Dueling Editors
Posted by Stuart Staniford on September 28, 2005 - 3:48am
Heading Out offers some support for the integrity of our beloved Mr al-Naimi here. I differ strongly. En garde, sir! Here are some of the things one has to believe in order to believe Mr al-Naimi:
- A consortium of world class oil companies with over 40 years free rein over the province and extensive production experience in it, grossly under-estimated the original oil in place (they said 530 bbls, implying Mr al-Naimi's 460bbl reserves plus 110bbl cumulative production to date would represent a greater than 100% recovery rate), or in the alternate, lied under oath to the US Senate about it for unknown reasons.
- That in realizing the errors of the Americans, the Saudi's made that realization in two giant leaps, one in 1988 and one in 2005, but did not attribute these sudden massive realizations to any particular cause, or in the alternate, that they maintained internal estimates of reserves different than the external estimates between those giant leaps, but despite this misleading behavior, are now telling the truth.
- That, more specifically, Saudi Arabia must have been telling the truth last year when it said it's reserves were 260bbl, but Mr al-Naimi must also be telling the truth now that it's new reserves estimate will be 460bbl. These are honest guys, right? So the wonderful technological advances must have been made this year, or at least the work of re-estimating reserves based on the wonderful new technology must all have been done this year. Ditto for 1988.
- That, despite the fact that cumulative production is less than 1/5 of (cumulative production + claimed reserves), the Saudis cannot readily increase production very much now, even though they were able to raise it readily in the past.
- That, despite the fact that cumulative production is less than 1/5 of (cumulative production + claimed reserves), the Saudis are increasingly producing heavy sour oil that they have to discount, implying they are able to produce less light oil than in the past. Since light oil produces very readily, we would have to believe that most of the 460bbl remaining reserves were heavy oil. But the pre-Saudi Aramco believed most of the OOIP was light.
- That, despite the fact the Saudis are less than 1/5 of the way into reserves, they have had to rework most of their big fields with horizontal MRC wells because of water breakthrough into the original vertical well developments, and increasingly need to start doing water-control downhole even in those wells.
- That, despite the fact that the Saudis are less than 1/5 of the way into reserves, it was financially rational to develop the Shaybah field under very difficult conditions in the middle of massive sand dunes hundreds of miles from anywhere in the empty quarter, or in the alternative that the Saudis use Tarot cards to decide what project to do next.
- That, despite the fact that they are less than 1/5 of the way into reserves, it was worthwhile to develop the Manifa field which has oil too contaminated with vanadium and sulphur for anyone to refine it, or in the alternate that Allah made them do it.
- That, despite the fact that they are less than 1/5 of the way into reserves, production is depleting at 5% to 12% per year.
- That, despite the fact that they are less than 1/5 of the way into reserves, and despite the fact that even heavy sour oils are selling in the range of $50/barrel, they are warning us that production will drop next month.
- That an authoritarian Middle Eastern government is not truthful (like Iraq under Saddam, like Iran about it's uranium enrichment, and like Palestine under Arafat).
- That the Saudi government has a motive to mislead people that there is more oil than there really is (such as that the US won't protect them if they don't have much oil left, and their own people will be outraged if they discover the regime sold most of the oil cheap to the West).
My gut feeling is that this development is extremely worrying. It has a flavor of desperation about it. When you combine that they are now explicitly saying their production is about to decrease, along with insider anecdotes like this one (thanks Nihilist), it does indeed have a flavor of the Iraqi Information Minister becoming even more delusional as the situation deteriorated (as Dave has suggested).
But they haven't, and most likely won't, judging them by long-established past behaviour.
All we have to go on is raw total production, and the quality of the stuff, by which to judge their situation and claims, and coming out of the pipe is evidence to the contrary - heavier, sourer crude.
The market is going to settle for whatever the Saudis decide to give it. The market has no power to enforce transparency. You've got the power relationship backwards. The junky doesn't tell the dealer what to do; the dealer tells the junky what to do.
I do believe there are those in power who would kill to find out exactly what the real scoop in Saudi Arabia is. The implications of a positive or negative answer are subtantial, affecting all of humanity.
