A little snippet that may not be as good as it sounds
Posted by Heading Out on November 7, 2005 - 12:25pm
Production this year may approach a record 10.7 million barrels a day, including light oils and the kingdom's share of output from the so-called Neutral Zone, a territory between Saudi Arabia and Kuwait, the IEA said. It will probably climb to 11.9 million a day in 2010.Which is interesting beyond the point that this is 600,000 bd less than the original production objective, which was 12.5 mbd. In an earlier post I had noted that the list of oil fields that would be tapped for the increase had grown by one from the original list, suggesting some possible snags in the original fields. I note that in the new evaluation Ghawar is being expected to carry an even larger volume of production.
One of those is Ghawar, the world's largest deposit. More than 80 percent of all the oil produced from Saudi Arabia over time has come from Ghawar and other two fields, Abqaiq and Safaniyah, according to the IEA.The increasingly heavy reliance on Ghawar is, of course, one of the things that worries Matt Simmons. When the fields at Abu Saf'ah and Qatif were initially discussed they were set aside for offsets of the declining production in some of the older fields. The production target was 800,000 bd. which was the 2004 IEA estimate of Saudi depletion. But production at those two fields has apparently not only not reached the target figure (it is still in the 600,000 to 650,000 range apparently depending on who you read) but it is now being counted as increased production, rather than offsetting declines. The make-up of old field production is to be achieved by getting more from the old fields. And hence, I suppose, the increase in projected numbers for Ghawar.Output from Ghawar, which started production in 1951, can still increase because ``Saudi Aramco has managed its oilfields very conservatively over several decades in order to extend their plateau production for as long as possible,'' an attempt to ``maximize long-term recovery factors,'' the IEA says.
Ghawar is currently producing 5.8 million barrels a day and that may climb to more than 6 million a day in 2010, the IEA says. Output would then peak by about the middle of the next decade, declining to about 3.7 million a day in 2030.
Well I suppose it also depends on which part of Ghawar they are talking about, since under the overall definition the Haradh III development which should be adding 300,000 bd, can be considered as part of that field, though it is generally now discussed as a separate development. And to get this production they will, as we have discussed, need to have an increasing number of oil rigs to drill the wells. No, somehow the details of the story don't quite carry the hope that the headline did.
Claude Mandil, head of the IEA.
That's all for now.
http://www.extension.umn.edu/distribution/familydevelopment/DE2466.html
we have progressed past the initial stage ..denial...to the second stage ...blame..
can't you just see it ..the IEA down the ever so obvious road says .."well, it wasn't our forecasting that was wrong, it was those darn money hungry saudis...if they would have just drilled more wells we would have all the oil we need."
$59 bbl oil in 2030 under their "worst case scenario?"...puleeze!
Message board post
"Engineers who have personally worked Ghawar
tell me that their reservoir models show a catastrophic decline in production by 2008-2009."
(It turns out that Glenn Morton has a webpage where he writes about several topics. Here are his oil crisis articles: Glenn Morton's Oil Crisis Page)
Where have we heard this before that production will "plateau" and "as long as ever" is just plain BS..
$35 today, inflated at an arbitrary 5%, is $44.66 in nominal dollars five years out. A moderate inflation assumption for a medium term doesn't change things much.
But over the long term, $39 inflated at 5% annually, over 25 years, gets us to a nominal price of $132 in 2030. The $52 price inflates to $176 in nominal dollars. At 6% it grows to $225, and will go up exponentially from there with higher inflation rates.
I assume oil will behave like everything else: there will be some real price increase trend, which will be compounded by inflation and currency variations.
Now, any competent psychologist will tell you that making sense of or sorting out fantasies like these is a very difficult task indeed. So, I can not pretend to know what these IEA people are thinking.
"Greenhouse gas emissions rise 30% overall but are 16% less than they would be if the Alternative Energy Scenario is
notfollowed by 2030.The WSJ in particular picked up on concern that so much of the forecast increased production comes from so few countries which have a history of frequent large production disruptions.
Large organizations such as the IEA don't change their outlook on a dime. If the IEA is like most large bureaucracies, even if most of the rank and file were convinced that peak oil was imminent conservative elements at the top would be slow to shift the message they were sending out to the world.
I think there has been a huge shift in the IEA position in the last several years. They seem to be furiously back peddling away from their complete denial of a peak in oil production before 2030 to a position that on the surface is not incompatible with their former projections, but which increasingly supports some of the basic elements of the peak oil argument: that non-OPEC production is nearing a peak (or plateau?), that most future growth has to come from OPEC and the Middle East OPEC states in particular, and perhaps we shouldn't be so trusting that those few states will really step up to the plate.
I think it's significant that the WSJ is giving the IEA report an alarming spin and noting that the report is a big break from past assessments, especially given the financial press' tendency to assume the cornucopian viewpoint without question.
I sent them a letter debunking their arguments, borrowing from Heinberg and throwing in a shot at the folly of the expected hydrogen economy, but surprise, surprise, the only letter they printed about that story was one that suggested that ANWR not be counted as a single year's equivalent to US consumption, but as x million barrels per year over a certain number of years.
No news to you folks but I believe that Wall Street in particular has a lot to fear from Peak Oil. The impact on the stock market could be devastating. My personal view is that PO won't result in the end of the world, but the end of the middle class.
Seriously though, I agree that the loss of high-paying, blue collar jobs overseas has already hurt the middle class, but I also suspect that high-paying, white collar jobs, like mine, are going to be scarcer in a post-peak world.
With less energy supporting our society, we will lose a layer or two of complexity in our economy, and complexity is what gave rise to the populous white-collar class.
I'm already experiencing what this will be like myself. I'm a former globe-trotting, big city corporate communications manager now living in rural Vermont. It's quite a change. A lot of the people around here are very self-sufficient, and get by on very little compared to city and suburban folks.
Hence IEA's push for making sure the orange (MENA fields) is squeezed dry before moving on to the less juicy fruits.