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Tech Talk - Cutting Back on Supply in the Presence of Optimism
Posted by Heading Out on May 26, 2013 - 5:28am
We have reached, I would suppose, a period of complacency in the perception of the coming of Peak Oil. We are in a period where, as recent posts have shown, the promises of bountiful supply are built on increasingly tenuous propositions. Unfortunately, the evolving story of the mess that we are heading into is at a point where the critical aspects of the problem rate minor paragraphs in articles that largely talk about something else. And the potential of the fossil fuels that lie within shale have commentators drooling over the benefits that will come from this abundant resource. Unfortunately, within this euphoria there are sufficient concerns that need airing, since overall, the situation has not changed that much since the Hirsch Report was published, just over eight years ago.
One of the points that was made in that report was that it would take some twenty years for new technologies to mitigate the foreseen shortages of liquid fossil fuels, made when gasoline prices averaged some $2 a gallon. Driven by concerns over climate change, there has been a significant effort to find alternate fuel options that can provide a renewable option. And the hopes for these producers lead to predictions of a different future.
The British Department of Energy and Climate Change (DECC) has just released a report on the future of coal-fired power plants in Germany, Spain and the Netherlands. It notes that although Germany will open more coal-fired power plants this year than at any time within the past twenty years, the future for coal is not that promising. In rough numbers, Germany has a peak demand of 85 GW of electricity with coal and lignite capacity of around 47.6 GW in 2011. From then until 2015, an additional 10.7 GW of coal-fired plant will come on line. The DECC report notes that while an additional 2.7 GW of plant are in development they have not advanced and, it is suggested, they will likely be cancelled. Some 22 coal-fired projects have been cancelled, and four postponed in recent years. A new plant does not spring, like corn, fresh out of the ground within months of planting. Rather there are years of effort, and millions invested, before power starts to flow. The report brings these views to the following:
We conclude that further new projects to build coal-fired generation in Germany, the Netherlands, and Spain are all very unlikely.
The three major oil companies each had different technologies on which they hung their hats to ease any fears of the future – including the widespread development of either methane hydrates or the oil shales of Colorado. (Neither of which can be realistically expected to come to pass in the next twenty years). The British National Grid in their view of the future seems to put is faith more in the widespread use of high-efficiency heat pumps.
The also anticipate considerable growth in future sales of electric vehicles, though admitting that their earlier projections for these numbers were overly optimistic.
As a result they anticipate significant reduction in the needs for fossil fuels, although the least optimistic of the scenarios (the Slow Progress one) means that:
In the Slow Progression scenario developments in renewable and low carbon energy are comparatively slow, and the renewable energy target for 2020 is not met until some time between 2020 and 2025. The carbon reduction target for 2020 is achieved but not the indicative target for 2030.
The concern with these optimistic projections, is that it also impacts the investment strategies of those who will need to supply those fuels in the future. Just as it takes time and money to build a power station, so it also takes time to permit and build a coal mine, or an oil or gas well, and the infrastructure to support it.
The current situation in the United States has proponents of the natural gas boom urging the development of export terminals to ship LNG to a global market at a very competitive price. By last December there were plans for a dozen such terminals in the works.
This additional supply, and the likely impact of cheaper natural gas into the European market has already caused Gazprom to rethink its strategy for natural gas development over the next few years.
The major Russian current development is taking place in the Yamal Peninsula, where the Bovanenkovo field, which came on stream last October had been projected to yield 4 Tcf by 2017, increasing 5 Tcf in the out years. Other adjacent fields, Kharasaveyskoye, Kruzensternskoye, Tambey and Nonoportskoye, were scheduled to follow in order to meet anticipated demand.
But those plans are now being scaled back. Russia has already lost some of their Chinese natural gas market to Turkmenistan, and now it can see that the US might take some of the European market. It cost $41 billion to develop Bovanenkovo, which made it “one of the most expensive industrial projects in the world.” Gazprom is cutting production by around 83% of capacity this year, and expects it may have to go lower. The natural follow-on to this will be a slowing of investment and development in Yamal, which also produces oil.
At present Russia is closing in on a record post-Soviet oil production
() reaching a level of 10.49 mbd (the Soviet peak was 11.48 mbd in 1987). Rembrandt recently noted that it is going to take a significant and ongoing investment in order to have any hope of sustaining those numbers.
