak of global oil considers the topping out of production. There are hydrocarbons everywhere and you are right, some are economic to produce at a certain price. But others will never get produced at any price or their production is very hard regardless of price. Consider Kashagan in Kazahkstan. When this field was discovered in 2000, various estimates put its recoverable reserves at anywhere between 9 and 17 Gb (billions of barrels). Right now, the view is that there is a 13.4 Gb URR. However, due to the geological and physical context of the discovery, the world has never seen a barrel of oil from there yet and the date at which that is scheduled to happen keeps moving further and further out into the future. We will see some flows from Kashagan -- but how much and in what timeframe? That is a peak oil question.
I have dealt with all this, as has Stuart Staniford, HO and others. You can click on any of our names in the right side-bar and read through the various stories we have published. But you probably won't because, unlike Dr. James Hamilton, an excellent economist, you appear to be one of those Cornucopian economists that thinks the "free market" will always provide. It is just a question of price, right? That's how they teach in school.
I think you may have wandered on to the wrong site. The key proponents of peak oil on this site are well versed with knowledge of the industry, economics, engineering, and oil specific geology. Whether there are some people jumping on the bandwagon is irrelevant. On this site, you are required to confront some formidable experts, including some who have spent decades in the oil industry.
Your discussion of reserves is pedantic, at best, and hardly needs to be pointed out to most of the people who frequent this site. Again, I think you may have mistaken this site for those sites which consist mostly of neophytes.
As to the substitution effect, thus far we have mainly exercised that option by substituting foreign oil for domestic oil. Higher prices did little or nothing to stem the tide of peak oil within the U.S. We continue to slide.
Yes, there are all kinds of potential substitutions. It does not necessarily follow, however, that these subsitutions will be sufficiently inexpensive to run a world wide energy intensive economy without wrecking the planet with global warming. One of the popular subsitutions is coal. Ironically, oil is and was a substitution for coal. Now we are going backwards at great environmental cost. Just because we get substitutions doesn't mean we are making progress.
Where the depletion curve is a smooth time curve up to the right (time t on the X axis, price p on the Y axis).
The problems are:
- uncertainty. Solow says that the last barrel or pound of an exhaustible resource, will be consumed at the moment when the price hits infinity.
But we don't know when that is. So our assumptions about developing alternative supplies may be wrong. The actual price path could be extremely jagged.
- substitutability. the model also predicts alternative sources will come in, as prices rise.
To some extent (Canadian oil sands) that is happening. Conversely, it's pretty clear there aren't enough substitute technologies now to substitute for even a significant fraction of our oil and gas consumption (other than coal, which has its own set of issues).
So if oil production ceases rising, or even just doesn't rise as fast as we think it will, the price of oil could go to the stratosphere.
The other point, which Deffyes makes very well (and why his first book is worth a read), and so does Simmons (see the powerpoints on Simmons & Co website) is that higher prices does not lead to higher (conventional) production. US real oil prices have been far higher post 1972 than pre 1972, but domestic lower 48 oil production peaked in 1972 and has followed a remorseless slide since.
This despite the greatest revolution in oilfield drilling since the late 19th century: horizontal drilling and real time 3D imaging.
So the smartest people in the world, with the best equipment, have dug more wells in the US than ever before in history, and found less oil and gas. Despite the highest real prices ever experienced.
that should give one pause on cornucopian arguments about conventional oil and gas supplies.
It looks like we are well up that Hotelling curve.
I would dispute that. Given the massive increases in energy efficiency by going with electrified rail, wind and other renewables (geothermal, some more hydro, solar PV even) OR just conservation could supply the electricity to replace, say, half the oil used for transprtation easily.
Most recent data has 0.17% of US electricity going for transportation. NYC's 8,000 subway cars, Amtrak's Northeast corridor, Chicago, Boston, DC Metro, SF BART, and every other existing urban rail system = 0.17%
Multiple by a factor 50 and new renewables could still "carry the load" with a 20 year build up in both electrified rail and renewable production (or conservation, or both).
Best Hopes,
Alan
One of the most moving moments of the BBC TV series 'People's Century' stories by the people who survived the 20th century:
http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/peoplescentury/
is when the credits roll - the camera rolls up a street that could be 1910 Vienna with the streetcars (trams), it keeps running down that street...
it rolls on into the nightmare of the trenches...
and then the slums of the 30s...
and then the devastated war torn cities of Europe...
and past the guard tower at Auschwitz...
and towards the Berlin Wall... and at the end, the break in that wall.
----------------------
Those trams are a symbol of a world that once was, a closer, tighter world, of Vienna cafes and dance halls in Potsdammer Place in Berlin.
Why not now? The costs of new lines are phenomenal, and the economics never work out without heavy state subsidy.
The TTC's proposed St. Clair "streetcar right-of-way" (reservation) would upgrade the existing St. Clair streetcar line, currently running in mixed traffic, for 6.7 km (4.2 miles), from Yonge St. to west of Keele St. - an improvement expected increase the streetcar service's speed (6 minutes per end-to-end trip) and safety, and to attract significantly higher ridership. The projected cost of Canadian $65 million (US $52 million, or about $12 million/mile) includes replacing the line's worn trackage, construction to rehabilitate crumbling infrastructure, plus streetscaping, parks, lighting, and other urban amenities added to win public approval.
[Toronto Sun, 30 Sep. 2004; Eye, 29 May 2004]
$12m bucks a mile, for a service that is already there.
We are too spread out, and too devoted to personal transport.
Electrification? Maybe. Don't see it, but if there was a crisis...
