Prof. Goose's comment:

A continued humble and sincere thank you to all who have donated thus far. It will help us pay for the fourth server we brought online to accommodate the increased traffic. (See point 3 below.)

1. The Oil Drum is a special place. We strive to maintain a high signal to noise ratio in our comment threads. Short, unengaging comments, or comments that are off topic, are likely to be deleted without notice. (to be clear--engaging, on point humor and levity, more than welcome.)

We are trying to perform a service to the public here to coordinate smart people who know their stuff with other people who want to learn about what's going on. Promotion of that ideal will be the criteria by which we make our decisions about what stays and what goes.

Flame wars, polemic exchanges, and other content deleterious to the community will be removed, either by an editor or by the community through its moderation process.

2. If you see a problematic comment USE THE COMMENT MODERATION SYSTEM--see the "Flag as inappropriate" and (?) beside it? Learn more there. If you see comments that are questionable after you've done that (that aren't being removed), let us know at the eds email address.

It is up to this community to enforce the norms we have established here (a high signal to noise ratio), keep. it. up.

Our guide to commenting at TOD can be found here: http://www.theoildrum.com/special/guidelines . Please check it out if you are unfamiliar with it, but it is essentially 1) citations welcome (if not necessary), 2) be kind to others, and 3) be nice to the furniture.

3. We have gotten a lot of queries whether this bump in traffic is adding costs to keep the site functioning. Truth is, yes, we are incurring added expenses from these events. It is also true that we try not to beg from you very often as we are not the types to bother you with constant queries.

That being said, if you are inclined to help out, your support is always welcome and very much appreciated. To those who have already given, thank you very much.

You can find the donate button in the top left hand corner of the main page.

4. If you have come here to vet your plan to kill the well, understand that you will be queried on whether or not you have read the other 10 previous comment threads and all the myriad plans that have already been run by the kind folks in this room; if you have actually read all 10 comment threads and still think your plan has legs, well, then maybe yours really is the one that will save the Gulf of Mexico.

This is not to say that well considered questions about current attempts and modifications to those attempts are not welcome; they are. But try to place them in context and in what's actually going on, as opposed to your MacGyver dream solution where you have a 10 megaton bomb, an ice pick, and Commander Spock at your side.

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6. Don't be afraid to go back and read the last couple of open threads yesterday and today before you start on this thread. They are really good, and will likely catch you up if you have been out of the loop for a while. We shut down threads when we get to 300-400 comments, as it's really unmanageable. Lots of good stuff in there though.

I would like to know, how much money BP can net on each bbl pulled up this way. I mean the simple net (direct costs) per unit, not taking into account the additional financial pressures etc. (And even if not a profit, still better than zero gross return as in lost oil.) There's no reason to waste (in so many senses of the term) the oil if it can be used, but remember that only weeks ago we were told BP could and would only kill the well, there was no point in talking of pulling some up from this well? Could thinking of the benefits of the latter approach have influenced their decision making?

BTW the latest claim going around in right-wing circles is that the current approach is what BP wanted to do first, but "Obama blocked them." I don't think he even exercised any power at all esp. in the early stages, and wonder what formal power or agencies have anyway. Maybe he should, but I suggest a post here to clarify the governments legal and logistical situation (again, if necessary) about the leak disaster.

BTW there is no reason to resent their making money off this collection if they can. They might as well have money to pay for this with. That's also why it is stupid to boycott BT. First, it hurts the franchisees, who didn't know any better and why take it out on them? Second, we should want BP to have a decent income stream, the better to pay fines, compensation, etc. I sure don't think much of their recent big payout to shareholders (was it really a 9% cut of profit?) which looks like evading cash on hand to pay damages etc.

This is one of the fall outs that nobody ever noticed from the de-nationalisation of the coal industry by Mrs-Thatcher-The-Milk-Snatcher. The mining villages have gone to hell in a hand basket, particularly around Nottingham, but nobody missed management, all long retired to wherever you retire to in the UK (probably Torquay).
There is probably nobody left in the UK who can manage an underground coal mine. This includes the geologists, well-head management, inspectors, etc. Plus there is probably nobody who can do the budgeting, planning and business plan for the day-to-day running, and most importantly ... put together a business plan to raise the money in the City to do the job.
As if anybody cared.
I'm sounding like Alan From The big Easy ranting against Bush Pigs and Tony-Twit-Of-The-Year.
Incidentally, thanks to Peskild, Alan from the Big Easy, Trailman, Deseng, etc for their help on who has the tightest offshore drilling regulations.