My concern is that in the current Western euphoria, if all the current plans and projections for alternative supplies and conservation fail, those who must invest to build the alternative infrastructure that will provide sufficient fuel will not be motivated to make those investments in a timely manner. If they do not, or have not, then we will still need the 20-years that Robert Hirsch and his committee projected, when we run out of that time. (That clock is ticking). Unfortunately, those whosing this song, like Cassandra, are less likely to be heard in this interval.
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Thanks HO.
As a Brit I had not read that Sept 2012 offering from our National grid.
It makes rather weird reading - I find none of their axioms or scenarios convincing, let alone representing 'alternatives' to one another.
The big feature in our Western economies since 2008 (2005?) seems to have been the aggregate reduction in demand for primary energy as well as a reduced demand for liquid fuel. Similarly, the trends in ratios of ‘expensive’ fuel to ‘cheap’ fuel seem to go on substituting expensive for cheap. Even the large investment in Chinese manufacturing (including 'off shoring' previous Western manufacture) seems to be running out of utility for us in the West or OECD even while it has accelerated burning of 'cheap' Chinese coal. Rembrandt et al 2011 remarkable paper describes this predicament.
http://www.iier.ch/content/green-growth-oxymoron
It may well be that investment in 'Renewables' is a 'boondoggle', as again discussed in Rembrandt 2011, but however rapid the recent or continuing growth in PV and wind power, it seems pretty ‘small beer’ in any case in the larger industrial scheme. Returns on investment including those for energy projects within OECD seem not to have kick-started much of an aggregate ‘revival’ in industrial or overall economic expansion and to have excluded Nuclear as well as any Renewables as likely commensurate substitutes for existing primary energy. (We should not mention ethanol I guess.)
In the US the reasons for competitive NG surplus just now have been explained before I think, but as I understand them, these ride on the back of perception of profit from co-produced oil, which would not seem to alter very much the trend in ratios I mention above?
Phil H
A serious omission from the British National Grid Report in my view is not discussing the potential for much more efficient use of gas, or indeed gasified coal, in combined heat and power through the use of fuel cells.
This is also largely omitted from this report on future gas generation strategy:
https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/fil...
At 1.13 above savings are shown at around 30% from (non fuel cell) CHP installations.
Although only recently coming into use, both in Germany and particularly in Japan CHP fuel cells are rapidly approaching full commercial viability, both in PEM units and SOFC from Kyocera.
http://www.greencarcongress.com/2012/01/japan-20120115.html
Although they are expensive, costs are dropping fast and Japan projects home installations of around 5 million units by 2030:
http://www.fuelcelltoday.com/news-events/news-archive/2012/june/forecast...
Solar and fuel cell combinations are also being developed in Japan:
http://fuelcellsworks.com/news/2013/01/10/jx-nippon-oil-energy-corp-will...
Meanwhile in Germany the use of fuel cells is central to their plans to run the grid largely on renewables, with both biomass and stored wind and solar power being utilised.
http://www.fuelcelltoday.com/news-events/news-archive/2012/october/germa...
Re: EV graph for UK and peak oil complacency
Meanwhile, the reality downunder is:
Era of the Aussie car over
Australia's loss-making car industry is under threat and risks closure following Ford's move to end nearly 100 years of local manufacturing.
The decision comes as Ford revealed fresh losses of $141 million and as the ACTU warned of up to 10,000 jobs being shed across the industry. The iconic Falcon brand will cease to exist.
Despite receiving hefty government subsidies, the three local car makers - Toyota, Holden and Ford - reported losses of more than $320 million in their latest filings.
''Our cost structure remained uncompetitive … [it is] double that of Europe and nearly four times that of Ford in Asia,'' he said. Even if Ford slashed wages and received
even larger subsidies, ''the business case did not stack up''.
http://www.smh.com.au/business/era-of-the-aussie-car-over-20130523-2k48f...
No one links the closures of refineries and car factories to peak oil which is a process having started in 2005.
Australian car production peaked in 2004 at 407 K. See fig 2.1.1 and table 8 in:
http://www.innovation.gov.au/Industry/Automotive/Statistics/Documents/Ke...
>> "No one links the closures of refineries and car factories to peak oil which is a process having started in 2005."
Peak Oil is not the reason for the closures.
The refineries closure is due to the newer/larger/more economic refineries in Singapore/Malaysia and the Ford factory closure is due to the same reasons in Thailand.