Build the Desire Streetcar Line on North Rampart Street (edge of French Quarter, uber-historic) with a 36' wide (now 20') neutral ground (median to y'all), one traffic lane & one bicycle lane on each side vs two traffic lanes as part of a city streetrebuilding project. The street was "scheduled" to be rebuilt @2015 (last rebuild ~1905), but we would move that up. Use historic lights as streetcar trolley wire supports.
Marginal cost if combined with street rebuilding ? About $1 million for 1.5 miles for track & overhead supports. Mayor Nagin was going to announce this ~45 days after Katrina as part of his re-election effort. (I do good smart things that you like, vote for me).
This effort has survived but has to wait for more immediate rebuilding efforts.
You make it sound like $12 million a mile is expensive. Just look at the costs of road projects & maintenance !
Or the $5 trillion plan by Hirsch, Bezdek & Wendling !
$5 trillion would buy 416,667 miles of streetcar lines.
BTW, Portland has developed technique (I took class @ Portland State on it) to build streetcar track for $300 per foot. I think that any urgent/crash effort should involve learning how to build cheaper (& better).
I had a draft letter for DC DOT to send to New Orleans proposing such a collabrative effort when Katrina hit. At my suggestion, a DC DOT engineer joined me at the Portland State short course.
There is much unmeet demand for specific lines (~$120 billion) in the US. All these lines are worth building in a post-Peak Oil scenario. Start there and expand, modifying as one develops the infrastructure.
France is building a tram line in almost every city of 250,000 and two lines in cities of 500,000. (Voting correctly helps). The US could to.
Some bad investments in suburban sprawl may not make it but ...
Best Hopes,
Alan
I think you are talking about NGPL (or Natural Gas Plant Lqiuid) and not LNG which is Liquid Natural Gas. BP numbers are not "all liquids" but Crude Oil + lease condensate + NGPL. They do not include "Other liquids" such as Oxygenates and refinery gains.
You're right. The non-specified liquids are derived from Oil Shale, Tar Sands, Heavy Oil and Deepwater Oil.
Terrific writeup! I just posted on Reddit to help bring more eyeballs to gaze upon this masterpiece. I was hoping to go to bed here in a few minutes, but now I know I will restlessly toss and turn considering the ramifications arising from the importing countries' predicaments.
Bob Shaw in Phx,Az Are Humans Smarter than Yeast?
Figure 23 defines the export peak as opposed to the production peak. It shows two things -- subject to leaving out Iraq, Nigeria and Angola.
The most important conclusion is this:
Unfortunately, here I must differ with you. Oil wealth is disproportionately shared in the exporting countries and does not necessarily lead to greater affluence there leading to higher internal consumption rates. In fact, there is the "curse of oil wealth" which paradoxically creates poverty & social dependency in exporting nations. This is because oil wealth drives out other domestic industries, creates large foreign worker contingencies and is dominated by corruption. These -- and other factors -- comprise the "curse". There are many references on this subject.Still, the transfer of money you discuss does take place -- the disagreement is over whether that wealth will drive up consumption in the exporting countries.
How will this play out? I believe that -- as you surmise -- the "importers collapse from lack of new wealth to transfer". This contributes to recession because it is like a "tax" on the importers, which leads to lower demand in the those nations. I discuss in The Specter of Recession. There, I argued that there is good reason to believe that the OECD countries are already in deep trouble. It ties in nicely with your post.
There is much to say about all this which I will not attempt to do off the top of my head. Good job.
-- Dave
All data point to an increase in consumption in exporting countries from 2002 to 2005, the only exception is Denmark.
Poor or rich they all spend more oil. I'm particularly familiar with the situation in Angola, in spite of the democratic process being suspended and corruption being endemic, consumption is simply skyrocketing.
I would agree with you if the data pointed that way.
Look at the FSU (Russian, Kazakhstan, Azerbaijan), Mexico, Malaysia, Ecuador, Argentina, Columbia, Venezuela -- mostly flat. Look at Algeria, Kuwait, UAE, Algeria -- modest internal consumption growth. Exceptions? Saudi Arabia, Qatar, Kuwait and Iran.
Sorry, but I don't believe you can extrapolate your change rates into the future. Look for an "S-shaped" curve in many cases -- and be mindful of the scale.
I may extrapolate fixed rates into the future; I'll just have to be careful with the conclusions taken.
As for the S-curve, maybe another time (a not so simplistic one).
P.S.: Remember that in a limited zone of the S-curve the rate looks like fixed.
PS: sure in a limited scale the S-shape looks flat. See the EIA data below.
best --
S-shaped at these scales
would be S-shaped if it went back further in time, I think
mature country, here you are seeing the tail end of the S-shape
just plain flat, really
mature country, same as Mexico, actually down since 1995
I promise the next time I won't use simple fixed rates. But for now that's what we have.
In some cases the governments of oil producing countries have embarked on economic development like expanded airlines and tourist destination (Dubai of UAE). These factors will lead to higher internal oil consumption, unless the price of oil drops to a point where these countries cannot afford to "spread the oil wealth".
I'm all for $5/gallon motor fuel tomorrow (and I'm a US citizen, never lived elsewhere). Unfortunately, I'm not sure that's high enough, soon enough.
- The kleptocratic model : an elite which controls state apparatus and the oil industry, confiscates most of the oil wealth, and does not even seek to maximize national profit (corruption favours sweetheart deals with foreign oil companies). There is little trickle-down economic development because they tend to invest their money outside the producing country. This, I submit, is the model which produces a maximal proportion of export with respect to production. Examples include Nigeria, Congo/Brazzaville, Khazakhstan...
- The distributive model : the government, of whatever form (democratic or enlightened despotism), seeks to maximize local economic development from oil wealth. Mechanisms may include : striking harder bargains with oil companies or nationalising production; subsidising local prices for oil products; massive investment in education and economic development.