At some point they will have to come clean in a transparent way or, I fear, they will do so at the point of someone's gun.
Lack of transparency will be what kills us.
Needing transparency and getting it are two different kettles of biodiesel, though.
This is the unspoken subtext, isn't it. "Transparency" is a veiled threat. "We" have a right to know how much oil is there because it's our oil.
This is why the Saudi's are right to resist calls for transparency. Inspectors are the vanguard troops of invasion and appropriation, just like they were in Iraq.
As far as I'm concerned, Saudi oil belongs to the Saudis, and "our" dependence on it is our problem, not theirs. Personally, if I were them, I would have a contigency plan for destroying the infrastructure and poisoning the fields, just in case.
I said here--or somewhere--long ago that I think peak oil needs geological/economic models to demonstrate, for example, how difficult it will be to use tar sands and shale oil to meet our energy needs. And a better understanding of future production is also useful. But many at peakoil.com, have argued that we have the right to pull those numbers out of Saudi Arabia.
Sorry folks. These are more arguments from whining little children who have eaten their cookies and now are demanding that the other kids declare how many cookies they have.
Transparency is not going to help us. The world will slam into the limits and will have to adapt. Hirsch gaps and whiners-for-transparency be damned.
and all the whiners about "those who endanger our children", should wake up and realize WE are endangering our children, and have been for decades (if not longer), with endless consumption of globally created corporate "goods" along with our addiction to cheap oil. not to mention the adoption of unsustainable economic systems, such as debt financing/banking and fiat currency. we (govt., multinational corporations, the unquestioning public) all share the blame in this, and to finger the "untransparent" ones is merely scapegoating.
Peak Oil seems to be a convienent excuse for imperialistic tendencies...subtle or not.
I note that when prices are rising, no one whines.
What gives ;-)
If the government is a real force in energy prices via actual trading in open markets, I will eat my hat.
** Disclaimer, I own no hats.
That was meant to be a joke, but I'm not so sure now...
That was some short squeeze today...
http://www.trendvue.com/charts/2005/09/tv20050928-16.gif
After Katrina, I thought this was a good idea: The SPR is designed to help recover from short-term disruptions, and if they sold at the post-Katrina price, they might even make a profit. But after seeing another devasting Cat 5 hurricane within a month, I'm not so sure. Unless they replenish the SPR between hurricane seasons, it'll rapidly be depleted.
US domestic oil creaks down year by year on a steady basis.
http://epiccs.com/Publications/CIM2004_272.pdf
And your response to my other nine points?
You can have reserve growth driven by mistakes in calculation or new technology, but ultimately there is a finite limit to what can be extracted, at any price.
What part of that do you not understand?
These trusts by and large are set up for one purpose - to extract the value out of the ground and pay an income stream to investors at fairly high rates... much higher than any mainstream oil and gas company involved in exploration and reserve building activity.
Why?
Because they expect the resource - the land - to ultimately be worthless. Eventually some of these trusts will pay their last dividend and close up, because there'll be nothing left to pump.
Slightly simplistic but gets to the heart of the matter.
I'm not saying this is true of you, JD, but transparency is crucial if we are to convince the rest of the world that there's a problem regarding world oil supply.
Last year, didn't Aramco announce that their OIP was actually closer to 1200 Gb? (I may be confused on what that number referred to; this ArabNews story from April 2004 says Al-Naimi meant proven reserves, but that's absurd.)
Is it plausible? Circa 1975, estimates of Saudi OIP were 500 Gb, with "proven" reserves of 160 Gb. Adding the 25 Gb produced to then, and that's a recovery rate of 35%
But maybe that's how it all hangs together. If Original OIP is now 1200, and proven reserves now 461, that implies 38% recovery.
It's also possible that the 1200 is OIP remaining - i.e. after subtracting the 100 Gb already extracted. In that case, total recovery should be 43% Take your pick...
Hmmm...
Also, check this out: It's not new - we were warned last year!
Washington Post, Dec 27, 2004:
That would imply that last December, when he said "we may be able to increase..." he was really saying "if prices go over $50 and stay there..."