A question for the insiders here:

Is there really such a shortage of processing capacity in the gulf that not having a sufficient amount yet or for weeks to come is justifiable?

Aren't there rigs in the gulf that could have been leased?

I find this bizarre and, if the capacity was available, maybe the clearest example of gross negligence in the whole affair.

I'm guessing it is rooted in some sort of anti-science, anti-outsider denialism, and the fact that such has now become habitual for the corporation and many in the industry. And it bit back.

Counting the cost of drilling down deep

THE ecological catastrophe unfolding in the Gulf of Mexico has failed to discourage the Rudd government, which has granted oil and gas explorers permission to drill deep off the Australian coastline.

The latest federal government exploration releases confirm a trend towards deep-sea drilling, offering explorers blocks largely around the 1000-metre mark.

''The problem is if you screw up in a highly productive rock formation, the consequential flow is automatically very large.'' Mr Bourne said the remoteness of Australian offshore fields from any oil industry centre made an accident likely to be even more damaging. ''A dynamically-positioned rig would take several months even to get it to Australia before it could begin drilling a relief well. An immediate moratorium on deep water drilling now would be straight logic.''

Last August, when the West Atlas rig blew out in only 77 metres of water in the Timor Sea off Western Australia's Kimberley Coast, it still took 75 days to plug the Montara oil well.

http://www.smh.com.au/environment/counting-the-cost-of-drilling-down-dee...

5/5/2010
Western Australia's battle for offshore oil
Crude Oil dropped by 27% in 2009
http://www.crudeoilpeak.com/?p=1425

I got to say, but this posting exemplifies the wrong way to do it in my opinion; more regulation, more enforcement - it only makes it worse.

The problems with this approach are:
1) no set of regulations can deal with every eventuality and every circumstance, so there are still plenty of opportunities for the dumb process follower to do everything required, and still have an accident. By the book makes for dumb.

2) the more complete the regulations, the more onerous and the more inappropriate in particular circumstances. Net result is that people get used to shaving off the corners of what they are supposed to do, because it makes no sense. Then they shave a bit more and eventually you still get the accident because they don't agree with or respect the rules. This also promotes the behaviour where the regulators impose regulations to ensure that their will always be transgressions, so they can always point to the company as failing, even if the regulations are stupid (its not our fault, look at the thickness of the regs...)

3) the more enforcement, the more time consuming and annoying it becomes, the more things are hidden from the enforcement team (who become 'the bad guys'). No practical level of enforcement will catch even half the transgressions of the rules anyway. Net safety goes down.

4) the more regulations, the more enforcement, the more it costs, the less drilling is done - with far bigger systematic effects than the accident rate risk.

5) you will still get accidents, no matter what. Its in the 'risk sea' where you don't know, can't know what's going to bite you - just that it will happen no matter what. Better to realise and cope with this reality.

A better approach?

a) DON'T tell a company how to maintain safety. Tell the company that they have to define their own approach to maintaining it, describe it to regulators and prove it. Also tell them they are responsible for it. That way if something goes wrong, they are automatically in the frame for failing to ensure safety, whatever they actually do. They then have to prove they couldn't have foreseen it. This general approach is much better, more flexible, more effective and rewards innovation.

b) address the systematic issues with how drilling is conducted, to make the entirety more 'fail safe', as well as cheaper and more attuned to the post peak world. They have been doing the same basic thing for 100 years, they need a revolution.

c) create INDEPENDENTLY a service which only aim is to prevent leaks and close down accident sites. Don't give it to the oil company, have it government administered (and probably paid for)

d) state that the majority of the board of any dangerous or accident prone industry have to be qualified engineers, and make sure the accountants and lawyers in such organisations are kept on a leash. Arts grads, financial types and PR make poor board managers for such structures, for a variety of reasons that include safety.

Why wasn't this extra capacity out there a week ago when the cap was installed? This whole exercise has an ad hoc, they're winging it feel to it. Where are the adults?

Would it be a good thing to require the regulatory as well as the corporate people to serve an apprenticeship of some kind,that is, on the drill floor,at the long wall or down in the pit?

via deepwaterbp.com here are the links to each of the BP vessels - The link takes you to the vessel main page and in the left margin there is a link to "Itineraries History", which with a couple of exceptions has been removed but if you click on the Current Vessel's Track link the vessel position will appear on the map.