I have a feeling that the distributive model is spreading, which will tend to accelerate the decline of net exports. Countries which have changed their orientation would seem to include Venezuela, Saudi Arabia, Angola, arguably Russia?The economic interest of oil-consuming nations will be to favour the kleptocratic model. Democracy in the Congo is bad for business.
If you look at the dispersion of wealth, income life expectancies, I am not even sure you could include Texas and Oklahoma in the above. Dubai is probably in here somewhere. UK and Netherlands in there too, maybe.
Kleptocratic model: everyone else. See especially Angola, Sudan, Nigeria, KSA, all the oil states.
Maybe third model:
Populist - give the money away, whilst you have it, to buy political popularity. Bolivia, Venezuela.
And, credit to westtexas for raising the issue some time ago.
This certainly explains the price increases in 05/06, but not the recent decline, even accepting that volatile means down as well as up. It is interesting that every source talks about large world wide stocks, when the truth is that oecd stocks, which includes the US, are at a ten-year low, and down 30mmb from a year ago per eia. While no doubt influenced by the logical crash in NA ng stocks, the odd combination lends some credence to manipulation, eg at goldman, which I earlier pooh-poohed.
It does explain all if you consider prof. Deffeyes being right on is Queue Theory for energy prices.
Oil as a driving mechanism of the global economy first raised the US's economic boat as we were the largest exporter of oil for quite some time, even taking oil from other countries and adding that wealth to our own. As our production slowed and others picked up and as others nationalized their production, the US has been eating into its bank of stored oil wealth on its great consumer binge.
As other countries go through the same process we did, they will go through their consumer binge, and we, the US, will slide down the economic bannister and become just another third world country. The tide shifts.
That this would happen always seemed a given if you simply followed the logic and assumed that economic rules apply to everyone and that humans remain humans even if they live outside of the US. (For an American, that may be difficult to believe.)
I appreciate the time you took to prove the sun rises in the east, but come on, who couldn't figure out, with a cursory glance at history, that oil/energy-producing economies grow?
That wasn't the purpose of this post.
Actually, once again, I feel compelled to point out that we arent at peak oil production at all by historical standards. We have had 3 of these 'peaks' in the last decade. The only reason this one gets so much attention is because of Stuart and the timing with Deffeyes rant.
But on a lighter not, I've started sharpening some stones as I expect to be ahead of the game when we return to the stoneage in 2020, al la Deffeys!
This was several years ago when Bush was pushing tax cuts and the Dems were insisting on a tax increase on the top 1%. It gets a lot of preasure because over 1/3 of the people think it will directly affect them.
sigh
I think that is somewhat of a naive statement. Any economic rules that exist in this game are made up as the players move along. OPEC, the US and all involved stakeholders act in underhanded methods to accomplish what they want. It is not so simple as "the US is out of oil" and will become a third world country. Simply we have a 100 year headstart on much of the world economically and militarily. I see no sign in the current administration or any future administration that we will concede powers. Also we have a lot of coal and nukes.
So in the future cherenkov you may have to use ethanol or synthetic diesel to burn your flag, but that flag will still fly over a superpower.
Break down in simple terms how you get from where we are now to 1/3 of the US population living in New Delhi conditions. I think well before that occurs global warming will make canada build a border fence for their immigration problem.
matt
But probably will be unable to direct that military power overseas. Much of the US military hardware is deplendant of fossile fuels. The two branches of the US military that is can affectively deliver military power overseas are the US Air Force and the US Navy. The US Air force is 100 percent dependant of liquid fossil fuels and only a minor fraction of the US Navy's surface fleet is Nuclear powered. The rest use liquid fossil fuels. US carriers are nuclear powered but the planes are not.
While its possible to produce liquid fuels from FT, the US military is deplendant on the US economy for logistical support. I believe it will be very difficult for the US to project military power overseas effectively once imports fall below 20 to 25%.
Finally if an major fuel shortages occur in the US, the US military may be required to to maintain law and order which could prevent ground troop deployment overseas.
And the issue will be - what will be the reaction of the poor?
$5K vs $30K (Payouts to be 'on the dole' VS prision cost). A 'smart move'. But in a low energy economy, how will the $5K payouts keep happening, and how shall the $30K payments to 'non-productive or energy sinks' be maintainted?
I don't see how this all ends well.
http://www.miami.com/mld/elnuevo/15718987.htm
Instability there should continue to be interesting, energy-wise, for neighboring countries.
Also, while Chavez is still the favorite for December, Manuel Rosales is now a serious challenger in Venezuela:
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/entertainment/6036331.stm
As everyone already knows, the opposition is capable of absalutely anything in that country, including shutting down the oil industry. If this election is at all close, things could get ugly.
Sorry, wrong link:
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/americas/4801521.stm
I remember watching on Univision the first time they took Chavez out of power. That was a fun night of television. It was cool when he came flying back in in his helicopter.
If anyone is currently in Miami and looks hispanic, just hang out on a street corner somewhere. The CIA might pick you up and ask you to run one of these countries.
"Survivalists?" Sounds like Paris and Nicole are preparing for peak oil...big time.
Does anyone else see Oil CEO's hand in all of this?
The Beatles will have the first song on my First album. I'll even let AlphaProphet request a few. And no, Paris will not get preferential treatment.
Everybody is always blown away. And I get Everybody Dancing. Oh, I got the shit dude. And I got the technical skills to actually use Nero and iTunes and all that crap. Unlike the rest of yuse. Who are you kidding?
Plus. And this is the dirty little secret. Post peak. There ain't gonna be no music.
Anyway, my first song is called.
