Prof. Goose's Comment:

New stuff in this introductory comment, 1 JUL 10.

A continued humble and sincere thank you to all who have donated thus far. It will help us pay for the fourth server we brought online to accommodate the increased traffic. (See point 3 below.)

1. The Oil Drum is a special place. We strive to maintain a high signal to noise ratio in our comment threads. Short, unengaging comments, or comments that are off topic, are likely to be deleted without notice. (to be clear--engaging, on point humor and levity, more than welcome.)

We are trying to perform a service to the public here to coordinate smart people who know their stuff with other people who want to learn about what's going on. Promotion of that ideal will be the criteria by which we make our decisions about what stays and what goes.

Flame wars, polemic exchanges, and other content deleterious to the community will be removed, either by an editor or by the community through its moderation process.

2. If you see a problematic comment USE THE COMMENT MODERATION SYSTEM--see the "Flag as inappropriate" and (?) beside it? Learn more there. If you see comments that are questionable after you've done that (that aren't being removed), let us know at the eds email address.

It is up to this community to enforce the norms we have established here (a high signal to noise ratio), keep. it. up.

Our guide to commenting at TOD can be found here: http://www.theoildrum.com/special/guidelines . Please check it out if you are unfamiliar with it, but it is essentially 1) citations welcome (if not necessary), 2) be kind to others, and 3) be nice to the furniture.

3. We have gotten a lot of queries whether this bump in traffic is adding costs to keep the site functioning. Truth is, yes, we are incurring added expenses from these events. It is also true that we try not to beg from you very often as we are not the types to bother you with constant queries.

That being said, if you are inclined to help out, your support is always welcome and very much appreciated. To those who have already given, thank you very much.

You can find the donate button in the top left hand corner of the main page.

4. If you have come here to vet your plan to kill the well, understand that you will be queried on whether or not you have read all the other previous comment threads and all the myriad plans that have already been run by the kind folks in this room; if you have actually read all the comment threads and still think your plan has legs, well, then maybe yours really is the one that will save the Gulf of Mexico.

This is not to say that well considered questions about current attempts and modifications to those attempts are not welcome; they are. But try to place them in context and in what's actually going on, as opposed to your MacGyver dream solution where you have a 10 megaton bomb, an ice pick, and Commander Spock at your side.

5. If you would like to catch up with what's been going on in the last few days, our IRC channel has been maintaining a FAQ, which is an open source log full of information, links, and such. Check it out: http://docs.google.com/View?id=dff7zmqz_7c6rdwsc9

6. Also, if you're looking for live chat to talk about the ROV/LMRP video, etc., and are IRC capable, go to freenode, the channel is #theoildrum

(google MIRC and download it; Hit the lightening bolt and fill in your info; select the server as "freenode" (it is in the server list), hit connect; when connected type /join #theoildrum)

or you can get there just via a browser: http://webchat.freenode.net / Just enter a nickname and #theoildrum in the boxes; then when connected type /join #theoildrum)

7. Don't be afraid to go back and read the last couple of open threads yesterday and today before you start on this thread. They are really good, and will likely catch you up if you have been out of the loop for a while. We shut down threads when we get to 300-400 comments, as it's really unmanageable. Lots of good stuff in there though.

8. Yes, HO and others have put up many counterarguments to the "DougR" comment. There are many many links, but the first one was here: http://www.theoildrum.com/node/6609. If you ask in the thread nicely, they will also point you to others.

At least the pressure is still rising - sure looks like a lot of attention(ROV-wise) is focused on the seafloor

Thad Allen's latest words "When the test is eventually stopped (return to containment)". Note it doesn't say "When the test is stopped". Nothing can be assumed from that statement because "eventually" suggests possible further extensions of the test time (event dependent) allowing for changes to what happens next depending on what they see.

I point this out because some people have taken it as meaning they have decided definitely to end the complete closure at some point and produce the well. To me it has just left that as a default option if they don't have absolute confidence after further tests.

Hoping for a response from an industry member here,
with your indulgence I am reposting this query.
The thread closed before much chance of reply:

"We find no evidence of lack of integrity..."
- Kent Wells @ 7:30am briefing 7/17/10

I find this conclusion by Kent Wells bizarre. Logic seems to be stood on it's head here. Are we being spun a flimsy certainty on well integrity?

Rewind back to the Top Kill attempt now shrouded in the mists of memory. Am I correct in saying that the Top Kill was abandoned precisely because the top well pressure was found to be in between 6,000 to 7,000psi? And this development was a sufficiently worrying indication of the likelihood of a down hole breach to cause the abandonment of Top Kill.

Fast forward a couple of months to the last few days. Now with a sealed cap in place the pressure is again found to be in the same range of 6,000 to 7,000psi.

But this time the finding is readily and conveniently dismissed on the basis of well depletion (perhaps due to compartmentalization). Obviously the earlier low pressure could not be dismissed by well depletion.

There seems to be a viable alternative explanation.

There is a breach down hole which is either a crossflow leak or a leak into formation. That leak was there at Top Kill and caused the low pressure reading. That leak still is there and confirms the earlier Top Kill pressure reading. There is a 75 million bbl reservoir with no compartmentalization and there is no significant well depletion.