OCEAN INTERVENTION 3
VIKING POSEIDON
BOA DEEP C
SKANDI NEPTUNE
Q4000
DISCOVER ENTERPRISE
TOISA PISCES
LOCH RANNOCH
DEVELOPMENT DRILLER 3

For All

It’s a quiet Saturday morning, coffee has been brewed and the dog let out. And I feeling a little more full of myself then usual so I’ll offer a quick and easy method of greatly reducing the risk of all future offshore drilling that won’t cost the tax payers one cent. Additional it would get the oil field workers back on the job, kick the cash flow back into the service industry and reduce the loss of royalty revenue to the taxpayers.

The original thought was offered as much for comic relief as a practical solution: hire engineers formerly employed by an offshore operator to monitor their safe drilling practices. The idea produced a number of funny anecdotal stories of former employees in a number of industries who have very sharp axes to grind. They would jump at the chances to impose strong safety recommendations that were ignored (and sometimes mocked) by their former employers.

The serious proposal: First, develop specific criteria for the safest drilling procedures. This would take no time at all. Most companies already have very detailed safe drilling protocols (SDP) already developed. How well any one company follows its SDP is another matter. Second, have independent inspectors monitor how well any company is following the SDP especially at critical phases of the operation. Can the gov’t make offshore operators do this? Of course, they do it right now. Many here now understand there is a gov’t regulation that requires BOP’s be tested on a regular basis. These tests are done by private companies and are paid directly by the operators for providing this service. But the analysis by these companies is reported directly to the MMS. If the MMS doesn’t like the results it has the immediate authority to shut down the drilling ops. And how honest are these BOP testing companies? They certify their results under both civil and criminal penalties if they misrepresent the facts. Everyone can judge for themselves how well such a system might work.

So now I’ve incorporated Rockman, Inc. I’ve recruited about 80 consultant engineers. They are all experienced but not the most skilled hands out there. No need to hire the most expensive folks available. Remember they aren’t developing drilling proposals or making those tough judgment calls: they are “watchers”. Consider my background as a well site logging consultant. I sit in a Schlumberger logging unit and watch them log the well. I’m responsible for hole safety and quality control. Could I run the logging unit? Not if my life depended upon it. Way above my pay grade. But I can shut them down in a heart beat if I don’t like what I see. Same situation with my SDP inspectors. They don’t have to have the skills to do a job but can readily tell if it isn’t being done properly.

The cost to the operator? Minimal despite their complaints. The SDP inspectors need not be onboard everyday. Just at critical phases: cementing ops and testing, running casing, displacing riser, setting plugs. Just a guess but on a 80-day well they could be onsite 20 days. Two SDP inspectors working 12-hour towers. They chopper in and out as required. My inspectors would get paid $1400/day each. So the costs estimate for the model above; $1400*2*20 days = $56,000. Cost to drill a typical DW GOM well: $800,000/day*80 days = $64 million + $60 million (casing, mud, etc costs) = about $120 million. Percentage for SDP inspection: about 1/20 of one percent. Companies can bitch but who’ll will take them seriously.

But can the public trust these supposedly “independent” SDP inspectors? Did I mention that as owner of Rockman, Inc I get 20% of my consultants’ fee? Pretty standard cut for running a “body shop”. So what do I make: 80-days per well = about 4 wells per year. Assume 30 rigs drilling DW GOM. So $56,000*30 rigs*4 wells/year = $6.7 million/year. My 20% = $1.3 million/year just sitting in my office sending out invoices. So what would I do if I caught one of my SDP inspectors playing footsie with an operator? I would nail his b*lls to my office door as a warning to the other inspectors as a warning.

Pure speculation, of course. But how would have the situation developed on the BP well if Rockman, Inc. had been onboard? The cmt pressure test would have been rejected out of hand. Either re-cement and get a valid test or the rig is shut down. Displacing the riser? The mud returns are closely monitored or the rig is shut down. BOP in good working order? If the SDP inspectors don’t agree than the rig is shut down. Could Rockman Inc. eliminate all risk? No. But it’s unlikely we would see what’s happening in the GOM right now.