Everybody's Got Something To Hide Except For Me And My Monkey
Thank You George
Let us look at the record:
WWI - kept out of it until the Germans had exhausted themselves against Britain and France.
WWII - Germany was defeated singlehandedly by Russia, so the US gets no credit for that at all. An almost honorable mention though for the defeat of Japan (which just goes to show the Japanese were far less formidable opponents than political mythology pretends).
Korean War - a 'draw'.
Vietnam - outright defeat.
Gulf War I - blew up a lot of conscripts with no interest in fighting. Technically a great victory.
Gulf War II - after proclaiming an illusory victory, the US is finding its clueless troops control little of the country and are subjected to hundreds of attacks every day from populations which universally revile them. It is virtually certain that the US will leave Iraq within years, again defeated as in Vietnam.
Afghanistan - once again, a proclamation of 'victory' without any actual control of the country. The US is desperately trying to rope in some other suckers to take the punches: the British, the Canadians, and even the Germans.
In fact, with the notable exception of the defeat of Japan, the US has only engaged in war with very weak countries, and has lost a surprising fraction of those wars. Victory in the Philippines, defeat in Vietnam, Somalia (and Afghanistan and Iraq).
Please understand: superficial appearances to the contrary (money spent plus a lot of hot air), the US is not and has never been an effective military power - by contrast with the British, the Germans, the Russians and the French. (No laughing please - the French invented modern war. Napoleon, anyone?) Indeed, the prime lesson of the US military is how useless the physical material of power is when it is applied in an entirely clueless fashion. So much stuff, so little accomplished.
Do not look to the US military to preserve US dominance. That is an illusory hope. Unless you intend to nuke the whole planet, in which event I will grant you do have an unparalleled advantage.
Seriously its amazing how many people believe we defeated the Nazis. Russia turned back the Germans at Stalingrad at the beginning of 1943, 18 months before the Normandy invasion. By June of 1944 most German soldiers were heading west (to surrender to someone more sympathetic than the Russians)
Secondly operations on the 'Western Front' caused huge losses to the German military - for example few people now recall that more axis troops were captured (180,000) in the final month of the North African campaign than was the case at Stalingrad.
Clearly Germany suffered its worth casualties on the Eastern Front, but its ultimate defeat within the 6 year scope of WW2 had as much to do with being forced to either plan for or actually fight a war on two fronts (four if you include the Italian and Home fronts (the bomber war for example tied up over a million servicemen and the greater proportion of the artillery and Luftwaffe arms)).
The coastal defenses in the west also needs to be taken into account, it wasn't easy to launch the biggest amphibian invasion in history against the most heavily defended coastline in history. Most europeans should be glad they did though, if russian soldiers had been allowed to push the germans back all the way to the Bay of Biscay I think Soviet influence in western Europe would have been higher, to put it mildly. The relentless bombing campaigns over germany in the final stages of the war was, although mostly aimed at terrorizing the population, also quite damaging to the war effort. Albert Speer writes in his memoirs that he thought the people in charge of the airforce on both sides was incompetent, the allies because they didn't bomb crucial targets like the ball bearing factories without wich the whole Wehrmacht would grind to a halt, and the luftwaffe because hitler insisted that fighters should be deployed on the western front, not in Germany where they could have done some good attacking the flying fortresses.
All in all Europe has alot to thank the US for, unless ofcourse one thinks the world would have been a better place had the Germans won the war, or been defeated by the Soviets alone.
Interestingly, the russians played an important part in conquering the Japanese as well, when they were finished in germany they moved a couple million soldiers east via the transsiberian railway and forced the japanese out of China. I suppose they had an old debt to settle after the war of 1905.
Aachen was one of the most brutal city battles fought anywhere in WWII. Hurtgen Forest will go down in history as one of the worst slugfests ever staged.
The reasons we underestimate the Russian sacrifice:
- Stalin's propaganda machine and penchant for secrecy. The true scope of the Russian losses (25 million) have been hidden until relatively recently, and of course any admission of the mistakes made.
The archives have only recently become open, and now Putin's mob are closing them again.
- Western Cold War rhetoric - if you are fighting WW III against someone, it's not nice to admit that they were actually heroes, and pretty good soldiers and generals
For a nice visualisation of the losses in the respective theatres during WW2 take a look at http://users.erols.com/mwhite28/ww2-loss.htm
Their military is utterly crack. Especially the Marines, but through and through they are consummate professionals, with access to overwhelming power and technology.
The USN and USAF have technological leads over any potential enemy which are practically insurmountable, and first class people to fly the planes and do the missions.
Ignoring what the US forces went through in WWII, and what they achieved, and in Korea. Whether they were late or not, they became good soldiers and dealt heavy blows to their enemies.
In a practical hands on sense, the Israelis are better (more experience, and the best in society have a role in the military). Arguably the British have more skill in low intensity warfare (but we are dissippating our military like a wasting asset, these regimental 'reforms' are probably the last straw).
But you put technology, firepower and skill on the battlefield, and the Americans are top dog.
Don't disagree that in 'modern' history, other nations have proven themselves on the battlefield and in war: France, Germany, Russia, Vietnam, China, Israel, Britain, Finland to name a few.
What the US military cannot do is successfully pacify or occupy a territory. The methods used to do this are not possible because of political or social restraints. If the US had the garrison in Iraq that it had in Japan at the end of WWII, I very much doubt we would be hearing much about successful insurgency. That is a political restraint. The other option would be to go the Mongol approach and kill every man, woman and child in the country. I think we can consider that one a social limitation(Thank God).