Instead we have a down hole breach which is in stable equilibrium and feeding steadily (not explosively) into formation. (It could even in theory be feeding natural seepage lines all this time, with the sea floor exit of this seepage many miles away.)

There is no evidence of compartmentalization or well depletion. There is instead an assumption that this depletion explains the low pressure.

Kent Wells is formally correct. There is no evidence of lost well integrity. But absence of evidence is not evidence of absence. And there is a viable alternative explanation of the low pressure which is consistent with our earlier Top Kill pressure reading.

Can you help show the error in my logic? Thanks.

Fdoleza ~

On July 15th you replied to my July 14, 2010 - 8:54pm questions, which were the following….

1# If there are combinations of fluids, they can still be supercritical if the phases exceed critical point, they just become a uniform K, Mpa(atm), weight, density.

#2 If one were to examine a single chemical, at a single point (space) in time (ms), that single chemical at that specific point-in-time (space/time) would also be supercritical, if it has exceeded it's critical point for some reason.

Fdoleza, here was your reply….

[-] fdoleza on July 15, 2010 - 7:25am Permalink | Subthread | Parent | Parent subthread | Comments top

I think Bruce answered very lucidly how this works. Let me add that, if nature allowed molecules to break up and reform the way you surmised, then we would have a real problem staying alive, because hydrocarbons and salty water is what we are...it's just re-jiggered by nature into goo so we can pump it easier.

What I didn’t suggest and what I think you misunderstood or misread is that molecules change without a cause. However, what I did say is that an elemental particle or compounds have a critical point (boiling point) and when their K,MPa(atm),weight,density EXCEEDS the critical point for the particular molecule(s), they synthesize and achieve a supercritical form (steady state/ambient molecules transform from solid to liquid or liquid to gas).

I can’t speak for you, but I don’t have any trouble staying alive because I don’t have the necessary K,MPa(atm),weight,density AND a catalyst applied to my organic makeup which would cause my molecules to become critical or supercritical.

My personal opinion is still that a weak-point exists in the well, the molecular contents of the well bore re-assorted and there was something that caused those molecules to re-assort. Once the re-assortment process began and continued to occur there was molecular re-assortment chain reaction occurring, with various temperature changes to the molecules and the casing(s)(different molecular combinations with different tolerances). I believe this reaction occurred very quickly along every square inch of the well bore, from the bottom of the casing(s) all the way up to the top, the reaction occurring maybe a millisecond per vertical inch. And similarly, now that the pressures are equalizing, there is an inverse effect, which has its own set of challenges. Maybe they are now operating the well like a dimming light switch. Instead of a dimming dial they are “fine tuning” the well with pumps and vents to keep an optimal pressure before they resume the bottom kill operations.

Like many folks here, I don't think all the pieces add up. We are not privy to all the nitty-gritty details, so it is hard to deduce and rule out any scenario without all the facts. I made some exotic guesses on the off chance some of them might be relevant.

Well, I'm going to see a movie with my daughter. Hope you have a good evening and thanks for sharing all of your expertise.

I am downloading my Photobucket, but there is something you need to see. The metal boom system at Perdido Pass in Orange Beach Alabama is causing the pass to fill up. Notice the sand piling up to boom system. It took too long to make the system, and the original design was modified many times. Promised separation equipment never materialized and this white elephant needs to go.

I need a little bit of help here.

I am currently working on a master's program (in Homeland Security) and my curent class is in crisis management. One of the books discussed the concept that there are things called 'prenomes' that occur prior to a crisis that - at least in hindsight - could have been used to warn that an orginization is at risk for a crisis. An example used in the book was a Union Carbide pesticide plant having a 'near miss' of an accident that could have released tons of methyl isocynate (a deadly poison gas). The plant made immedeate mechanical and procuderal changes to ensure that this event could not happen again. However - this information failed to make its way up the Union Carbide management bureaucracy and be provided to an identical plant in Bhopl, India. The result of this simple failure to share information killed thousands of people.

One of the requirements of this course is that I turn in an APA-formatted research paper.

Now - this is where TOD comes in. Around a month or so ago somebody postes a list of 'near accidents' where the BOP prevented disaster. Additionally, I get the impression that drilling for oil is considered to be a dangerous osccupation by those who do the work.

I am considering writing my paper using the basis that the prenomes for this disaster were the BOP activations on other wells and the culture among drillers that they are in a dangerous line of work and that 'risk' is something to be accepted as part of the job.

My constrast with this will be the FAA's regulation of air safety. In air travel, near accidents' are managed with a similar amount seriousness as actual accidents.

My thesis will be that: 1) The BOP activations werre prenomes to an oil spill disaster due to the fact that it was inevitable that a BOP would eventually fail. 2) The oil drilling industry should change their corporate culture so that each employee on an oil righ should regard his job as 'safe' and that anything that creates risk is an abnormal situation requiring immedeate corrective action.