As you can see I meant it when I said I was feeling really full of myself this morning. But I’ve sat in the company man’s office a number of times and listened to concerned hands being over ruled on safety issues because of monetary considerations. In such situations I couldn’t open my mouth let alone change the course of events. All I could do is follow the standard practice when you become concerned about well safety: go to your bunk room and put your wallet and car keys in your pocket. That’s all you’re allowed to take into the escape capsule with you. And I’ve done that more times than I care to remember.

BTW: Do I think there’s much of a chance of such a program being implemented? No.

"It has happened more than once in my career, as we have students go from having many job offers, to students coming back for graduate degrees because there was no work in the industry. The employees that are laid off go find work in other, less cyclic industries. And so when the next boom comes around, they are no longer available."

Oh, we're still available. It is just that we don't bother sending resumes in to the Petro industry. Why not? Because every job has a requirement for 5 yrs experience examining the left hind leg of an osteoarthritic Namibian dung beetle. Without that specific experience, the HR bouncers just toss the resumes into the garbage. Forget the years you spent studying in school, forget the years worth of experience you might have with metallurgy or FMEA - they are "not applicable" in the Petro industry.

I remember very well attending a job fair in Houston three years ago to market my expertise in computational fluid dynamics. At one booth, the young lady I spoke with looked at me with a blank expression and asked me "what is that?"

A friend of mine who is an expert in fracture mechanics also does not apply to jobs in Petro industry. When I asked why not, his response was ..... "they are Neanderthals". No, I am not kidding, that really was his response.

I am not an expert on the nature of regulation. I do think that BETTER regulation, followed by companies, is the way to go. In terms of personnel supply, however, you have hit some very hard targets. Western students do not seem attracted to the "hard" disciplines in the proportions they used to. Most universitiee give huge numbers of degrees in business, education, etc., and many traditional places [Nevada, for exa] are closing or merging schools of mines. We educate the technical people for the world - and I have no problem with that, but if you want effective regulations, and transparency, we need people who can work both sides of the game. I fear the continued decline in numbers for both industry and the regulatory world.

Another factor, about which I have no data, is the impact of private sector salaries and job challenges. When times are good, why would most people take a regulatory job, when in fact it is a hell of a lot more interesting to most geos and engineers to find oil, drill an complete wells, bring production online, and get paid well for it [and again, I think it is great that the pay is good]. Who does that leave for the regulatory world?

One idea that floated in the financial world discussed this in light of the Foriegn Service. Long ago we decided that it was in our best interest to educate a cadre of people to represent the US to the world - they go to good schools, learn languages, and through different presidents, work in the US Foriegn Service. They get paid pretty well, get good pensions. I make no claims as to the long-term effectiveness of their work, as I don't have data nor do I want to make this a political post.

The point is that most of us in the US view all regulation negatively, and regulators are a nusiance at best. The WV mine catastrope, the BP disaster, etc., point out that both sides are benefitted by a different model, and part of that model is that we need to refigure how we regulate ourselves, and be regulated by professionals. OF course, in the short run, we know that, and not neceissarily better, regs are coming. Thank you BP.

This came off Mike Ruperts CollapseNet website. Is it as bad as this? Could it be true? If so are BP's efforts virtually pointless?

A credible source, highly-placed within the oil industry has told me that BP was drilling without a casing in the hours before the fatal disaster… to save money and time. That piece of information – which may or may not have been reported in the Babel of schizophrenic and conflicting news reports since April 20th – fits perfectly with news reports about how many leaks there actually are, how much oil they are spewing, and the so-called mysterious plumes devastating the Gulf.

The casing is a very strong cement structure built to house the drill string (shaft of the bit), the bit, and the drilling mud which makes it possible to extract crushed rock from the bore hole. It is much wider than the string because drilling mud is forced down through the center of the string and out the tip of the bit to recirculate back up to the surface inside the casing carrying debris with it. The only thing to prevent a loss of mud and a blowout once the oil and gas pocket is reached is the now infamous blowout preventer (BOP). The casing’s sole function is to keep the sides of the bore hole from collapsing inward. At the depths involved the lateral pressures on the bore hole are enormous.

Although I cannot say with certainty that there was no casing, what my source told me is supported by observable facts. They include, multiple (two and perhaps three) large leaks, widespread wreckage indicating a massive undersea explosion and secondary geologic ruptures and super-large plumes with apparent multiple origination points. It was this set of facts that I was analyzing when I was told about the casing. It fits.