Any nuclear power/alliance with nuclear weapons can pretty well ensure that even America's superpower status is meaningless at anything beyond the level of deterrence and assured mass death - I don't think the U.S. will be invading Russia for oil any time soon, even if Russia is a second rate has been, sliding into a decrepit future - at least, that is what I read when I also read about America being so dominant. But though America is unlikely to be able to sieze major chunks of the former Soviet Union with oil reserves, I am pretty sure the Russians can - being biggest and most hyped doesn't really count much compared to reality.
Of course, the countries which actually know that there are things more useful than military power are creating the infrastructure which may help them survive more comfortably into the future. And quite honestly - the waste of American military equipment in the desert is hard to imagine, unless you look at the scale of waste in America's last long distance war.
America is a profoundly wasteful society, and generally, that is a proven strategy to avoid long term survival. Worse, America's priorities always seem so misdirected - as Bismarck is reputed to have remarked "God protects little children, drunks, and the United States of America." At some point, even God loses patience.
Remember it is older as a country than Germany, Italy at the very least.
Whether it will continue to do so is another question. I would say that relative to Europe it has expanding demographics, whereas Europe has static or contracting demographics.
The US is also a higher productivity economy, with a lower unemployment rate, and a higher standard of living.
All armies and wars are colossally inefficient. In 10,000 sorties, and a billion dollars of munitions, the Israelis managed to destroy $10bn of Lebanese capital investment, and not incidentally kill hundreds or thousands of civilians.
The risks are simply that the US can't adapt to an era of much more expensive energy. But history has shown the US people and economy to be incredibly adaptable.
My own concern is more fundamental. The world is emitting enough CO2 to radically alter the climate, and the US is leading that emission. If we don't do something to slow down and halt this process, we may not have a planet left to bicker over.
This is one of my conclusions from having grown up during the late 1960s on, and watching the same patterns recur.
I think a lot of things Americans believe and say about themselves is cheap. What counts is what they do, and in that, I tend to agree with Kunstler - America has committed the greatest misallocation of resources in history.
And the amount of wasted effort likely to be spent in keeping that investment going will cost everyone on the planet - Iraq is only a foretaste, and climate change hasn't even started yet.
And yet, most people in the suburbs seem unable to concieve of any other way to live. This is not adaptability.
And the best companies, and the smartest people (but other places are catching up-- the majority of science Phds are by non-Americans, I believe), and the biggest, most flexible economy with the best record of innovation.
but
it's also the world's largest debtor nation. And one still in the grip of a housing and personal debt bubble. And an extremely low personal savings rate.
and its military is getting hopelessly overstretched and worn out.
and it has a hugely expensive and complex medical system-- more so than any other country and a serious burden on doing business. And a legal system that is very costly and expensive for business.
Not all its industries have proven to be adaptable-- look at the decline of the domestic car industry.
And a big fall in oil consumption is going to hurt the US more than other countries, in the sense that American society is geared around oil and distance.
I have seen this before though. When the Americans move on something, it happens. It is a great sleepy fat lazy selfish nation, but when it focuses on a goal, it achieves that goal... and shakes the world.
What it needs now is a leader who will say 'there, we must go'. Carter was derided for it.
John McCain? Hilary Clinton? Don't know. Don't see it in either of them, but they both could spring some surprises.
We are quite literally drenched in energy every day. We're just not so good at grabbing it... yet.
In the 21st we might say the same thing: about its vast resources of wind and solar power.
You mean Iraq, not Iran don't you ?
Best Hopes,
Alan
More reviewing required next time.
We will be unable to prevent iran from getting nukes, no matter how much huffing and puffing we do. Sadaam was, in retrospect, a pretty good foil for Iran. He's tanned and rested - you don't suppose we could put him back? Sorry, our bad... so, how fast can you boost production? Happy to loan some helicoptor gunships...
There is talk of an opec cut, maybe 1mmb/d. SA is resisting, but may go along because SA is paradoxically losing power, at least among opec. We are coming to the point that a few lesser producers can control world prices with a production cut. Kuwait, for example, is having an internal quarel over the level of their reserves and the appropriate maximum export volume... there is a distinct possibility that they will arbitrarily cut exports, maybe by 1/3.
PO, and the appropriate response, is, at least on an individual basis, no doubt being carefully reviewed by many exporters, maybe all long time exporters save SA. Pity the oil importing country I live in is not doing the same. The US does not export much that the oil exportering countries want, except perhaps arms. We look to be at an increasing disadvantage, as others have posted.
And food is always a "bedrock" export.
Best Hopes,
Alan
*Might have been another of the UAE.
Best Hopes,
Alan
Less they plan to relocate here in the US when production collapses. You'll know that trouble is immenment when suddenly a large number of Royal make surprise visits to the US and other western nations.
They have won the Preakness & Belmont but not the Kentucky Derby.
These horse farms typically have white (or black) lumber fences and have not seen the plow for generations. Top soil 1 to 3 feet deep (30 to 90 cm) Fertile ground if TSHTF.
Alan
The impact on economies and industries will be very varied. For motor car use, the short run price elasticity is very low - about 0.2%. Thus a 2% drop in gasolmine ùeans a 10% price increase. This will have a most damaging impact on those importing economies where the (Motor fuel)/GDP ratio is high. Worst culprit is the USA. The EU governments are much better preparedand working hard at getting better.
In France, water heating and space heating are moving rapidly to solar and heat pumps thanks to subsidies and state purchases which make change from gas to Heat pumps cost free to the consumer.
Air transport has a much higher price elasticity - about 2% for vacation travel. Business travel is most sensitive to the rate at which businesses are accumulating financial assets. In a recession, the airlines will see massive traffic falls.
Those regions that depend upon tourists arriving by air are heading for big trouble. Greece, Turkey, Spain will be most affected in Europe. Mexico, Canada, and the US in the Americas.