Ford Australia to close Broadmeadows and Geelong plants, 1,200 jobs to go
That's what the media say. Malaysia? Crude oil production peaked there. In fact, the whole South East Asian crude production has peaked in 2007. Australian refineries now have to get crude oil from far afield, e.g. West Africa, Libya, Russia and Azerbaijan, and that is getting harder and harder. They don't upgrade their refineries because they know it's a shrinking game
http://crudeoilpeak.info/australian-graphs/oil-and-fuel-imports
4/2/2013
Shrinking crude oil exports - a tough game for oil importers
http://crudeoilpeak.info/shrinking-crude-oil-exports-a-tough-game-for-oi...
27/7/2012
After Sydney's refinery closure: Caltex to import fuel from Chevron's shrinking sales
http://crudeoilpeak.info/after-sydney-refinery-closure-caltex-to-import-...
Singapore depends entirely on the Middle East.
Australian car production peaked already in 2004 and became unprofitable in 2005. The world produces too many cars compared to limited oil supplies. That's peak oil. Yes, there are other reasons but it's the long-term oil supply outlook which certainly they are aware of.
>> "Malaysia? Crude oil production peaked there."
So what.
Refineries source (appropriate) crude from all over the world.
Australia's refineries are older/smaller/less economic compared to Singapore/Malaysia, its a simple economic decision.
>> "Australian car production peaked already in 2004 and became unprofitable in 2005. The world produces too many cars compared to limited oil supplies. That's peak oil."
The (too many) number of cars produced in the world has nothing to do with Ford's decision to close production in Australia. The reason for the closure is simply due to the economics of production in Thailand vs Australia.
Economic decisions. Yes. How actually do you think peak oil to evolve? Someone saying: oh there is peak oil, we have to close down? There will be many economic decisions which will bring about the dismantling of an oil dependent system. There are always other factors at work of course so the media focus is on these because they still have not accepted the concept of peaking oil. If petrol were cheap, Ford could have continued with its gas guzzlers.
27 May 2013
World car production grows 3 times faster than global oil supplies
http://crudeoilpeak.info/world-car-production-grows-3-times-faster-than-...
>> "There are always other factors at work of course so the media focus is on these because they still have not accepted the concept of peaking oil. If petrol were cheap, Ford could have continued with its gas guzzlers."
I am not arguing against Peak Oil.
I am simply stating that the reasons for the closures were due to economic decisions, not peak oil. If petrol were cheap and Ford continued with gas guzzlers, it would still be cheaper to produce them in Thailand than in Australia.
This appears to be a symptom of Dutch Disease.
The Australian dollar is about 50% overpriced, due to commodity exports like coal. That means manufacturers, like car makers, can't compete with manufacturing in other countries.
Today on CNN GPS it was mentioned that the IMF suggests Britain spends/borrows on infrastructure and dial back the austerity cuts. NG storage makes sense since they were down to a 6 hour cushion of supply this past winter. They could fill storage whern prices are low or from LNG sources from NA.
Paulo
2005 Hirsch report ( http://www.netl.doe.gov/publications/others/pdf/Oil_Peaking_NETL.pdf ) wasn't really useful - it was concerned exclusively with finding new sources of liquid fuels.
page 44: "Fuel switching to electricity"
"In the future, electricity storage may improve enough to win consumer acceptance of electric automobiles. In addition, extremely high gasoline prices may cause some comsumers to find EV's more acceptable, especially for around-town use. Such a shift in public preferences is unpredictable, so electric vehicles cannot now be projected as a significant offset to future gasoline use."
On the other hand, I agree: EREVs, and hybrids are likely to dominate over EVs for quite some time.
On the 3rd hand, Hirsch should have considered hybrids and plug-in hybrids/EREVs - that's a major omission. I guess plug-in hybrds and EREVs were getting very little attention at the time, so it's a little bit understandable that he'd make that mistake. OTOH, he did make the mistake, and it's a crucial one.
---------------
Hirsch's analysis is sloppy. First, we see sloppiness in inconsistent data. On page 4 we see"The average age of U.S. automobiles is nine years. Under normal conditions, replacement of only half the automobile fleet will require 10-15 years." And, on page 27 we see: "Recent studies show that one half of the1990-model year cars will remain on the road 17 years later in 2007." There's a real difference between "10-15" and "17 years".
Second, both are wrong. In fact, the the median point is 6 years of age: 50% of Vehicle Miles Travelled comes from vehicles 6 years old or less.
Let me put a fine point on that: Hirsch said replacement of half the automobile fleet would require 10-17 years, when the correct figure was 6.