Here’s what I think happened. Someone from BP overrode the objections of TransOcean and maybe even Halliburton and ordered drilling to proceed without the casing. We already know that a BP official had said to stop using mud and replace it with lighter water. As a result the bore hole collapsed in on itself and the softer sedimentary rock under great pressure filled the hole temporarily. But in so doing, it weakened the surrounding (porous) rock creating fissures and pockets which also filled very rapidly. Under enormous pressure the oil and liquid natural gas raced to fill in every crack and crevice, enlarging them and filling them with still more oil and gas, exerting more pressure and creating more cracks. The result became a giant, expanding, angry and explosive pimple of oil and gas which, when it overcame the rock, blew out a wide area around the rig. This would account for the fact that the riser has been universally reported to be almost a mile away from the bore hole.

Very early on, experts were remarking that the leaks were like “sticking a garden hose under pressure into a tub of pudding”. Nobody ran with those stories.

We know that Deepwater Horizon serviced more than one well. We also have multiple credible news reports of one and likely two separate leaks from another nearby wellhead and possibly a fissure. Because mainstream media reports have been so inconsistent it is hard to say anything with certainty except that there is more than one big leak. But the casing explanation does fit with these facts. There are huge geologic issues involved and this, above all else, is what I believe BP is hiding. So, by implication, is the United States government and every major news organization.

Also being hidden is the now obvious fact that BP’s use of the toxic dispersant Corexit was intended to hide as much of the oil as possible by keeping it away from the surface, causing much more damage to the ocean and life at all depths and levels of the food chain.

A month ago both I and Matthew Simmons, the world’s largest energy investment banker, told you that the flow rate was vastly more than 5,000 bpd. We were right. Coming from different places we both concluded that the flow rate was probably close to 100,000 bpd as has now been confirmed by several news organizations. (McClatchy has been doing a great job.) The reports of huge plumes in several different locations with multiple origins are also consistent with this explanation.

And the use of a nuclear device placed deep in the bedrock to melt the rocks and seal the whole may still be the only available option. In other words, BP is trying to stop a leak by trying to plug one hole in a dam that has just been hit by a shotgun blast. All the while patting themselves on the back and hoping you don’t see the other holes.

Like so many now, I believe the USG should nationalize BP immediately and put the Navy in charge. Every day the suffering of people in the Gulf becomes much more serious than the loss of a few weeks income. People are getting sick, and they’re getting pissed off at BP’s arrogant dissembling and ineffective spin. BP’s market capitalization has been cut in half as its stock plummets and it will never be able to repair or pay for the damage that continues to be done. I am convinced that BP is racing towards Chapter 11 due to its own stupidity and arrogance.

Only the naïve will cheer when BP goes bankrupt. People who have read me for years will stop and ask, “But wait, what about all those British, American and other pension funds around the world that are heavily invested in BP? Pension funds are going bust anyway. What happens to all those pensions? Who’s going to bail them out?

Until you change the way money works, you change nothing.

MCR

Rockman, I am going to put this in pdf and save it. I will print it out and keep it.
My confusion begins with what happened after the first negative pressure test came back as negative. After that, it's obivious something went horribly wrong as 11 souls perished in the explosions.
I don't know what changes will be brought to regulation yet.
I have been watching the live feeds and have learned a lot. I still wonder what I am looking a lot of the time.

Couldn't this have been substantially mitigated by having a failproof breakaway design and emergency blowout taps in the Riser? If the Riser had a failproof break-off beneath the rig and subsurface junction with 4-way adapter taps that could have new Risers attached to them in a blowout emergency then this could have all been solved easily and early. Regulations would require 4 processing ships to be on standby at all times. They could just hook-up to the taps and get all the oil without too much overload danger.

Also: Don't forget some of the 'experts' in here were chiding us just a few weeks ago that the flow was only 5-11,000 barrels and showing us the math for it. And some of the company shills were asking us "show us some evidence for a higher flow". Don't forget to put them in the book too (lol)...

"BP Official (Hofmeister) Admits to Damage Beneath the Sea Floor" (a bit of informed conjecture...)

http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/discussion/2010/06/10/DI201...

Yesterday, recently-retired Shell Oil President John Hofmeister said that the well casing below the sea floor may have been compromised:

[Question] What are the chances that the well casing below the sea floor has been compromised, and that gas and oil are coming up the outside of the well casing, eroding the surrounding soft rock. Could this lead to a catastrophic geological failure, unstoppable even by the relief wells?