Places like Bali, Thailand and the Phillipines where locals cannot afford the resort prices will see their markets dissappear. Unfortunate but also necessary.
Those are my words.
The work of people like Robert Ayres and Charlie Hall shows that oil is responsible for more than half of the economic growth registered in industrialized countries in the XX century. A projected drop of 40% in exports cannot be a good thing... but of course some countries will fare better than others.
If you think that CO2 emitions are causing Global Warming you should not claim victory so fast and should start worrying about Coal.
And less food means less people.
So now you know.
Of course all this will be very good for Mother Earth in the long run but very bad for all the people and even the animals living on the earth. As people begin to starve, they will eat every wild thing they can catch, including chimps, gorillas and all great apes, including the most prolific great ape of all, Homo sapiens.
Ron Patterson
I sense a new cookbook niche opening up.
In fact, here's a pretty disturbing link on the topic from NK, with testimony from the famine period 1996-1997.
It's not Soylent Green, but the behaviour is far from uncommon throughout history.
What perhaps is shocking is the world described by him, the New York of 2000, actually did happen- but in the Third World, not in New York.
His vision of a society slowly falling apart due to pollution, soil exhaustion, starvation and water shortage is an amazingly vivid one.
http://www.fantasticfiction.co.uk/h/harry-harrison/make-room-make-room.htm
I think it is excellent. It has a good chance of becoming the new, best-ever "post-apocalyptic" story. Cannibalism figures heavily. It plays a prominent role.
(another place where there was significant cannibalism was Japanese troops cut off in the Pacific in WWII. And German POWs under the Russians)
The NK's were also down to eating grass (as were German prisoners of the allies in Germany in 1945).
Judt's point is that the postwar miracle of Europe was based on forgetting, forgetting about the European complicity in the occupation and the Holocaust.
I wouldn't be surprised about cannibalism. Ukraine in 1943 was a horrible place. They showed one interview with an ex German soldier (now) after watching film clips about burning villages to destroy the supplies and shelter for partisans, asking him what he thought, and he shrugged his shoulders and said that these were peasants, they knew how to survive (in the Russian winter) out of doors....
There was another home movie film clip of Russian prisoners of war digging graves. They asked the German home movie camerman what happened next, and he looks at the camera and says 'you don't want me to tell you that'.
But human sacrifice, well that is as old as 'civilisation': think the Aztecs, the Romans, the Carthaginians, the Greeks...
Certainly there are many cases historically where a country exports natural resources even though its internal populace is extremely poor and even starving. It is one of the classical critiques of globalism. Third world nations have been vulnerable to this for generations. And in Western democracies, the same effect happens for different reasons, as the internal population pays the same market prices as do people in oil importing countries. Norwegians do not pay less for their oil than Swedes today.
Therefore it is fundamentally flawed to extrapolate production and consumption on the assumption that each country is an island and will satisfy its internal consumption needs completely before doing any exports. But that is what is going on here.
A better way to think of it is as follows. Make a list of all the countries in the world that produce oil, and add up their total production. Then make a second list of all the countries in the world that consume oil, and add up their total consumption. The two totals will be equal (modulo small buildups or drawdown of storage). Now, we could choose to pair up the production and consumption of oil exporting countries, and it will be mathematically true that the excess of production over consumption in those countries equals net world oil exports. And this will by definition be equal to the consumption of all the countries that don't export oil, i.e. net world oil imports. But this is not a fundamental way of organizing the data, it is merely an arithmetical trick where we combine some of the numbers in the two lists in a certain way.
The real constraint is that the sums in the two lists (total production and total consumption) have to be equal. In a sense, all the consuming countries are fighting over the limited production of oil. If there is a shortage, all consuming countries are going to have to pay more and consume less than they would. It may well be that some country that doesn't produce any oil at all, say France, is able to increase its consumption while some oil producing country, say Nigeria, has to decrease its consumption; because France is a lot richer than Nigeria and can outbid for oil in the worldwide market. Nigeria's corrupt administration would rather receive international wealth and power than divert oil to its impoverished population.
The bottom line is that everyone, oil exporters and importers, is subject to the pain of shortages and is forced to choose between a barrel of oil and $60 or $100 or whatever it is at the time. Which do you want more, the oil or the money. That is the choice that everyone faces whether they are importing or exporting. As oil gets more expensive, more and more people will choose the money over the oil, and consumption will fall regardless of the country's export or import status.
See it this way: Norwegians pay the same for gas as the Swedes, but the Norwegians are getting higher and higher wages. Hence although the nominal price is the same, compared to the median wage gas is becoming cheaper in Norway. That's the assumption, there's a wealth transfer from the Swedes to the Norwegians - the data confirms this.
My bottom line is (opposing to yours) that gas and other oil products will become a cheaper and cheaper commodity in exporting countries. Of course as Dave notes, that does not imply an ever increase in consumption.
As for your double list model I invite you to do it and post it, so we can learn from the results.
lads:
Yes, but if Norway wants to have something remotely close to an ordinary diversified economy, there is an upper limit for how big the difference can be. If Norwegian wages gets too high, this will of course also result in a degrading ability to compete - export other than oil will end. Such increase in wages could occur in an economy solely dependent on oil revenues, in particular with virtually no export besides oil and most of the population being employed in oil related activities or as servants to the oil noblesse. I believe there is not very many countries where such governance is preferable.
Also, IMHO the wealth created by oil revenues in producing countries is normally not distributed is such way that rising price of oil is compensated by rising wages. My take is that the majority of the population in oil producing countries will be subject to the same demand destruction as the population in importing countries.
