The Chinese don't think oil is fungible
Posted by Heading Out on August 25, 2005 - 10:08pm
But concerns about China's energy deals are overblown. It is immaterial who owns oil reserves as sooner or later the oil ends up on the world market. If China decides to hoard oil from one of its foreign reserves, say in Kazakhstan or Sudan, it frees up a barrel of Saudi oil for the world market.
Owning reserves does not change the price either. If the price of oil goes to $100 a barrel, and China owns a field in Sudan, the price for that barrel from Sudan is still $100. If China hoards that oil from Sudan for its own use, it would miss the chance to sell it at the higher price. That oil from Sudan would effectively cost the Chinese the same as if they bought oil on the open market.
This only works when there is more oil available than there is a need for. And until we see more demand destruction than we have so far one must conclude that this historical situation is coming to an end. As depletion continues to carve away at the oil available from existing fields, and as new development fails to match both this depletion and the growth in demand, then oil will stop being fungible.
The article goes on to state:
There are other reasons why China may be on to a hiding for nothing. First, China's oil concessions abroad will not yield anything like enough for its energy needs in the next two decades. Second, most of the oil produced in China's foreign concessions will not physically enter China because of transport and logistical costs.I wonder how they reach that conclusion? China seems bent on a very determined program of oil acquisition around the world - the purchase of the PetroKazakhstan reserves are only a step in that process. Unocal was obviously another such attempt, and though that failed, remember that Unocal has large Asian reserves. In looking at China's five year plans (from Asia Times
The oil will most likely be sold on the international market or swapped for oil that will enter China
The tenth plan, which runs from 2001 from 2005, continued the previous efficiency goals but also called on enterprises to seek international sources of oil and gas. CNPC responded to this goal energetically, and now has projects in over 11 countries, including Indonesia, Sudan, Azerbaijan, Syria, Algeria, Ecuador, Peru, Niger, Chad, Russia, and Kazakhstan. The latter two have been the main focus of China's international oil hunt in recent years.
The Guardian would suggest that China does not see its demand growing, which is obvious nonsense. Likely what China sees is that if it does not tie up reserves, then down the road as the pie gets smaller it may lose its share. As the Asia Times notes:
For China, this deal is about resources. It's material. But it's not a solution to China's growing oil demand. PetroKazakhstan represents maybe 30% of one year's demand growth in China if it keeps growing [at its current rate]. So the Chinese would need one PetroKazakhstan every four months to satisfy demand [growth]. Still, it's a good and a fairly large purchase for them."The bid, however, is not yet a done deal. And Business Week would seem to agree.Magee specifies, "They have a very good refinery - it's pretty modern - as well as production and reserves. They produce high quality oil, too. It's light sweet crude. So taken as a whole - the reserves, the production facilities, the refinery, and pipelines - it's a nice package. And it's strategically located near the Chinese border, close to its ultimate markets."
With its economy booming, China is striving to meet its enormous energy needs by intensifying its ties to major energy producing countries and seeking to buy a wide array of foreign oil and natural gas assets.?Though that article goes on to note that their purchases will not be enough to keep up with demand, and that, like the rest of us, Chinese needs can only be met by Saudi Arabia.
It is an unarguable fact that China's dependence on Middle East oil is increasing," said a recent report from the government-sponsored Chinese Academy of Social Sciences. "And this reliance will continue. Henceforth the Middle East will be the most important supply source of international oil for China."
Out of China's total oil consumption last year of 6.7 million barrels a day, almost half came from imports, according to BP PLC statistics. Chinese customs figures show Saudi Arabia provided 16 percent of China's import needs, with Oman and Iran contributing another 24 percent between them.
Less than 10 percent of its imports -- about 300,000 barrels a day -- came from foreign oil properties controlled by Chinese firms, said Wu Kang, a fellow at the University of Hawaii's East-West Center in Honolulu, citing Chinese statistics. And as China's economy expands, Wu estimates that its import demands will swell to 5 million barrels a day by 2010.
Saudi Arabia is probably the only country that can meet those demands, Wu says -- at least for the next several years. "But in the long term, there is a big problem," he said
Adrian Loh, an analyst with Merrill Lynch in Singapore, believes the situation will deteriorate even sooner. He predicts China's oil import needs in 2010 will grow to at least 10 million barrels a day -- twice Wu's projection and an amount that would leave it struggling to find Persian Gulf suppliers.
So, if the contract is signed for $50/barrel and the price of oil rises to $100/b or falls to $25/b in 5 years Sudan will still get $50.
Note that China could have a similar financial hedge by buying an option on Nymex but Nymex only goes out to 5 years, may not list the volume of contracts that China wants, and probably offers terms worse than China could negotiste bilaterally with Sudan.
At the same time, economics doesn't go away. If your oil increases from $65/bbl to $200/bbl, people still face the same choice: holding $200 or holding a barrel of oil. This choice applies to equally to people who hold the oil and to people who don't. Owning the oil doesn't make this choice go away.
Generally, absent price controls, the price will rise to the point where (marginal) producers are ambivalent between holding the oil and holding the money. This means that even if you own oil, you're still going to be faced with a hard choice between whether to sell it (i.e. go without the oil but have the money) or keep it (go without the money but have the oil). Exactly the same choice is faced by a buyer: go without the money and have oil, or go without oil and have money.
This is the point of the "oil is fungible" argument, and it applies even if the price rises. Again, of course being an owner is better during the price rise; it's always good to own an appreciating asset. But that doesn't change the fact that you will always be faced with the hard choice: oil or money. Both owners and consumers are in that same situation.
I am aware that if the oil was then shipped to China from the foreign concession and priced lower inside China based on production cost, China would be taking an opportunity cost hit. Nonetheless no one in China would have to write a check for the penalty. IOW, if they obtained Kazakh oil on the cheap, swapped it for other oil at world prices, the accounting costs (as opposed to economic costs) would be essentially the same to China.
If however the foreign concession nationalized its fields and compelled China to buy back oil... or taxed away China's "economic rent" then China would be taking an accounting hit as well if they sold their oil to domestic users at below market rates.
From what I know China will try to get the oil it needs in order to fund its plans for economic development as a strategic goal. It can be expected to pay up for reserves because it will not hold itself to the high hurdle rates than Exxon-Mobil or Chevron-Texaco would.
Furthermore the recent press coverage says that China is building a number of greefield refineries and that its recent cutbacks in consumption growth are seen as temporary, despite what the Guardian seems to think. So I think I pretty much agree with HO here.
For example:
Let's say I buy water from the city, and suddenly the price tripled. If I were able to sink a well (either on my property or with a neighbor who agreed to terms), I could pump my own water and not have to pay the city for it anymore. I could also (if I wanted) sell some of my water to other folks and compete with the city, to help pay expenses (pumps don't last forever!), or not sell and just keep a stock tank, it would be my choice. That's one way I look at it.
Or, let's say our govt. has decided it is in the interest of National Security that we no longer export oil to China. They would then either restrict exports or place such a premium on them (tarriff or whatnot) that Exxon and pals either would not or could not export to China. (I'm picking on China but it could easily be any other country, and I know we don't export domestic oil but our oil cos are working midle eastern oil fields and they are exporting). I know that the US govt. can't tell a foreign based oil company what to do, but pretend for a moment that they can.
Now, if that scenario makes sense, from a national security standpoint, why wouldn't the chinese do exactly the same thing with their oil companies?
Am I wrong totally? (this is simplistic, I'm lacking sleep, etc. etc.)