John Hofmeister: This is what some people fear has occurred. It is also why the "top kill" process was halted. If the casing is compromised the well is that much more difficult to shut down, including the risk that the relief wells may not be enough. If the relief wells do not result in stopping the flow, the next and drastic step is to implode the well on top of itself, which carries other risks as well.

http://www.theengineer.co.uk/channels/process-engineering/bp-now-capturi...

As noted yesterday in The Engineer magazine, an official from Cameron International - the manufacturer of the blowout preventer for BP's leaking oil drilling operation - noted that one cause of the failure of the BOP could have been damage to the well bore:

Steel casing or casing hanger could have been ejected from the well and blocked the operation of the rams.

Oil industry expert Rob Cavner believes that the casing might be damaged beneath the sea floor, noting:

The real doomsday scenario here… is if that casing gives up, and it does come through the other strings of pipe. Remember, it is concentric pipe that holds this well together. If it comes into the formation, basically, you‘ve got uncontrolled [oil] flow to the sea floor. And that is the doomsday scenario.

Much more aggregated here...it may all be conjecture, but it's at least some of the pieces pulled together.

http://www.washingtonsblog.com/2010/06/evidence-points-to-destruction-be...

OT except for mention of Cassandra: Here's an important reference document on the value of Florida's coastal & ocean economy.
http://www.dep.state.fl.us/oceanscouncil/reports/Florida_Phase_II_Report...

The exec summary on p. 7-8 says Florida’s coastal economy generated almost $562B in 2006 and Florida’s ocean economy contributed $25B in 2005. There's further $ breakdown into categories of fishing industry, marine transportation, coastal construction, the cruise industry, real estate, seasonal housing, marine research and education, and coastal recreation.

This report was released at the time state leaders were pushing to create a Florida offshore oil industry. Key political leaders were visited to introduce the report with the polite message that the coastal/ocean economy was very important to the state, "so whatever you do, don't screw up what we already have." IMO this messsage was politely ignored, but the campaign to drill (no closer than 3 miles offshore!) has gone quiet recently, so maybe Cassandra has been heard.

If the current high estimate of 40,000 bpd is assumed as a given (for now), does anyone have a handle on what percentage of that could actually be captured by the new containment system planned?

I anticipate that waiting for the relief well will be as painful as anything we've seen thus far.

August/September is a long way off.

Peter B.

-----

NASA has continued to post some imagery of the slick on their 'natural hazards' page:

http://earthobservatory.nasa.gov/NaturalHazards/view.php?id=44285

The main surface slick seems to be slinging off stringers and clots mainly to the east.

Rockman: Ahh yes. kinda like making a good oiler/rigger out of an account type.They learn enough to be dangerous. that danged human nature of ours is always present,isn't it?

I am boned. When did this change?

I have not seen such a gloomy prediction for me here in Gulf Shores, Alabama yet. After the soccer match, I plan to post photos for all to see what such a projection means on the beach in this case. Go Team USA, beat those polluting, Tony Hayward loving, BP owning Limeys. I still treasure our close alliance, but it is game day.

Is this entire thread an example of the Bargaining Stage ?

I'm not trying to be a troll - I love the content of this thread. I'm just trying to figure out where we as a community are in terms of the Stages of Grief. Pre-peak oil this shortage of experienced personnel might be considered a relatively "normal" (but painful) cyclical event.

But if we are entering the Post-peak oil world economy, might this personnel problem be a symptom of "Catabolic Collapse"? And our discussions about this symptom an example of "bargaining"?

Feel free to flag as inappropriate if so inclined.

I'd like to see this Question answered under oath by BP officials - Would you shut off this well if such a device can be fitted to the BOP, or do you have any knowledge that doing so would result in uncontrolled leakage from the well casing? Every solution proposed by BP so far involves a constant drawdown from the well. No solution proposed involves shutting the well down. It certainly makes me suspicious that some of the theories about improper cementing of the well have creedence. However, I want to note that if BP is in fact interested in capping this well, that it is a daunting task. The BOP flange appears to measure about 36 in. in diameter. A device sealing at this dia. would be subject to approx. 1100 sq. in. times the pressure differential at this depth. 100 psi would be 110,000 lbs trying to lift the device off the BOP flange, and 1000 psi would be 1,100,000 lbs. That's why the cap currently in use has big open chimney holes in it, and doesn't even try to contain more than a fraction of the oil & gas pouring out of the well.