But in any case, the ground work for this was laid over a year and a half ago - before Simmons hit the publicity trail for his book and more people started asking the hard questions. I find that interesting.
Since we don't know WHAT the Saudis have done in the interim, I agree, it is difficult to take them at face value. But at the same time, the Saudis ARE doing further exploration.
Here's Al-Naimi
http://www.gasandoil.com/goc/news/ntm52126.htm
Lots more news here:
http://www.gasandoil.com/goc/news/h_ntm_left.htm
Discoveries here:
http://www.gasandoil.com/goc/discover/h_left.htm
I also suggest that linking to enormous lists of articles about all discoveries worldwide do not provide us with any insight into the question at hand.
My suggestion is that you go read Twilight in the Desert and then come back and try again if you aren't persuaded by it. It certainly would be a great service for a sceptic to attempt a detailed and careful rebuttal of that book.
Proving Proven Reserves Are Proven: An Art Form Or A Science?
http://www.simmonsco-intl.com/research.aspx?Type=researchspeeches
It is better to look good, than to feel good.
Pulling a few rigs over to their waters, lots of talk but no action and heavier and more sour oil in the OPEC reference basket, and the finishing touch: upping reserves - again - does smack somewhat of looking good.
But seriously, every damn point you just made is right on target IMHO. I've said this in some comments but I will state it here altogether as one statement. Well, at least that's my take. Have a good one....
But it may well be that they are giving such optimistic statements for security reasons. At home their people would be shocked to realize that that days of oil riches may be soon gone and that the there is not much left for the ordinary Saudis after the princes have pocketed most of them. Internationally acknowledging future production declines would worsen the situation in Middle East. Now the Saudis assure that there will be enough for everybody, no need to start securing the shares of supply. May be they fear a rush to grab the remaining oil?
In Britain there is a little grumbling about the royals <$100m annual income from the public purse, but not much. And, the public is well aware of the big draw to the American tourist, always agog at the possibility of seeing a real live prince. In Saudi the locals might see too much of theirs.
I suspect the legions of Saudi royals are well aware they're not very popular, and therefore are worried about their grip. They might look at the Saudi oil wealth from the same perspective as the Americans did in the seventies - produce every drop while they can, don't worry about possible damage to the fields, as the old Senate hearings did do. Focus - every year we hang on is (now) another $75b, much of which is usefully flowing into Swiss bank accounts. The last thing they want to do is let the public begin to worry about the quality of their stewardship. The truth is the first ballast to go overboard when the ship of state is insecure.
Regarding Russian reserves and output, there might well be substantial reserves still to be found in the forbidding north. However, these reserves, if they exist, would take many years to bring on line, not least on account of their new policy to limit foreign investment. In any event they would not delay the peak if, as many predict, it comes between now and 2008. On the other hand, Russia's political influence, already growing sharply in Europe on account of gas exports, will grow further if Saudi oil output begins to decline while Russia's continues to grow.
I think HO really wanted to get a discussion going about SA comments in the media. If so he succeeded wonderfully.
I think Stuart brought to light the non oil related reasons for making reserve statements. He defined the political environment well.
All other posts have brought great data to bear on both sides of these arguments, the technical and political. I have been greatly educated with respect to the interplay between geologic reserves and need for political position by oil producing entities. It strikes me this is a lot like the energy markets recently. The price and the trends of oil, NG, etc. aren't directly linked to the measurable (production)supply on any particular day. The spin is as (more?) important in manipulating the market than the data.
Thanks to all for having this discussion in the public forum where I can see all sides and make up my own mind. I am trusting the markets less and less every day because they are too easily manipulated by those with more information and clout than little old me.
Crude production sags as Putin touts reserves
Russia may have two to three times current estimates
Russia's crude oil production growth may be flagging, but President Vladimir Putin said Tuesday that the country's enormous oil and natural gas reserves were in no danger of running out.
Analysts agree and estimate they could be two to three times higher than currently reported.
"As for our oil and reserves, they are underestimated -- there is enough for generations to come," Putin said, speaking during a nearly three-hour televised question and answer session with the public.