What I need from all of yuou is 1) comments (I have a thick skin so be honest)* 2) A link to the origional post discussing the BOP activations as well as how to get at the source documents. 3) Information that will either prove or disprove my thesis that an acceptance that wotking in the 'oil patch' carries risks allows people to tolerate and accept risks to a greater extent than professions (such as air travel) that regards themselves as 'safe.'

* I may regret saying this :-)

Yesterday, it was duct tape on the 'hazardous' materials. Today it is rope and plastic wire ties on my favorite rusty fence. Redneck engineering at its best.

My internet connection is on the blink so this is a retry to post something said earlier however, some of the later discussion brings it more into focus since I am proposing a reintroduction of 'top kill' as an interim measure.

Upstream fdoleza talked about the need for equalizing pressures as the RW breaks through to reduce the risk of cracking and crumpling.

After the flow was shut off I asked why drilling mud could not then be introduced at the new cap and allowed to flow down the well in order to reduce the pressure under the cap, and thereby immediately ie before the bottom kill, protect well integrity at the point where some weakness is suspected and leaks to the surrounding formation may - I say 'may' - be occurring - and to facilitate equalization of pressures, on both sides, as the RW breaks through.

Would this be a useful thing to now do? What are the drawbacks?

Hi,
What potential is there for the shale to absorb rises in pressure due to compressibility? (at least along the upper part of the well shaft)
KB

Sorry for my directness. I'd be satisfied with a quick surmise of why not.

HUGE KUDOS to "Another Kevin" for his map of the Macondo site...(and I'm glad he showed up here on the `Drum):

http://www.flickr.com/photos/ke9tv/4741841599/sizes/o/

Regarding the position of the DWH rig wreck, I inferred it's direction from the well head by the inclination of the BOP and headings from HUDs on the ROV feeds during inclination readings. I assumed that the lean of the BOP was primarily due to the forces generated by the sinking rig while the riser was still connected to it. I also assumed that since the riser was about a mile long that the wreck would be "close" to a mile away -- depending on when/if the riser separated.

I have no idea how Kevin "located" it on his map, but I consider it "independent confirmation".

The smoke break tent for the workers. Notice the fire extinguisher. Yet the bridge has a rope and plastic wire tied fence. Tsk, tsk.

Edit: Enlarged to enable reading of sign. Taken from bridge,

[Special to Swift Loris/other TOD lit-geeks] DON'T THE REST OF Y'ALL LOOK.

Woohoo, here -- one for us sentence engineers! Shhhh.

P.S. In the fifth paragraph, WTF?

Speaker To Animals on July 17, 2010 - 6:31pm

$100 a gallon? Whom ever you heard this from is clearly a very poor source of information. I have some practical knowledge of the pricing of dispersants in commercial applications from work in paper recycling I did about 10 years ago. Even the more exotic materials containing silicone oils rarely are above $1 a pound. The ingredients in Corexit suggest pricing circa 50 cents or less per pound.

Your source is off by a factor of 25.
---------------------------------------------------------------

Corexit may be worth 50 cents a pound by they are charging way more than that for it. The following article suggests $40-$60 per gallon. http://www.smartplanet.com/business/blog/smart-takes/bp-oil-spill-puts-n...

What I had heard was that Nalco is getting $99 per gallon for the stuff. I know it sounds outrageous, but I suspect it is true.

TOD people blasted Matt Simmons for his 50,000psi bottom hole pressure on the Macondo well. Rightly so. It would have been impossible to make a drill pipe connection.

Lets see some insightful analysis on BP/government’s expected 8000-9000psi absolute pressure at bottom of closed blind ram upon shutting in the Macondo well. The knowledgeable folks on TOD have been silent on this subject. There is a large difference between the 6720psi result and what was expected. The high value was good before, but now the low value is good.

What principles and numbers were used to calculate this static BOP shut-in pressure (9000-8000psi) for the Macondo well?

"Progress also continues on the two relief wells the federal government has required BP to drill."

Comment seems a bit disingenuous.... Does he really mean that BP didn't want to drill the relief wells, but, thanks to our President and his A#@ kicking threats, BP knuckled under and reluctantly drilled the two relief wells? Is this a prelude to: "They didn't want plug the hole, but I made them do it."?

I was just going to ask someone to take a look at the Q4000 Rov 2 video but when I checked to make sure the seabed shot was the same, the preview window shot was still of the seabed but when clicked it took you to a photo of the orange sonar. I was surprised at the current in the seabed video, with lots of stuff, including what looked like oil and methane cathrate pieces shooting around. Anyone seen anything similar to that today? It sure wasn't the Rov's thrusters.

Something really strange is going on. Now the video won't load, but all the others do. Did I see something they would prefer no one saw??? Sorry for the melodrama, but what I saw didn't look good. Lots of oil and lots of methane.

Anybody know what this piece of gear is and its function? From the Enterprise ROV feed about 8:40pm CDT. First time I've seen this.

Here is a thought...since the new cap is doing it's job, why not just re-do the Top-Kill operation like before? The mud would have no place to go except down the hole like it was supposed to the first time. The injection would be through the origional BOP & once the hole was full & the pressure was at zero, inject plenty of cement to plug the top so the well would be sealed & they could remove the BOP for inspection so they could determine if it's failure was a design flaw, mechanical failure or operator failure. I would think this would be iMportant info for further deep ocean wells.