I am curious about the air quality along the Gulf Coast -- can residents smell the oil? As crude oil continues to flow and the summer heat builds will this become a health problem?

Also:
http://www.theonion.com/articles/massive-flow-of-bullshit-continues-to-g...

At WashingtonMonthly, Steve Benen was just discussing a Ron Brownstein story about the Innovation Council's "mayday manifesto" on the need for research into clean-energy technologies. Brownstein, in part:

Without such a commitment, they warned, the United States will remain vulnerable to energy price shocks; continue to "enrich hostile regimes" that supply much of the United States' oil; and cede to other nations dominance of "vast new markets for clean-energy technologies." ...

The council frames the need for a new energy direction as being as much of an economic imperative as an environmental one. It calls for a national energy strategy centered on a $16 billion annual federal investment in energy research -- as much, the group pointedly notes, as the United States spends on imported oil every 16 days.

Equally important, the group urges that government catalyze the development of energy alternatives by sending "a strong market signal" through such mechanisms as mandates on utilities to produce more renewable energy or "a price or a cap" on carbon emissions. Such a cap is precisely what the Senate resolution sought to block. But the business leaders said that it is one of the policies that could "create a large, sustained market for new energy technology."

One of the council's key insights was to recognize that expanded energy research and limits on carbon (or other mandates to promote renewable power) are not alternative but complementary policies: One increases the supply of new energy sources; the other increases demand for them.

Hard to beat that as a worthy application of education and expertise, no?

Proof:
Oysters love oil:

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=qhTx0a0AkdE&feature=player_embedded

So who thinks our chances to win this soccer match are much better than recovering our losses from BP and its shareholders. BP is a Green Devil and for today Team England is too.

http://s892.photobucket.com/albums/ac126/tinfoilhatguy/BP%20is%20the%20d...

How do I make the whole picture clickable to source image?

Remember how all the MSM and blogs that were going crazy over the big black oil plumes found by the Pelican?

From NOAA:
R/V Pelican (LUMC)

A NOAA-supported research mission aboard the Pelican, owned by the Louisiana Universities Marine Consortium, was conducted May 2-16. Water column samples provided to NOAA and analyzed by Louisiana State University indicated no detectable hydrocarbons (smaller than parts per billion range). However, the sample storage practices were not consistent with EPA guidance, so the results are not considered valid for analysis, and will not be used.

So these are the type of folks who are going to solve the problems?

I believe the 8 NOAA supervised cruises that did follow EPA guidelines also only found PPB.

Pressures up to 10,000 psi at the well head.

We have also seen the statement that they pumped mud at up to 80 barrels per minute during the top kill. 80/minute = 115,200/day. The latter figure could be reconciled with a moderate barrels per day oil leak assuming that the main pressure drop was taking place below the point of mud injection (e.g at the formation to well entry point). In that case the size of the openings in the BOP and riser would not be the limiting factor for the oil leak, but would still be the limiting factor for the mud loss. This could explain a much higher flow of mud than of oil/gas. But that would require the pressure at the well head to be much closer to the water pressure at the sea floor.

I do not understand the geometry of the choke and kill lines. Can somebody explain? I have not seen any description of the difference between the choke and kill lines. Why do they have these names? What are their purpose under normal procedures?

They now plan to capture additional oil and gas through them. If the main interest is to produce and sell oil, it makes sense. If the point is to reduce the losses to the sea, it would only make sense if the principal pressure drop happens below the point where the the choke and kill lines communicate with the well and BOP cavities. But that contradicts 10,000ps at well head.

As I understood the description of the top kill and junk shot procedures, the top kill depends on a restriction in the flow path between the choke/kill lines and the sea. I understood that the choke/kill lines communicate with the regions below the shear rams, and I assumed that the shear rams were the point of the largest pressure drop, i.e. the narrowest part of the flow path. In that case the mud was not essentially pumped into open sea (through wide open holes in riser), but into a high-pressure region below the main path constriction. The 10,000psi figure fits well here. In this case, the oil/gas flow should be comparable to the mud flow, or a oil+gas+water flow comparable to 100,000 bpd.