...
But unlike Saudi Arabia, Russia's oil reserves are poorly explored, in part because of their comparative inaccessibility, locked under the seabed or permafrost.
No serious exploration work using the latest technologies has been conducted in Russia since the 1980s, according to Chris Weafer, chief strategist with Moscow-based Alfa Bank.
"A safe number is probably double that figure," Weafer said, referring to the 72 billion barrels. "But it's not impossible it's three times as high."
http://www.chron.com/cs/CDA/ssistory.mpl/business/3372701
As for Saudi Arabia, I am much more doubtful and I see possibly another reason. Stuart provided a graph that gives discovery and also production curves based on the reserve estimates. I notice that the production peak is pretty much here for 250 but is averted for a while at 450. Thus, by stating reserves at 470, magically, the peak is once again in the future and production will rise so no need to worry... yet.
What do you think?
www.cbc.ca/cp/world/050928/w092806.html
3 thoughts :
In the past periods of rapidly rising energy costs the Saudis have obliged the US by "recycling" their petrodollars via US Treasuries.
Suppose they no longer wish to reinvest in the US? Perhaps they feel some concern that the US might find that "unmutual." They just might need to have some other plausible use for all those profits.
One justification for holding the profits that would be hard to fault is that the money is needed for exploration and development in areas that were previously uneconomic. Naturally they will not allow outside observers to come in and audit their activity.
Increasing the reserve estimate would be the first step. Next the Saudis will set up drilling and exploration companies to find the "new reserves."
One motive for announcing new reserves is to set up a situation in which they can spend all these new petrodollars on activities that will lead to the production of more energy.
Bin Laden Energy Development Corporation, for instance.
* What do we know about reserve estimation and growth, and its correlation with actual production from, say, 1950 on, and what does that lead us to believe about the limited data that we have from Saudi Arabia?
If we can't answer that question, we're largely making noise.
There is a lot of speculation that can be made about why Saudis are pumping sour (historical outcome of drilling to date--they've tapped into some sour crude and haven't done much with it??). Speculation about why they are spending money on technology to increase production from older fields (bird in the hand? Known production capability?). Simmons speculates based on very old data and then wrote a book. Transparency isn't likely to happen. These are not publicy traded companies. There are strategic, economic, and political issues here that transcend the SEC. And transparency, I think, will lead to enormous political pressure to pump at the cheapest price possible. Not good for the future. Let's not do it. If transparency says there is easy oil, the US will go to great lengths to ensure that easy oil is produced at a cheap price. If transparency says we're running low, I argue the US will still likely run up against the price wall and let the market drive the response. Therefore, we're all better off if the Saudis might have a few pockets of reserve in their pocket. Blather about it. Create uncertainty. And maybe, just maybe, we can transform that peak into a long decline.
I don't think the US would lift a finger, but market forces would reduce price by itself.
The U.S. government forces oil companies to define their reserves rather strictly in terms of economically recoverable reserves. As oil prices rise and technology improves, this type of reserves would be expected to increase. Heading Out seemed to be thinking along these lines when he commented that it made sense for the Saudis to raise their reserve estimates after leaving them static for 15 years.
Which definition of reserves are the Saudis using in their recent comments? Do we know this for sure?
Also see Simmons pages 120 to 123. If all fields had peaked at the same time, peak production would have been less than 13 Mb/d. Since several fields are now past peak, the idea that they can get to 12 Mb/d by 2010 is nonsense.
Someone above said that Simmons is using 30 year+ old material. That is not true. The bulk of the 200 odd papers he analyzed were presented between 1970 and 2004.
I'll go with Simmons and hard data rather than Al Naimi and disinformation. Murray
If the Saudis do pump 12mbd in 2010, will you concede that you and Simmons were wrong, and apologize for spreading disinformation?
See JD's comments above, http://www.theoildrum.com/story/2005/9/28/33827/4040#10 . He provides evidence that it is not unusual for reserves to increase.