Part of the problem with the fleet replacement time is the chosen metric varies.
Your six year number is weighted by vehicle miles traveled, and because newer cars are driven more will give a smaller number than if you counted all operational vehicles evenly. Also the lifespan may be changing, which further complicates matters.
Yes, one could consider it a different metric, but it's the appropriate one. Weighting by VMT is simply more accurate for an analysis of this sort. Anything else is misleading and flawed. After all, who cares about 15 year old cars driving only 1,000 miles per year?
Yes, lifespan is going up, so the VMT midpoint might now be 6.5 or 7 years. On the other hand, people keep their cars in part because there's little that's new - the automatic transmission was the last big improvement, and that was 60 years ago. If public policy (or oil prices) shift the industry sharply to EREVs etc, that number could go down significantly. Already, taxis fleets are converting sharply to hybrids.
Let me put a fine point on that: Hirsch said replacement of half the automobile fleet would require 10-17 years, when the correct figure was 6.
Here is a 2012 artical.
http://business.time.com/2012/03/20/what-you-only-have-100k-miles-on-you...
Now, the New York Times offers the viewpoint that, in terms of cars and mileage, 200,000 is the new 100,000.
The Times reports a robust market for used Hondas, Toyotas, and Volvos with 150,000 or 200,000 miles on them, and these vehicles aren’t expected to be scrappers plucked for parts, but as solid commuter cars with good life left in them
Data gathered by Polk indicate that, as of the third quarter of 2011, the average driver who purchases a car new hangs onto the vehicle for 71.4 months, or just shy of six years. That figure has been climbing for years, measuring about 60 months in 2009, 54 months in 2007, and 50 months in 2003, when the firm started tracking this information.
Read more: http://business.time.com/2012/02/23/drivers-upgrading-to-new-cars-at-slo...
The cash for clunkers program distorted the numbers which would suggest that people are hung onto cars even longer between 2007 and 2009. It would be interesting to find data on number of cars per garage as this will also extend the life of the car. New neighborhoods have alot more garages than old ones. The data by Polk was talking about when the cars were flipped the first time. I just sold a 1985 Nissan with 90,000 miles. It should be good for another 25 years.
Yes, vehicle lifespan is going up, and people are hanging on to new cars longer. Yet, new car sales are almost back to pre-recession levels, and the volume of used car sales is still 3x as large as new sales.
New cars are still driven more than old cars. For instance, taxi fleets are converting to hybrids, and driving 75k miles per year for the vehicles 1st 4 years of life.
Part of the result: the total number of cars on the road has been rising for years, and i suspect the average VMT per vehicle has been dropping. There are more old cars, but the old:new ratio of VMT hasn't changed that much.
If the fossil fuel junkies get their way by taxing EV's and PHEV's by distance driven using GPS tracking, I think it unlikely that I would ever get one because I am not interested in being tracked by government. The possible success of the people interfering with the conversion adds additional uncertainty and possible delays.
Yes, the FF reactionary forces (is there a pun there?) are on the warpath.
Seems like the fate of the world hangs on that battle, doesn't it?
Or at least my ability to stop using gasoline.
First off, thank you Heading Out for this post. I too, wonder if all the techno-optimism is justified. I was particularly interested in what you wrote about Germany (the rapid increase in coal-powered capacity).
Much as I hate to say it, I have to take some of my fellow greens to task for their overly rosy predictions about how Germany will in the near future be able to meet all its needs for electricity with solar panels and wind farms (and thus will have no need for nuclear). In order to make such a thing happen, there will either need to be a breakthrough in electricity storage technology, or else Germany will just revert to coal-powered generation as a backup (and only if sufficient coal is available, which it probably isn't).
What I see as a the most realistic future for Germany - lots more solar panels and wind farms, with frequent fallback to coal, accompanied by increasing brownouts/blackouts and desperate attempts to buy power from neighbors (most of which will be generated by coal, natural gas and nuclear). And of course, it won't only be Germany that finds itself in this predicament.
Thus, a future of power shortages, rising CO2 levels, with global warming to match. What a thing to leave the younger generation! As the Earth marches to a population of maybe 10 billion by 2050, I find it hard to be optimistic. Maybe the 10,000 survivors still alive by 2150 (mainly living in the Arctic and Antarctic regions) will be OK though.