Jeff

Looks like k3d59's thread beat me to the ticker (with more info) by 3 minutes, regarding chemist Bob Naman's water samples, (which answered the question I had about methodology, headspace gas chromatography)...

This was in regards to water and soil samples in the NE Gulf area. I'm quite a bit south of there, but since I just jumped in the same body of water, I'd like to keep updated on what it is I'm swimmin' in.

the thread I started a few minutes later

Also bringing this thread up from the buried depths, 'cuz it spoke to me in a totally not-anything to do with anything you might care about kind of way. I still read it and nodded my head in agreement all the way through. Well put, David.

David E. Brown's post on what I would call "frames of reference".

I've listened to the briefings and read everything I can on here. Can someone help me understand why they'd want to go back to the collection process again if the well integrity tests are giving positive results? I haven't seen anything yet that explains why they wouldn't allow it to stay shut-in.

The cynical side of me wants to say it's because the collected oil could be worth as much as $5 million per day. But, I must wonder if even BP would attempt any alternative that involved more risk given all the scrutiny at this point.

On the other hand, wouldn't flowing the well give definite proof of the rates at which oil has been escaping -- thus exposing BP to more fines and leading to more accusations of earlier lies about the flow rate. early?

I'm sorry, I am a total TOD newbie and was hoping to lurk on this forum for a long time, but I'm finding it very difficult to parse the useful information out of this thread concerning the integrity test.

It seems that since these integrity test TOD reports have begun, all the very smart people here have shied away from the one crucial discussion point, namely:
WTF does this pressure reading mean?!

Let's review some key, basic points:
1. The gooberment and BP said "above 8000: good. Below 6000: bad." Why did they leave 2000 PSI available for media and public confusion? Now they have been forced to do major levels of media spin to make this whole thing work. Why didn't they say "above 6000 good, below 6000, bad"????

2. Media spin seems pretty dominant in Allen's public statements. "The well is at 6700 PSI" hours later "the well is at 6700 PSI and *rising*"…. what does THAT mean?? Those two number are the same. You're left to wonder-- was it static in the beginning and then finally started rising just as Allen released that statement? Over 24 hours later: "The well is at 6745 PSI and rising"… wtf? You mean in 24 hours it only went up 45 PSI? What is it rising 2 PSI an hour or something?

3. The Simmons "theory": the real leak is far away. A number of you have offered pretty good information backing up the idea that this scenario is either impossible or very unlikely. However, if the pressure is only moderately low, not critically low, BUT barely rising, does that not imply that MAYBE the increase in well pressure from closing it in is in fact pushing the oil out somewhere else-- but that it's perhaps really far away? They are now continuing pressure tests-- perhaps maybe because they're waiting for the slight DROPS in pressure to start occurring once the oil and gas finally reaches the "real" leak site.

4. Does it not seem that the amount of oil that has drained compared to the amount that is "supposed" to be in there is somewhat minuscule and therefore not enough to prompt a lower "minimum pressure needed for all to be well and dandy" PSI number, due to depletion? And if there really has been depletion and THAT explains the low pressure, then it brings me back to point 1, which is why didn't USG and BP give themselves a break and target a lower PSI? If you estimate 60,000 barrels a day for 90 days, compared to the amount that's supposed to be in the well, seems you could get a more accurate pressure prediction for the close-in attempt.

5. And this has been brought up-- why are they planning on re-opening?? Okay i know no one has officially said they ARE going to re-open, yay media-spin once again, but it seems that that's the popular idea amongst those in charge. It seems re-opening only has 2 advantages: a) make money off oil (durrrrr priorities right now maybe?!) or b) there's a leak somewhere else, it's spewing a lot, fast, and we better start racing that f'ing leak w/ more serious collection efforts.

Dunno. I would love to see real information that would give me enough confidence to say "we've plugged the leak" but it just doesn't add up. The above observations are based on pure logic and attempts at educating myself ONLY, i am by no means an expert in this field.

In a nutshell, if the reported cap pressure is 6742 psiG, the bottom-hole pressure is (plausibly) 11868 psia which is just shy of the P_init of around 11900 psia. If it is 6472 psiA, the bhp is around 9588 psia, 2300 psi below P_init.

With so many wild numbers floating around, I don't know what to assume, but ...

#assumptions based on common info I can find
T = 240. #degrees F
rho_oil_api = 38.0 #degrees API
gamma_g = .78 #gas gravity, MW_gas/MW_air
p_bubble = 5500.00 #bubble point pressure of oil, psi
convert_scf_lbmole = 379. #approx conversion for scf to lbmole at 14.7 psi and 60F reference
depth_of_hole = 18360. #feet below sea level
depth_to_seabed = 5067. #feet below sea level
reported_initial_pressure = 11900. #psia
current_cap_pressure = 6742. #psiG? or psia? - A REALLY CRITICAL DETAIL!!