Of course the Saudis did not discover their reserve increases in two giant leaps. They announced their reserve increases in two giant leaps. That's different. They are undoubtedly analyzing data and doing new field research on an ongoing basis. This may lead them to change their private, internal estimates of those reserves. That they don't choose to keep the world updated every day on the new figures is their political decision. But just because they choose to announce their new reserves rarely doesn't justify calling them liars.
Again, it doesn't mean that. The fact that Saudi Arabia was publicly sticking to its 15 year old reserve estimates last year is a matter of their stated policy of protecting the privacy of their internal affairs. They have never claimed to be providing transparency. You are erecting a straw man by pretending that the dates of the announcements are the dates of discovery.
I will address further comments in a subsequent post to keep these of manageable length.
As I noted to JD, growth in estimates in OOIP mostly occurs early in the life of fields. 1979 was quite late in the life of the major Saudi fields.
I do agree the case is circumstantial, since there is no third party access to data. I none the less find the case for Saudi dishonesty vastly more compelling that the case for Saudi honesty (especially given their extremely defensive reaction to challenge). Unfortunately, an enormous amount depends on it, and so we must decide what we each want to do before having proof beyond all doubt. I believe that in such situations it is better to state ones opinion firmly and act on it, rather than waiting for someone who is probably manipulating you into inaction to decide to stop manipulating you so you will have the certain information you crave.
Given the tendency for US public companies to increase reserves through "reserve growth" due to rising prices, I would have been astounded if something similar did NOT happen for SA.
Canada and Venezuela have revised their reserve numbers, ostensibly because their NCO is now "economical". Iran revised its reserves upward by 33% in 2002.
Why did the Saudis not report, or rather "re-calculate" their numbers before this? Perhaps they were wary that prices would decline soon. Perhaps they thought that, for political reasons, stability was better for intra-OPEC relations. Maybe they think they need to do more to answer (indirectly) Simmons and the oil worriers in Europe and America.
In my opinion, either they have integrity and routinely display it, or they don't and we are forced to ignore their words and look to more indirect means to determine the situation.
But we know that rising prices mean more oil is economical to recover. "Proven reserves" MUST rise.
So in 2003 and 2004, rising prices meant that, regardless of what they were doing on the ground, the reserve numbers were becoming less and less credible - they were becoming obviously wrong.
That's why I think the new number is more credible than the old number was in 2004. And support comes from the price-based upward revisions of several other major countries - Canada, Venezuela, Iran.
People of integrity are truthful all the time (with perhaps the exception of small social white lies on things that don't matter). People who do not have integrity are only truthful when it suits their purposes or they might get caught out in the lie. It seems to me that since you agree the earlier Saudi numbers were not credible, the Saudis must be assumed to be in the second category. But given that model, and given that we cannot verify their numbers and they have so far gotten away with this without serious scrutiny in the press, this new number cannot be relied on just because they say it, right? It's the number they want us to believe. It might or might not have anything to do with the truth and the fact that they claim it essentially provides us with zero bits of information about the true situation because they aren't honest. We are going to have to determine the truth by other methods - such as looking at what pre-Saudi Aramco thought, or trawling through hundreds of technical papers trying to infer the big picture as Matt Simmons has done, or looking at what projects they are currently doing and asking if they are consistent with the claimed reserve situation.
But if prices rise to $40/barrel, they've got $20 more to devote to exploration and extraction for every barrel. As long as that $21 barrel is in the ground, it can be added to the "proven reserves." And since they can't ramp up production immediately, that $21 barrel won't come out immediately.
Thus, when prices rise, "proven reserves" MUST increase.
So now they have raised their baseline, just like everyone else. Except they have the cheapest stuff on the planet, so they can pay a little more for the rigs.
Saudis are terrified by the perspective that the world will start persuing oil alternatives now. I do not doubt they have the ability to sell 100$ or 150$ oil for at least 30-40 years to come and then buy some Carribean Archipelago for the whole rotten kings family. But if alterntives are found/implemented than SA will have nothing to offer the rest of the world but its sands.