Some remakes on your reality detached contribution:
1) All the coal capacity was planned BEFORE the nuclaer phase out was announced, often with the wrong assumption that renewables simply can not provide enough energy. Here the differenece between wind turbines in 2000 and 2010 is telling.
2) The Energiewende has as target to replace 80% of the FF power with renewables until 2050, some studies showed that 100% are possible. In all scenarios we have of course between 2010 and 2050 coal power plants, question is how many and with how many FLHs.
3) After the Energiewende was seriuosly launched and despite the phase out of nuclear no new coal power plants are in the pipeline. Most of the older projects died. Until 2022 75% of added renewable capacity is used to compensate for the loss of nuclear, after 2022, coal will face a loss of 4% per year.
4) Even the German lignite producer assume that there is no need for the avaiable capacity, coal will die.
5) Try to understand the difference between power and energy. The problem for the FF capacity is that already 2020(!) around 25 GW (of 85 GW peak) are running with less than 200 FLH per year, this trend will of course continue. New coal power plants are not longer able to run with high FLH, they become too expensive.
6) Of course we will have even after 2050 backup power capacity, this will be methane fuled (P2G) or biomass. Until then written of coal power plants with low FLH are a good alternative.
7) Germany does not import more energy, get hard data (smoking pot is no substitute in a serious discussion :-)). Your "..accompanied by increasing brownouts/blackouts and desperate attempts to buy power from neighbors" is complete nonsense.
One should not forget that Germany sits in the center of the european power grid, making it much easier to balance varying supply and demand.
Portugal I guess will face more difficulties as it has way less options for electricity im-/export.
By the way: A free registration at www.entsoe.net grants access to two-hour-delay visualization of power flows across borders in Europe.
FLH = Full Load Hours, I presume. (I haven't seen the abbreviation before.)
If so, point 5) should read "New coal power plants are not longer able to run with low FLH, they become too expensive."
No, the capacity ("power band") with low full load hours will be 25 GW around 2020 and will increase even further. Expensive coal power plants need a certain number of FLH to be competitive against cheap gas turbines with high fuel NG price, therefore, with a quite saturated market at the moment there is no room for new coal power as long as renewables can easily provide replacement capacity. NG may have a come-back in a few years.
Germany has around 50 GW coal, with 40 years of operation of a plant we need around 1 GW (= 8 TWh p.a.) replacement, annual addition of 3 GW wind and 3 GW PV (quite conservative estimates) provide around 10 TWh p.a., that is the problem of coal.
FLH = full load hour
"Of course we will have even after 2050 backup power capacity, this will be methane fuled (P2G).."
The use of the words "of course" implies that it is a "fact".... while P2G tech holds great promise, but it is by NO MEANS proven and established. To say it WILL be a backup in 2050 is not creditable.
With regards to biomass what exactly will you use for fuel?
Further, Coal plants are base load plants, they like to run at one steady point and do not follow grid loads. Getting a coal plant on line (I have been out of the elec gen arena for 20 years so, maybe it has changed but I doubt it) takes many days (depending on the plant design), you don't just turn these babies off and on, or throttle them back.
There have been articles written regarding the German grid stability, these issues are going to have to be addressed.
The problem with many of the things you site is that the tech is not proven, and there will be lessons and mistakes made along the way to "getting it right"... this takes time, money and "bright engineers".... tick-tock, tick-tock.......
http://www.spiegel.de/international/germany/instability-in-power-grid-co...
The FLHs of the remaining conventional power plants will be very low FLH (<500) but Germany may need at the same time around 50 GW power for only a few days per year. The only solution for this are chaep gas turbines at the moment.
In the 80% scenario of the German government these turbines would be fueled by NG, gasified coal or gasified biomass. In a 100% scenario methane from P2G would be used.
Hard coal power plants are used in Germany for decades as intermediate power plants, usually they are powered down on Friday evening and come back on-line Monday morning.
The intersting observation for Germany is that despite large increase of renewables the NG power plants lost 14% of their market share in 2012. Modern coal power plants are very flexible, even the lignite plants can align their output quite fast. I still have to find a serious source that find a too small power gradient (GW/h) for the next decade.
That is true for the old coal plants only because they were designed to operate continuously. Some of the newer ones are being designed to operate intermittently. This is not a technical barrier.
The nuclear phase-out was announced in 2000. The coal capacity was planned before that? I don't think so. (Merkel sort-of reversed the phase-out in 2010, then re-reversed it in 2011.)