# calculated results,using some standard correlations for
# fluid properties based on the above assumptions
pressure at the seabed = 2280 psia (.45 psi/ft average salt water gradient)
gas-oil ratio at bubble point = 2364 scf/stb
Formation volume factor at bubble point = 2.475 bbl/stb
oil compressibility at bubble point = 2.6e-005 /psi
oil compressibility at 11900 psi = 1.18e-005 /psi
Bo at 11900 is no less than 2.10 bbl/stb
density of oil in well is 173 lbm/bbl
pressure gradient in well is about 0.214 psi/ft

Approx bottom hole pressure = 11868 psia if CAP pressure given in psiG

Approx bottom hole pressure = 9588 psia if CAP pressure given in psiA

Has anyone heard of the results from the A-Whale skimmer testing? It seems that everything has gone quite since the original up roar and its arrival in the gulf.

The press is reporting that the decision to go to containment using surface vessels is now a definite. The "when" part is unclear and the CBS/AP story below finesses the issue of the release of oil into the Gulf as part of the transition to containment:

(CBS/AP) Updated at 6:15 p.m. ET

BP to Open Cap, Resume Oil Collection Sunday

Decision from Feds Comes After BP Says it Felt "More Comfortable" About Cap on Wellhead

The federal government announced Saturday that BP will open up its capped wellhead on the bottom of the Gulf of Mexico and pipe oil into ships on the surface. The collection will begin after a testing period for the cap ends, which was extended to Sunday.

Retired Coast Guard Adm. Thad Allen, the government's point man on the crisis, decided Saturday that after the testing was complete, the cap will be hooked up through pipes to ships on the surface that will collect the oil. Allen said BP will continue to monitor the cap.

The decision to collect the oil likely means releasing crude back into the water temporarily to relieve pressure. It still would not be gushing at the rate it had been before BP's latest fix.

The oil giant was initially given 48 hours to see whether its latest effort to stop the leak was working. Allen made the call to extend the trial run less than two hours after the period ended.

Scientists and engineers were optimistic that the well showed no obvious signs of leaks, but were still struggling to understand puzzling pressure readings emerging from the bottom of the sea.

It will take months, or possibly years for the Gulf to recover. But if the coast was on edge about the impending decision, it wasn't apparent. . . .

BP began Saturday saying they were feeling "more comfortable," though Kent Wells, a BP PLC vice president, cautioned the evaluation was not over. BP and the government want to make sure the well can stay bottled in case of a hurricane, when ships would have to leave the area.

Wells said engineers glued to an array of pressure, temperature, sonar and other sensors were seeing no evidence of oil escaping into the water or the sea floor. Undersea robots were also patrolling the well site for signs of trouble.

The cameras showed some activity midday Saturday. The robots passed a wand-like object back and forth, and appeared to be digging dirt-like debris out of a pipe. Meanwhile, a glowing globe appeared on the sea floor as bubbles swirled around. BP didn't explain what they were doing, and to a viewer, it was like watching a foreign film without subtitles.

BP shut valves in the cap Thursday, stopping the flow of oil into the Gulf for the first time since the April 20 explosion on the leased oil rig Deepwater Horizon killed 11 workers and unleashed the spill 5,000 feet below the sea.

Concern that the cap could cause oil to break out of the well at the seafloor lessened.

Pressure readings Saturday morning were 6,745 pounds per square inch and rising slowly, Wells said. The figure was below the 7,500 psi that would have reassured scientists the well was not leaking, but still high enough that it could be all right. . . .

The most likely reason the pressure is low is more oil has bled out than estimated, experts say. Last week, when an old cap was removed allowing oil to flow unimpeded into the water, the spew wasn't as violent as it had been.

"Depletion is actually pretty normal," said Don Van Nieuwenhuise, Director of Professional Geoscience Programs at the University of Houston. "At first it flowed very powerfully, and when you're producing too much too fast for too long, it takes longer to pull the oil."

My apologies if this is old news.

Info and informed speculation on the COMPATT deployment appreciated.

Bloomberg reporting that BP was ordered to reopen well, restart collection.
http://noir.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=20601087&sid=asUwVZGN92Go&pos=9

Anyone else think this Macondo thing might be a near-critical condensate reservoir?

Is the saturation pressure at the reservoir temperature greater than or less than the critical pressure of the reservoir fluid? What data is known for this fluid?

If BP has known the BOP inlet pressure and the formation pressure, as well as detailed fluid properties and exact well configuration, why would they not be able to perform a quite good calculation on the system flow rate?

An interesting report, any comments anyone? The Grauniad usually takes a little care with its articles.

http://www.guardian.co.uk/environment/2010/jul/18/deepwater-horizon-blow...

NAOM

Ok TOD gods. It is time for a dispersant and open thread. The Blogoshpere is now switched to primarily discussing the use of Corexit, its level of toxicity, the choice of brand and how it was deployed. I plan to either refer to that post or use with permission, or write my own. Since I think this is a top three issue now, I would prefer the broad, vetted, format here. I look forward to the commenters here discussing this in detail. There is so much misinformation around. My favorite is how Lisa Jackson was put into the EPA just for this one issue. It is really getting like the nuke or 100,000 PSI crowd.

Serendipitous Shutin?

If this was talked about earlier, I missed it and apologize.