The main reason the investors do not go for alternatives yet (btw coal liquification is viable at 30$/bbl) is fear - even if there is a mere 5% chance that oil will go back to 20-30$ there are a lot of people that won't risk their cosy chairs and would prefer and will wait until it is too late. So keeping this 5% chance is the most vital interest of SA for the years to come. Just like the US they are simply interested in the prolongment of the status quo.
Which of course screws us all (and the planet Earth as a co-latteral damage).
The key word here is "readily". It could be that the new reserves are more difficult to reach and will require considerable new infrastructure investment. Keep in mind that Saudi Arabia is for the most part untracked desert. It is not easy to build new roads and pipelines across hundreds of miles of shifting sands. Moving drilling rigs and other necessary equipment into place is expensive and time consuming. It is no wonder that they have chosen to concentrate their resources on the existing fields.
I don't think it follows that most of the reserves are heavy oil. Rather, it just means that the "readily" available reserves, given current infrastructure, are shifting more towards heavy oil. Although heavy oil is somewhat less valuable than light, it's still something like $50/bbl which is plenty of profit for the Saudis. It may be that $50 heavy oil produced from current wells is more profitable than $65 light oil produced from yet to be developed wells that may be hundreds of miles from existing infrastructure.
I don't see the big surprise in that they have chosen to do additional horizontal drilling in their existing fields. To me that seems perfectly rational. It allows them to exploit their in-place infrastructure and maximize the return on their investment in building all of those facilities in the first place. It's not surprising to me that it would be cheaper to do this, even with the water problems, than to drill and build new wells in a country as infrastructure-poor as Saudi Arabia.
I don't see your point here. They have to go where the oil is. The fact is that probably 90% of the country can be described as being "in the middle of massive sand dunes hundreds of miles from anywhere". Maybe most of their new reserves are in relatively small fields in exactly such locations. That wouldn't be at all surprising.
Your sarcasm suggests to me that you are working from emotion rather than reason here. I don't know the details of this field's history or why they chose it. Maybe it was in a good location and even though the oil is low quality, they still thought it would profitable. As noted above, low quality oil is still selling for what would have been considered astronomically high values just a couple of years ago.
Many Asian refineries accept high sulfur oil, so I don't know how literally to take your claim that no one can refine this oil. Are you certain that this entire oil field was developed to the point of production, but that the oil is just sitting in storage tanks somewhere? If so, then I agree that this would be evidence of irrational behavior on the part of SA, but it is not evidence of low oil reserves.
There is no inconsistency between these two facts. Depletion happens to individual fields, not to a whole country. SA could have many other fields, perhaps small ones, which add up to as much oil as all of their big fields. To me that is a very plausible picture. And it is consistent economically with them continuing to produce from their already-developed, large fields, as long as the rates are still profitable.
You can't read anything into month by month variations. That tells you nothing about how much their ultimate reserves are. Rather, it reflects a lack of capital investment in past years to develop new fields that can take up the slack of current fields' depletion. This is no doubt due in part to the extremely low oil prices we had through much of the 1990s, as well as political instability in the regime.
To sum up, a consistent picture which explains everything is a politically closed and private Saudi regime, a country with enormous oil deposits, much of which is in small fields that are far from existing infrastructure and which will be expensive to develop, and insufficient capital investment in past years to provide for short term expansion capability. As noted by many observers, the key question going forward is whether Saudi Arabia will be able to accept foreign capital in order to ramp up their development in time to meet future production needs. The possibility that they simply don't have oil to be devloped is not even being considered by mainstream analysis.
I don't think the points Stuart has raised contradict the conventional wisdom on the matter, and are in fact generally consistent with the usual view.
I don't want any part of this site to fall into groupthink. Yes, as I said above, I think Simmons' case is compelling...but there's nothing wrong with challenging it!
These ideas are going to be constantly challenged from all angles and sides...and the more we talk about them, the better we understand BOTH sides of the argument...and while that's not always the most fun thing to do, the more people inside this movement that understand both sides of the issues, the better, in my opinion.