At last i'd like to add that i'm not an economist and that i most certainly may be wrong in the above assertions. The only oil-producing country that i throughly know is Norway, where i live.
There's an important detail you are forgetting, these days production is mostly controlled by state owned companies. As I mentioned above, Angola is a good example of what's going on: no democracy yet (if that changes anything) heavy corruption and social inequity, but still consumption is soaring. The state revenues are being applied in major social projects, housing and some transport lines - the elites will keep the folk happy. Although the liquid wages seem to be the same, the affluence of the people is in fact growing.
The data shows otherwise. Remember that Norway is the only exporting country with the highest social standards in the world (by definition). There's a long way for some exporters to get to those standards.
You should also not forget other factors that increase internal consumption in exporters: lowering EROEI (see Gail's comment below) and growing population.
I partly agree with you. IMHO developing countries, like Angola, will experience consumption growth as long as the rulers spend a fair share of the revenues domestically. I would guess that increased consumption relate to efforts made to increase production, more than it would relate to increased govermental revenues as i still think my above assumtion to be correct; that there will be demand destruction in exporting countries as revenues is not distributed to compensate increase in oil-related costs.
Perhaps it would be wise to make a rough distinction between developing countries and others?
Yes the data support your assesment, but:
It's natural that developing countries increase consumption, especially oil producing countries. Cheap domestic oil is viewed as a measure to stimulate the economy. Some countries, like malaysia, subsidize fuel, a practice that might change soon if peak-now theory is correct. If peak is now, i reason that those oil producing developing countries will tax petrolium products, or at least stop subsidize. As we all know, if the difference in price in to different regions get large enought, there will be opportuneties for arbitage.
I consider it unpleasant to read a text with lots of errors, and understand those of you who feel likewise.
Actually the biggest political party here is pro spending oil revenues. It's a populist party with bad taste which never ever will get into office partly because of such attitudes. The political establishment simply tend to isolate the populist party, a practice that might be in flux these days.
The party is named "Fremskrittspartiet" - "Party of progression".
For instance on PPP financed roads and railways where you get a revenue as return on investment and it would probably be possible to find some projects that benefits Norways transportation needs.
We have smaller NIMBY issues with additional power production. We can sadly not host new nuclear powerplants during the next four years but you are welcome to do other profitable investments and sell the electricity in Norway, to Germany or wherever it pays best.
Or why not invest in a Norwegian owned natural gas pipeline network for Norwegian gas export to Sweden? It should probably find reasonable public support if you connect our biogas potential to it and build a fair ammount of gas stations for cars. Expect a governmnet policy that protects the local biogas potential and discourages competition with biomass heat but that should be fairly ok since the market is large and will grow and you do anyway want to sell the gas at a high price in direct competition with refined oil and not at a low price to compete with simple wood chips.
And as a bonus you will make your closest neighbour more prosperous and we will be a better trade partner in the post peak oil era. Dosent it sound a lot better then investing in derived papers etc?
From a third party POV, Norwegian - Swedish co-operation has been difficult (I remember vaguely a telecom merger failed). Difficult negotiations and trust.
The Icelanders find Norwegians very difficult to work with and were overjoyed when Norsk Hydro was replaced by Alcoa as the customer for the Kárahnjúkar power plant.
OTOH, I know Norwegians who are pleased to have Swedish waiters.
History seems to run deep.
Alan from New Orleans
Exept for PPP I argue for Norwegians to come over here and invest in things to own and control withouth complex deals, much simpler then a merger.
I guess they still have something to prove after the government union were dissolved a hundred years ago.
I also recognice some of their recent oil rich foreign policy behaviour from reading about near history when we in Sweden in the late 60:s and early 70:s were about the richest country in the world after exporting for the rebuilding europe boom. Then we started to toy too much with socialism and our downslide in relative wealth started. Its hard to see your own limitations and weaknesses when you are the top guy.
Norway is a leader in TBM drilling of tunnels (I have bought books from Norwegian professors) and drilling many rail tunnels would not be a complete waste of your black gold. They will last for centuries and use your hydropower.
Best Hopes,
Alan
I didn't know Norway was a leader in TBM drilling, I have assumed our tunnels are made the "old fashioned" way. We do have a lot of them though, I once tried to sum the total length of all the tunnels on the E16 from Bergen to Oslo (there is a sign showing the name and lenght at either entrance), but I couldn't keep track of it for more than perhaps the first 5 or 6 :) A guess would be that 10-15% of the 450 km is underground. A joke is that we have 1.4 tunnels per capita in the western counties.
One of the reasons for the nimbyism in Norway is the fact that there are almost no visible power plants anywhere. The hydroelectric ones are hidden in tunnels/caves. There are some dams (although many reservoirs are natural lakes) and of course transmission lines.
WRT to Dave's comments further up the thread I think that the change in domestic use within the Export Lands is probably of secondary importance to the change in production - as illustrated here for Russia.
It is production growth and decline that is determinant.
Your Figure 23 shows just how important KSA and Russia actually are, and while several countries begin to taper around 2010, it is really the decline in Russia that controls the Export Cliff. KSA may of course go up or down - and I'm beginning to feel that down is more likely in light of static - falling production this year - even with a doubling of rigs in the last 12 months. So there may be grounds to believe that things work out somewhat worse than you suggest.
I would also like to see a version of Figure 23 with Angola, Nigeria and Iraq. Even if the consumption data are imperfect - or does the data just not exist?
CW
Although Dave is right on the fixed rates thing, these results are robust enough for us to see that the projected demand for EU that you assessed will probably never be fulfilled.
I've searched on the internet for consumption data for these 3 countries without finding it (maybe I didn't search hard enough). These countries probably do not have statistic offices, at least not in the same fashion like we in the OECD have.