"A key turning point -- one that set the strategy that led to the integrity test -- came when government scientists in early June came up with a new, staggering estimate for the flow rate of 35,000 to 60,000 barrels a day. That spurred the government to demand that BP come up with a more robust set of containment measures. Allen said Thursday that, while developing this plan, it occurred to engineers that they might be able to use the new set-up to shut in the well."
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2010/07/15/AR201007...

Hi all,
This post is simply a request to Prof. Goose and HO to attempt to resolve the Psia/Psig indeterminacy by use of FOI request or more likely simple email request to the right persons. Our TOD experts try to inform us, but they are ‘snookered’ by a lack of simple information that surely is in the public domain.
Cheers

I believe the shut-in pressure should be 7,100 psi.

Pressure measurements taken of the BOP and published mid-June show 4,400 psi at the well head and 2,250 psi at the outlet to Top Hat. Given a formation pressure of 11,900 psi, the oil is losing 11,900 - 4,400 = 7,500 psi due to weight of the oil column and head loss due to friction of the flowing oil.

I believe the biggest uncertainty is the specific gravity of the oil/gas fluid, so I attempted to calculate the head loss, which is less sensitive to uncertainties in assumptions.

After hours wresting with Moody Friction Factors and the Darcy-Weisbach formula, I calculate that the loss due to friction if the oil was flowing up the 9 7/8" production tube was 150 psi. Triple that to account for the greater friction if the oil is flowing up the annulus, and you get a head loss due to friction of 450 psi.

Therefore, the head loss due to weight of the column of oil/gas is 7,500 - 450 = 7,050 psi.

So the shut-in pressure becomes 11,900 - 7,050 + 2,250 (sea pressure) = 7,100 psi.

Given that the formation may have lost drive pressure and the uncertainties in the calculations, anything close to 7,000 psi should be considered satisfactory.

DETAILS: I assumed oil flowed at 35,000 bopd. Add in 2200 cu ft gas at 9,300 psi (average pressure in oil column) and flow becomes 60,300 bpd of fluid, i.e. 0.11 m^3/sec. Assume viscosity of 1.0 ctS (it's probably much less) through 3,988 m of 218 mm ID steel pipe gives 407' head loss i.e. 187 psi probably nearer 150 psi given low viscosity.

TOD readers from BP Houston won't want to click on this, but from another, longer article in today's Observer:

The well is capped. But what else lurks below the surface for BP?
Success in sealing the gulf spill does not mark the end of BP's problems. Even amid the 'cowboy culture' of offshore drilling, its operational record raises concerns, and allegations are flying about its disregard for safety procedures and propensity to pass the buck

... BP is not the only company to benefit from an almost lawless operating environment in the Gulf. But an Observer investigation has uncovered evidence of how BP has benefited from this lack of regulation and failed to use standard procedures in its US operations, particularly offshore.

The company has a reputation with insurers in the gulf for pushing its offshore subcontractors especially hard: according to one well-placed industry source, it was unofficial policy about two years ago for the Houston offices of at least one major insurance company to refuse to process applications for companies working with the oil firm. BP subcontractors seeking well-control insurance, for example, were seen as too high a risk and their applications were not passed on to head office. BP was the only company unofficially blacklisted in this way in the gulf by this insurer, says the source. The evidence given to congressional hearings so far about the events leading up to the explosion on the Deepwater Horizon explosion on 20 April seem to have confirmed the insurers' worst fears. ...

A later passage:

... BP insists that the allegations [about Atlantis' missing documentation] are unsubstantiated, and that it has complied with regulations regarding compiling and retaining as-built documents. A spokeswoman referred to a previous company statement on the issue that says: "The engineering documents for Atlantis have the appropriate approvals and platform personnel have access to the information they need for the safe operation of the facility." Nevertheless, it has emerged that the drawings on the Deepwater Horizon's failed BOP do not appear to be up to date, according to evidence given to Congress.

In the hours after the explosion on the rig, BP officials asked Transocean for drawings of the device. But as the BOP had been modified in China and the drawings Transocean supplied had not been updated, they did not match what was on the sea floor. BP says engineers wasted crucial hours trying to work out how to remotely activate the device, which represented the last chance of shutting down the well. They knew the gushing oil and debris would be shredding the blades of the BOP's blind shear ram, which had to cut through the pipe to close off the well. More than a day after the explosion, they finally tried to reactivate it, but the ram did not budge. ...

Brief summary/highlights from Tech Briefing this morning

Suttles just now pressure currently at 6778 psi, no issues with the shut in and he says they will continue to leave the well shut in. Trying to get samples of the bubbles to determine their origin. Relief wells 17864 at the casing point next operation an additional ranging run. Ready to drill out not this week but the week after. Left to drill 100' vertical 4' lateral earliest intercept end of July. Seismic runs slowing the building out of containment systems.

Government is requiring BP to continue monitoring programs without a pressure target, instead an analysis of all of the data.

There is no target to return the well to flow.

Need to be careful about how long the integrity test will go, if we see a problem we may have to re-initiate flow so on a day by day basis it could go to mid August.