In other words, 75% of renewable capacity to be added in the next ten years -- at considerable expense -- will be wasted.
OK, I should have been more precise:
1) The accelarated phase out was announced 2011.
2) The uitilities severely understimated the impact of wind power (and PV) around 2000-2005, even with 15000 turbines wind only contributed ~3% to the electricity production in 2005. The managers made jokes in thesee years and did not realise that they had already lost a important battle. Everything we see now, was plannned and missed back then. Now only the replacement for these old turbines (10000 turbines with 3 MW and 2500 FLH, i.e. 75 TWh per year) will cost the coal power plants around 20% of their market share in the next decade.
3) You have to check the natural replacement level for coal power , this is around 1-1.5 GW per year. Only if there is over a longer period of time more added capacity than this then you have something like a come-back. The hard facts show, that with the current empty pipeline the coal capacity will be reduced in future. The rate is determined by NG price, CO2 certificates and the ability of German utilities to find new markets in neighbour countries. Here they have the claer advantage that German power plants are very efficient.
4) It is correct, that from a CO2 point of view most of the added green capacity is wasted until 2022, a delayed phase out of nuclear power would have been better, however, was in 2011 political suicide.
OK, I should have been more precise:
1) The accelarated phase out was announced 2011.
2) The uitilities severely understimated the impact of wind power (and PV) around 2000-2005, even with 15000 turbines wind only contributed ~3% to the electricity production in 2005. The managers of German uitilities made jokes in thesee years and did not realise that they had already lost an important battle. Everything we see now, was plannned and missed back then. Only the replacement of these old turbines (->10000 turbines with 3 MW and 2500 FLH, i.e. 75 TWh per year) will cost the coal power plants around 20% of their market share in the next decade.
3) You have to check the natural replacement level for coal power , this is around 1-1.5 GW per year. Only if there is over a longer period of time more added capacity than this then you have something like a come-back. The hard facts show, that with the current empty pipeline the coal capacity will be reduced in future. The rate is determined by NG price, CO2 certificates and the ability of German utilities to find new markets in neighbour countries. Here they have the claer advantage that German power plants are very efficient.
4) It is correct, that from a CO2 point of view most of the added green capacity is wasted until 2022, a delayed phase out of nuclear power would have been better, however, was in 2011 political suicide.
>> "My concern is that in the current Western euphoria, if all the current plans and projections for alternative supplies and conservation fail, those who must invest to build the alternative infrastructure that will provide sufficient fuel will not be motivated to make those investments in a timely manner. If they do not, or have not, then we will still need the 20-years that Robert Hirsch and his committee projected, when we run out of that time."
Its a real conundrum.
When you say "those who must invest to build the alternative infrastructure"
- who do you think are "those who must invest" ?
- what do you think the "alternative infrastructure" would be ?
I note in the opening remarks Robert Hirsch's ASPO YT video: Robert Hirsch - The Impending World Oil Shortage: Learning from the Past
He says it is a liquid fuels problem, with approx $50-100T of capital equipment built to operate on liquid fuels and there is no way to change that quickly. Electrification also wont have any impact quickly, but longer term technologies will be electrified with a better long term future.
My interpretation is that he is not referring to specific people. If one is going to build an alternative infrastructure, then someone must invest in that endeavor.
I was simply curious if HO had a particular view in mind.
You could argue for example that Governments may be the investor of last resort (assuming they have/print the money) if the private sector cant/wont invest.
The second point is just what would that alternative infrastructure be ?
Consider a hypothetical scenario in which you are given the job of Transition away from Liquid Fuels Manager (and assume you have the funding). What would you do ? Where would you start ?
While I think most would agree there is a need to start ASAP (perhaps 10 years ago), its not immediately obvious to me (yet) exactly what alternative infrastructure should be built.
Robert Hirsch says we will start to see problems with liquid fuels within the next three years. He also says electrification wont happen quickly. So what to do ?
Do you invest in CTL and GTL (Hirsch report) as a short term bridging measure to allow time for electrification to catch up ?
Do you invest in LNG/CNG filling stations as a short term bridging measure ?
Do you simultaneously invest in the grid ? or Do you think distributed PV/Wind/V2G is the way to go ?
Do you simultaneously invest in hydrogen FCEV filling stations ?
Do you invest in mass electrification of commuter rail/bus ?
How would you choose which path (particularly given evolving technology) ?
How would you assess commercial/technical risk ?
I think Hirsch is right about needing 20 years, but if he started tomorrow, what would he do ?