Lots of both -- production declines, internal consumption increases. Russia is anomaly in so many ways, in my view. But Indonesia does not support my "S-shaped" hypothesis as stated above, either -- at least, not yet. I expect demand there to flatten out. Obviously they are an importer now, with all that entails.
-- Dave
I believe that inserting population into the equation will bring some light - an exercise for the future.
Sad but true...
But if you look at UAE, more typical of the very wealthy booming export countries, you do see steady growth in consumption - but the overall export pattern is determined by production. Sure, the growing consumption matters - but errors in projecting that growth into the future are IMVHO swamped by the countries ability to turn production up or down by 500,000 bpd over short time periods.
http://www.skidubai.com/
HO
Cry no more.
here is the link to the original EU import data
From the source- EUROSTAT.
http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/pls/portal/docs/PAGE/PGP_PRD_CAT_PREREL/PGE_CAT_PREREL_YEAR_2006/PG E_CAT_PREREL_YEAR_2006_MONTH_09/8-21092006-EN-AP1.PDF
Regards/And1
Ahhhh, no you don't, I think. I see an elongated S-shaped curve here. Look at the entire data set since pre-1970. The UAE is only slightly above where they were in 1996. It's basically flat since then with some volatility. The EIA graph on a shorter scale (since 1980) looks like this:
The data seems to differ -- you're using the BP set like Lads? But I wouldn't call it steady growth.
A quick look at population stats suggests per capita consumption of 30.53 bpy - which beats even the Benelux countries - but then you'd have to look at coal and gas as well to get a feel for per capita enrgy consumption.
One of the big limiting factors for growth in UAE will be water supplies.
Also I think the Saudis were looking at importing water by tanker.
Thank you very much for this outstanding piece.
Its intresting that the slashdot comments are so predictable.
The response in general is what you would would expect i.e. technology is going to solve all problems. And you can prove peak oil till after it happens ( they said the same about global warming).
And of course the short term response "LOOK AT THE PRICE" of oil now.
But besides all that I do see one or two post from people seriously willing to look at the numbers. Also I find something that seems to be common people really believe the Canadian Oil sands are going to save the day. Even though they know nothing about its production.
It seems that the one issue that could be readily debunked is that the Oil Sands are going to save the SUV.
UK oil consumption has been flat for years.
An objective view of UK oil imports here:
http://uk.theoildrum.com/story/2006/9/17/135527/399
Here's the real graph:
Their conclusion:
Global production increased by a net 889 MBpd (2,376 - 1,487) from 2004 to 2005, which is less than the anticipated increases in demand in 2006 and 2007. Much of the demand growth during the past few years has been met by a reduction in surplus production capacity. Even though a number of significant new projects are coming online in 2006 and 2007, much of that new production is needed just to stem the large natural production decline from existing fields. Thus, the supply/demand balance should continue to remain tight if demand increases as expected.
dead on. EROEI is what always gets lost in all of this, because it's one of those technical details you have to caveat every time you talk about this stuff...
of course, there are many of those complex details that often get lost...that's why this stuff still feels like squeezing a handful of sand some days...
Nice to hear from you, Gail. I believe they already are changing their calculations.
Your first point is another strong argument for the growing internal consumption, and unfortunately another blow for the Oil Depletion Protocol.
All in all, exporting countries will completely command the market from now on, choosing who gets what, at what price.
I find it so ironic that the political leaders in Washington won't do anything about energy use, or the related global warming issue, for fear of the economic impact.
While technology won't help much with the peak oil problem, all evidence points to the conclusion that the corporations which develop innovative technology to produce alternative energy and make energy use more efficient will be the new Intels, Microsofts, and Ciscos of the next 10 to 20 years.
Sadly, the dinosaurs in charge in Washington will ensure that these companies will be based in place like Japan, South Korea, or Europe. The US seems destined to become a second rate power in a couple of decades. They better enjoy their SUVs while they can, because it won't last much longer.
So indonesia tries to keep control of the fields, thats
clear, and we will see more of that in other countries, I suppose.
Last sentence: "Although Indonesia is one of Asia's largest producers of natural gas and oil, production has declined in recent years because of a lack of investment in developing new fields. " No comments yet of peaked fields etc.
Would you be so kind as to produce a time chart of the percentage of total oil exports that is consumed by the US?
For example, in 2005 the US imported 12.75 mbpd vs. a total export base of 36 mbpd (minus Iraq, Nigeria and Angola), i.e. 35.4%. What has been that percentage thru the years?
Many thanks for your study.
FYG it looks like this...
In 1991 US imports accounted for approx. 25% of global exports. Today they account for 36%. If, as you say, global exports have peaked and the US keeps increasing imports at the same avg. rate as in the past 15 years, then by 2020 the US will need to import 55% of all oil available for export - and that assumes that exports plateau out at 36 mbpd for the next 15 years.
If exports do go down by abt. 900,000 b/d every year as your chart projects, then by 2015 the US will need to import 62% of all export oil. By 2020 it will need 83%. This is what World Wars are made of - nuclear wars, at that...clearly not an option (I hope).
Cutting to the chase: assuming you are correct in your analysis, the only immediately available, sensible solution is drastic consumption cuts in the US. Nothing else can possibly ameliorate the size AND urgency of the problem.
For starters, slap on a serious gasoline tax - something like $3/gal - and use the proceeds to fund alternatives.
I didn't get into those numbers on purpose, because the projections I made are very simplistic and cannot capture the full complexity that the exporting market will fall into.
A simple result is that by 2020 World oil exports won't be enough to cover the present demand of the US and EU alone. Now put into that accounting Japan, China, Australia, ...