To re-initiate containment the flow would have to be opened back up, there is a possibility we may have to do that, Q4000 standing by as is Helix and Loch Renoch. If re-initiation flow of up to 3 days.

No bubbles have been captured as yet.

No body wants to see more oil but no one wants to see the situation worse so data is being monitored and things being taken a day at a time.

Matt Gutman from ABC asks this doesn't seem like a test.

Suttles it is a test at some point we may call the test complete. No one wants to see more oil get into the Gulf. Way too early to say the test is complete.

The Seismic and Sonar tests are looking for any indication that flow has escaped the wellbore and we have seen no signs that is the case. NOAA Pisces looking for flow at the seabed along with the ROVs also monitoring temperature at the BOP currently 40 degrees.

Lawsuit - Fire suppression directed at Deepwater Horizon caused the MODU to sink.

Bloomberg article

"As many as eight fireboats each shot “10,000 to 50,000 gallons of seawater on the rig per minute,” according to the complaint. They flooded the rig’s upper compartments and destabilized it, causing it to tip over and sink, the plaintiffs said.

The fireboats should have used their “dynamic positioning systems” to hold the Deepwater Horizon in place while fighting the fire with industry-approved methods, the complaint alleged. That would have kept the rig connected to the well with an intact riser, “greatly enhancing the ability to manage and control the discharge of oil,” the complaint said."

I am interested to see what comments TOD denizens have regarding this lawsuit and the industry practices it will address. More specifically, I am interested to know more about SOP regarding fire suppression aboard a MODU from outboard locations (i.e. stand-by and/or support vessels in immediate vicinity.) Also, would the "fireboats" (I know they are really just service vessels equipped with fire-suppression cannons, etc.) really be used to hold the DWH MODU on station? That seems a bit far-fetched to me. That would be a further endangerment to the crews of those vessels providing fire suppression.

Here's an interesting perspective:

http://phoenixrisingfromthegulf.wordpress.com/2010/07/17/pressure-at-the...

BP and the Coast Guard are watching the pressure at the wellhead very, very closely because of what it will mean for the future prospects of this well. Pressure readings under a critical threshold usually mean that there may be leaking elsewhere in the system. If there is a single leak, it will be more easily diagnosed and remedied depending on where it is. If there is more than one leak present, a whole set of different challenges emerges. Most importantly, keeping the system under pressure, when leaks exist anywhere, will inevitably increase the potential for those leaks to worsen.

“One mysterious development was that the pressure readings were not rising as high as expected, said retired Coast Guard Adm. Thad Allen, the government’s point man on the crisis.” (Per AP Article of 7/17/10: “BP, scientists try to make sense of well puzzle”)

At this juncture of monitoring, everything points to the distinct possibility of leakage further down in the well system. BP will, therefore, be forced to open the valves to release oil in order to relieve some of the pressure. If the system is kept under pressure for any length of time, the likelihood of exacerbating any leaks increases rapidly, which will then create serious problems, as if BP doesn’t already have them.

“Admiral Allen added that the possibility remained that the well had been breached and that oil and gas were escaping into the surrounding rock and perhaps even into the Gulf.”(Per NYT on 7/17/10)
How did we get here? To a place where leaks have quite possibly opened up deeper in the well system. As follows:

In a high compression well such as this one, the effluent is moving up the pipe at a very high speed due to the extraordinary pressures pushing up from below. The methane gas component of the upsurging hydrocarbon brew changes its state at this speed and affects the characteristics of the entire effluent coming up the pipe in the following way. As methane ascends, the bubbles expand causing a discernible acceleration in velocity. The interaction between effluent speed, geological debris and any additional bump from acceleration can give rise to catastrophic ejections, explosive potential, stretch and inline cavitations. All one has to do is examine an oil pipe which has sustained a similar flow rate to find evidence of this phenomena.

The critical result of this “methane gas effect” is that a more intensified kind of friction begins to occur within the pipe between the rising effluent and the inside metal surface. The longer this situation is allowed to persist, the more the piping will become eroded from the inside out. As the surface becomes increasingly attenuated, cavitations begin to develop on this inside surface of the pipe thereby creating weak points. Given the relentless pressure in the system, and depending on the grade of the pipe steel, the weak points at the joints and seams can become compromised, as the subtle bends and leanings will receive a greater amount of frictional activity and impact. There is also the possibility of breaches deeper in the system, which could be practically impossible to remedy in any meaningful way.

“Benton F. Baugh, president of Radoil Inc. in Houston and a National Academy of Engineering member who specializes in underwater oil operations, warned that the pressure readings could mean that an underground blowout could occur. He said the oil coming up the well may be leaking out underground and entering a geological pocket that might not be able to hold it.” (Per AP Article of 7/17/10: “BP, scientists try to make sense of well puzzle”)

Another phenomenon occurs with methane that must also be considered in the sinking of the $350,000,000 Deepwater Horizon.