What would TOD commentators do?
I think the obvious first thing to do is get serious about conservation: Europeans have about as good a standard of living as Americans, but only use about half as much energy.
Energy conservation helps with both the energy problem and the global warming problem.
Several simple and effective things:
For Peak Oil:
1) Increase federal gas taxes to about $3/gallon, but increase it by $.05/month till you get there, and rebate all revenues to reduce FICA taxes.
2) accelerate CAFE regs.
3) implement mandatory HOV lanes on all highways.
For Climate Change:
1) Create a stiff carbon tax.
2) Implement an aggressive Renewable Portfolio requirement.
Nick, I think if you do #1 (Increase federal gas taxes to about $3/gallon), there will be enough conservation that you won't need to do the HOV lanes.
I imagine you're right. I think a multi-pronged effort is useful, though, as some people aren't that price sensitive, and often one kind of policy can get enacted/implemented where another element fails.
Belt and suspenders.
1. First eliminate the opposition. Declare martial law, shut down Fox News, nationalize the oil industry and put Republican leaders and people like the Koch Brothers in indefinite military detention. Halt construction on the Keystone XL pipeline. Basically, take charge.
2. Increase the tax on gasoline and diesel and spend it maintaining the roads and building replacement infrastructure.
3. To compensate for the increased fuel tax, encourage conservation. That conservation could be in vehicular fuel efficiency, carpooling, public transportation, more energy efficient homes and demand side management to better align demand with renewable energy sources. For example, refrigerator/freezers can be designed to run only during the day with thermal mass to keep them cold at night. This frees up electricity to charge electric vehicles at night.
4. Get the U.S. out of the Middle East and stop wasting money and lives keeping the oil flowing. Focus on eliminating the dependency on oil instead of perpetuating it.
5. Because the best alternative for transportation fuel is electricity, encourage the conversion to electricity.
6. Electrify the long distance freight rail lines and connect renewable energy systems to the overhead power lines. Shift the freight traveling along interstate highways in semi-trailer trucks to trains. Businesses need to relocate near the tracks.
7. Converting transportation fuel to electricity should be accompanied by a conversion to renewable electricity sources, otherwise one would be trading one polluting, depleting fuel for another. It is colossally wasteful of money and resource to convert the system from crude oil, to natural gas, to coal and finally to electricity. Just skip to the power source that has the best long term chance of success.
8. Decrease the balance of system costs for residential PV. Standardize the permitting process, standardize a feed-in tariff that favors PV systems, require electricians to attach properly installed DIY systems to the grid, decrease the cost of the electronics and pass a law that forbids NIMBYism. There is obviously room for improvement because Germany is installing them for half the price of Americans.
One must use the existing infrastructure and tools to convert the transportation sytem while keeping the entire system running. It is counterproductive to use some expensive bridging fuel because it wastes money and time. Plug-in series hybrid vehicles are good for the transition because they run from electricity or liquid fuel and minimize the size of the battery. It is also easier to swap a generator running on various fuels than the entire engine of a conventional vehicle. Expect such a transition to take at least 40 years, otherwise you will be shutting down infrastructure before it wears out.
"My concern is that in the current Western euphoria, if all the current plans and projections for alternative supplies and conservation fail, those who must invest to build the alternative infrastructure that will provide sufficient fuel will not be motivated to make those investments in a timely manner. "
For me, this is not a concern but hope. Our current unsustainable way of using resources will not change without a HUGE SHOCK. Humanity needs a new culture. "Sufficient" will have to be redefined drastically.
The timely building of alternative infrastructure would set us up for hitting the next, even more destructive bottleneck (likely ecological collapse).
I visit every day but seldom comment. I have observed that in politics when a Prime Minister says he has every confidence in one of his ministers then that guy is on the way out. The reason is simple – if the PM had every confidence he would not have to make a comment.
Peak Oil is the same. The current flood of comment saying peak oil does not exist is a sign that it does! If it did not exist then there would be no need to make the comment in the first place.
I see a problem with the lack of advanced planning and the execution of those plans. Once we find out we are in a jam, we have 20 years of build out to get to a solution. That is not a good idea.
Perhaps 'we' should have started 20 years ago?
The fact is "we" did not, so now WE have to deal with that.
As someone said upthread:
Jimmy Carter gambled (and lost) his second term by telling Americans, just a few months after his inauguration in 1977, that ending our dependence on imported oil was the "Moral equivalent of war."