You can find maps of the Saudi fields here, here, and here. They are all clustered together and any worth developing could have been readily developed once there was infrastructure into each cluster. Only Shaybah is in the empty quarter I believe. The Saudi's are not claiming to have found new fields, just to have greatly increased their estimates of what is in the existing fields. So to believe them now we'd have to believe there is a trillion or so barrels (OOIP) of hard-to-produce oil (ie less preferable than producing Manifa or Shaybah) that was discovered before 1979 but grossly underestimated.
Recovery rates and producability tend to go hand in hand. It could be hard to produce because the rocks are very tight so it flows slowly, but that also means a higher proportion of it stays stuck to the rock in the end and the recovery rate is low. It could be hard to produce because it's very heavy and viscous so it won't flow through the rock, but that also tends to mean a higher proportion ends up sticking to the rock grains and making for a lower recovery rate. Both factors also increase the likelihood of water breakthrough on channels of higher permeability (which also makes recovery harder and seems to have been a big factor in Saudi production). All this means it's very hard to buy a story of only an extra few hundred billion barrels of nearly 100% recoverable but hard-to-produce oil - there'd need to be a 1-2 trillion OOIP of hard-to-produce, low recovery rate oil.
I think you asked earlier about URR and OOIP. OOIP is the amount of oil initially in the rock at the outset. URR is the amount of oil that will ever be gotten up to the surface. So the URR is the OOIP times the final recovery rate.
Moreover, why not produce more heavy now? The refining capacity to handle heavy is ramping up. Slowly to be sure, but more now than before, and much more again in 3-7 years. If sweet light has peaked, it will only get more valuable in the ground: the margin between sweet-light and heavy-sour can only get bigger as heavy-sour supplies increase relative to sweet-light.
Other possible consideration?:
Shaybah is also a major field that lies close to a border. The northern tip is right up against the UAE, and perhaps the Saudis wanted to make sure they got their share of the sweet stuff before the Emirates sunk a few near-by wells and got lucky and started to drain the whole thing. Clearly they take that kinda thing seriously over in the P.Gulf - that's what sent Saddam into Kuwait, after all... Or not.
Also, let's not forget that many OPEC members view actual reserves, field level production levels, etc., as national secrets. As far as I can tell, no government (including the good old USA) in its right mind will be transparent about information it regards as state secrets willingly.
This whole discussion reminds me of the differences of opinion between equity analysts and the companies they follow. Sometimes the analyst is right, sometimes the company is right. I think we should just accept the lack of transparency and, as good analysts do, look for other sources of information weighted by our belief in its accuracy. What we don't want to do is to get so emotional about things that our judgement gets impaired.
Is this legal in the oil industry? Or just widely practiced and unpoliced? To me it sounds rather like booking a sale in a different quarter than the one it actually occurred in, in order to provide a better looking revenue stream. Very, very, tempting when the damn deal just won't quite close in time (I've been faced with that temptation as an entrepreneur). But illegal and unethical.
For obvious reasons, I think the transparency campaign is tilting at windmills, and the Saudis are not going to comply. So I think it would be interesting to establish a standard for verifying the conflicting hypotheses based on future Saudi production.
Personally, I subscribe to the view of Sadad Al Husseini:
Now you, on the other hand, subscribe to the view that information from the Saudis is lies, and that Matt Simmons' book is the gold standard on Saudi oil reserves. So why don't you tell us, based on Simmons' work, what the actual Saudi reserves are, and draw the future curve of Saudi production on that basis? This would be useful because your hypothesis would then become falsifiable against facts we have access to.
For reference, we know that Simmons is by far the most pessimistic of all forecasters:
This compares with the following 2030 forecasts from other sources:
Simmons: 10-20mbd
Koppelaar: 60mbd
ASPO: 60mbd
BP 2005: 65mbd
Total 2005: 80mbd
Laherrere 2005: 90mbd
EIA 2005 (High price scenario): 115mbd
OPEC 2004: 115mbd
Exxon/Mobil 2005: 115mbd
IEA 2004: 120mbd
http://trendlines.ca/economic.htm
That hypothesis can never be falsified, at least not in my lifetime.
Can you describe a reasonably near-term outcome which would prove you/Simmons wrong?