Per Wikipedia:
“When drilling in oil- and gas-bearing formations submerged in deep water, the reservoir gas may flow into the well bore and form gas hydrates due to the low temperatures and high pressures found during deep water drilling. The gas hydrates may then flow upward with drilling mud or other discharged fluids. As they rise, the pressure in the drill string decreases and the hydrates dissociate into gas and water. The rapid gas expansion ejects fluid from the well, reducing the pressure further, which leads to more hydrate dissociation and further fluid ejection. The resulting violent expulsion of fluid from the drill string is one potential cause or contributor to what is referred to as a ‘kick’.”

Then there is the matter of how BP’s cementing plan may have provided another very weak link in this whole chain of events. A careful study of the diagram below will reveal some serious issues that have come into play, both before the blowout and after. Clearly, if there are significant breaches in the system, the points of deficiency outlined in this chart should serve as a guide as to where the trouble-shooters ought to look. The real challenge here will be how to solve any of these potential problems given an active well status under tremendous pressure. Please click on the following link to view diagram.

phoenixrisingfromthegulf.files.wordpress.com/2010/07/screen-shot-2010-07-18-at-12-07-50-am.png

The confluence of circumstances which are of greatest concern are delineated by the following points of information:

(1) This gusher flowed with great velocity for 86 days and therefore produced a lot of wear and tear in the system.

(2) The gravel, mud, stones, sand, oil and gas mix rushing through the pipe at excessive speed has undermined the integrity of the well system to a degree not known.

(3) Over the course of the aforementioned period different quick fixes were attempted, which were not always in the best interest of maintaining the integrity of the entire well system.

(4) BP has drilled in an area that was known to be a very high risk prospect for a variety of reasons, the most significant being pressure.

(5) Because this is a high compression well, the pressures involved exceed the capability of much of the technology and equipment that has been utilized. (i.e. BP is in over their head both literally and figuratively.)

(6) BP made many missteps over a three-month period that have unequivocally caused unintended consequences to the system, as well as collateral damage to the area, the repercussions of which may not manifest until a later date.

(7) We know the formation structure around the wellhead has changed. The relationship of the wellbore to the casing, in the wake of a subsea explosion that occurred during the events that sunk the Deepwater Horizon, has most probably been impacted. The BOP and riser were substantially affected by this trauma, and therefore the pipe and wellhead may very likely have shifted a few degrees. Furthermore, the cement that holds the well casing in place is undoubtedly under assault by oil, gas and debris under high pressure. As the cement holds the casing and production line in place, a breaching of this architecture is quite possible if it has been sufficiently compromised.

(8) The convergence of these various factors may have caused breaches in the system that are below the relief wells, and therefore will be extremely difficult to address with any degree of finality.

As of this date, we do not know with certainty if there are leaks in the system. However, in light of BP’s track record for grossly misrepresenting the truth, as well as the US Federal Government’s passivity and lack of response in the face of this extraordinary pattern of misrepresentation, we can only conclude that it is extremely unlikely that we will receive an accurate status regarding the integrity of the current capping application. From this point forward, now that the gusher has been capped, it is likely that the true state of affairs will be concealed by BP and its agents spread across the media and Oil & Gas Industry. In an effort to spin it positive – at all costs – and perform the damage control necessary to return things back to where they were, this company and industry will proceed with a well organized and focused program of information control. It’s what the Oil & Gas Industry has done quite well for over hundred years.

After all, BP’s very existence is at stake, and therefore it will assume the posture of a cornered raccoon! The flow of accurate information regarding the actual condition of the capping system, the changes in the seafloor, and the emergence of additional leaks will be determined by BP spinmeisters. Therefore our sleuthing becomes proportionately more penetrating and prosecutorial in both tack and tone. Simply put, we won’t believe a word they say, even with doctored video backing them up!

HOUSTON, WE HAVE A PROBLEM! A HUGE PROBLEM ! ! !

Houston is the current location of BP’s US National Headquarters. Per Wikipedia, “BP America’s headquarters is in the One Westlake Park in the Houston Energy Corridor, Texas.” Houston is also home to many other oil and gas companies, as well as their affiliates that operate throughout the 48 contiguous states. Perhaps we should begin to look there to find a deeper source of the problems that have ceaselessly appeared throughout this catastrophe. We speak of the standard operating procedures that have evolved throughout the entire industry, as well as a status quo which has produced the most conducive environment for this kind of disaster to take place around the world.

Without any doubt, these calamitous events will continue to take place in the future with even greater consequence. Due to the organic changes that the planet is experiencing, and especially the quite profound and fundamental nature of these geological, oceanic and atmospheric transformations, the most dangerous practices of our civilization will produce quicker and more dramatic feedback from Mother Earth. The Gulf Oil Spill is but a foretaste of things to come, if we do not change our ways both individually and collectively.

Step # 1 is to begin transitioning the world away from the hydrocarbon fuel paradigm. She – Mother Earth – can no longer maintain a clean enough environment for nearly 7 billion humans to live a quality life while utilizing oil and gas resources. It now represents an energy platform that is as obsolete, as it is destructive, to almost every living thing (There are certain types of bacteria and other microbes that just love the stuff!).

Dr. Tom Termotto
National Coordinator
Gulf Oil Spill Remediation Conference (International Citizens’ Initiative)
Tallahassee, FL

OilSpillSolution@comcast.net

oilspillsolutionsnow.org/