He gave his speeches from the Oval Office while wearing a sweater to encourage Americans to turn down their household thermostats.
But Americans didn't want to hear it so we elected an actor to blow smoke up our butts for eight years and tell us, "It's morning in America!" Of course Reagan quickly pulled the solar water heaters off the White House, turned up the thermostat and defunded the NREL as a sort symbolic middle finger to the environmental movement. 40 year wasted. And now we know you can't get elected by telling Americans the truth. So sad.
I think we need to keep telling the Carter story (him speaking the truth while wearing cardigan sweaters on TV, solar panels on the WH, free residential energy audits, etc.). The younger generation of college students never heard it.
It may be worth the effort since they are the ones who seem willing to accept smaller abodes, are backing away from car ownership, and seem a bit more interested in "experiences" than in "consuming goods" (a bit of Angus Campbell's "being and becoming" rather than "having and hoarding?"). But they could use a bit of nudging.
Us old folks may be jaded; the younger among us, not so much.
[ Unless you think it's all utterly hopeless. But then, I ask, why are you even bothering reading TOD? ]
I was young then. I heard it. I lived it - I passed it on to my kids . . . I tried!
Best to all,
Kate
We energy geeks easily assume that voter perceptions of his energy policy were an important factor in Carter's re-election defeat, but they weren't, really.
18% interest rates and and the resulting recession were the important things (yes, oil helped raise the level of interest rates, but inflation was high before the 70's oil shocks, due to the Vietnam war spending, and the Fed's goosing the economy for the 72 election). The Iran hostages didn't help.
"It's the economy, stupid!" - Clinton.
Whereas automobiles could probably be converted in 20 years with a concerted effort, I suspect converting the fixed infrastructure would require more like 40 years because most of it is designed to last that long. A quicker conversion would require closing plants before the end of their lifetimes which would encounter fierce resistance from the people who have monetary interests.
Thanks, HO, but ...
I don't see complacency, I see the lull before the crash. All the hopeful talk of the original Hirsch Report was based on the expectation that 'somebody else' not the team writing the report, would do the grunt work of getting the numbers right. Whoever it was who was expected to actually do the work, has, all of them, come up empty handed and retired from the scene. Only the 'cheerleaders' are left.
In the UK we're experiencing an odd consequence of the aftermath of local 'Peak Coal': There are about 200 Heritage Railways that run old steam locos through some scenic bits of Britain. For example the heritage railway in North Yorkshire that featured in several Harry Potter movies. These tourist lines generate tens of millions of £/$ for their local tourist industries.
Unfortunately they're having great difficulty sourcing low ash coal (the locos use 2 tonnes a day or thereabouts) due to Scottish Coal going bust, and Daw Mill colliery being closed due to an underground fire that it's uneconomical to extinguish.
So they're having to source coal from Poland and Russia, which is pushing up costs. 50 years ago the UK was producing megatonnes of steam coal.
See http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/uknews/road-and-rail-transport/10057288/...
Do you happen to know whether during the long history of British coal there were other examples of mines being abandoned because they could not put out the fire? Plenty of flooded mines abandoned for whatever reason and old coal bings that smouldered for decades but I do not remember hearing of others still burning underground?
(Never mind - according to local legend here in NE England there is plenty of coal still down there if we run out oil and gas, never mind steam coal.)
I was face trained (i.e. taught how to shovel coal and prop up the roof with wood) on an manually loaded longwall coal face at Seghill Colliery in the UK in 1962. At that time, there was a section of the mine, which had been largely sealed off, which was smoldering and you could smell it in some of the roadways.
Centralia, Pennsylvania, US is above a coal mine that has been burning since the 1960's. The town has been mostly abandoned. I still don't get how/why we don't at least try to put out those fires. Seems like a huge waste of fossil fuel, and presumably the emissions will enter the atmosphere anyway. And without the advantage of controlled, efficient, (reasonably) clean combustion.
Yes, I agree that most of the facts and realities regarding each person's individual perspective according to the theory of Peak Oil are going to be increasingly obscured by the proliferation unconventional petroleum recovery, and unconventional petroleum harvesting methods.
My own perspective and previous readings of production estimates and drilling research would have concluded that an increasing amount of conventional petroleum product would now be coming from deeper wells - off the shores of Africa, South America and the Gulf of Mexico.
That ain't happening - is it? Does anybody remember the old charts? None of them included much coming from fracking or shale sands.