What am I missing? I cannot square the numbers!

texican: no offense intended. My Ol' Dad went thru the depression and, after the War, got a business degree from the U of Wyo, and he was the best darned dragline operator I've ever been around. Taught me my trade well.

Write your Congress-people (including State reps) and demand that the people of the United States have complete access (via media video, pictures, interviews, etc) to the oil spill disaster area and to all pertinent technical data whether produced by government, industry, or non-profit organizations.

There is no justification for keeping secrets from our citizens...it is our country.

http://motherjones.com/rights-stuff/2010/06/grande-terre-dolphin-towels-...

I want someone to—
[1] fill a swimming pool with saltwater
[2] put a dozen fish in it
[3] dump oil in the pool
[4] dump dispersant in the pool
[5] watch the fish for 4 days and see if they die

If they do then PLEASE stop the dispersants

Secondly the dispersants make it harder to collect the oil not easier but the dispersants do make it harder for us to see it. hehe

My bet is the two relief wells are using the same type of BOP the original well was using.

Does anyone think I am wrong and if so why-?

"Operations were stable ..." ... turning the GOM to sludge.

This disaster should be "it" for BP in America. The last straw. BP American operations should be shut down and assets sold off to safer oil companies, proceeds going to cleanup.

I have no desire to discuss this. It's just my opinion.

I hope many more people adopt this opinion.

Since a reference was made to Eyjafjallajökull a live video beware the infra red is very misleading.

I include a link regarding any seismic activity North America Region and all the best to you guys interested in the footie for tonights game.

I'm trying to visualize what is sitting down there on the bottom of the Gulf, with respect to the machinery sitting on top of this well.

First, there's the casing that is buried into the ground several hundred feet, that surrounds the liner and drill pipe. The casing supports everything above it.

The BOP sits on top of the casing, with the liner/DP running through it. The BOP is a large (50' high) piece of equipment with several rams designed to crush/seal/cut the riser and DP in the event of an imminent blowout. This one obviously failed to operate correctly and may be compromised structurally.

Now, here's where my understanding gets fuzzy. On top of the BOP is another device, one designed to attach the riser from the ship to the BOP, and capable of quickly detaching from the BOP if there's an emergency. It has a flexible joint to allow some movement of the riser without fracturing the connection, and valves to shut off the flow if needed. I don't recall the actual name of this device, but it's the one the current collection cap is siphoning oil/gas out of after the damaged riser was cut off. Do I have this geometry correct, or is there something else in there?

Now, my question is that flexible connection between the BOP and the device on top of it. What is it made of, how durable is it if there's oil flowing up the riser instead of the DP, and how flexible is it actually? Recent comments indicate the whole package is leaning over more; could this just be the joint flexing from all the past and present stresses being put upon it, or is this a symptom of something worse? ISTM that if this joint fails, oil collection goes out the window until a new device can be bolted onto the BOP (if that's possible).

Comments? Ridicule? Laughter?

This is a question about determining who is at fault... I know, for instance, by reason of understanding management structure, that Tony, et al, do not answer calls from field hands or even field supervisors, about specific decisions about which cement to use and dealing with what mud to use where and what parts go where.

In a situation such as this, could someone describe what authority is delegated to whom, and under what conditions higher ups are consulted, and how high do they go, and under what conditions?

I've been lurking and reading here for a while and there's a lot of "BP did x.." type of statements, but I have no idea what that means. Did some guy pushing buttons, wearing a BP hat do something stupid, or did a question escalate upwards 2-3 steps in authority and a bad answer (irresponsibility ordered) cause something bad to happen, when you say stuff like that?

For many years, I worked in a small business, where my boss was the owner, and the company name was his name. What I did or didn't do reflected to the credit or discredit of the business as a whole. Yet, sometimes the decisions were mine, sometimes his.

On Hayward's statements... Hayward doesn't have first hand "I was there" information to pass along. Whatever he knows is filtered to him by people below him. Would any lie to him to cover their own backsides? Is this whole thing the fault of some office jockey who gives out bad directions, because he's insulated by space from the real work, and from the media and blame by management above him?

And with the current rash of jumping to conclusions, I'm beginning to despair of ever having a factual conclusion that showed who made what decisions that resulted in, well, you-know-what.

It's 2:20 pacific time, and can anyone tell me what ocean intervention ROV1 is looking at?

There may be enough talent looking this site to figure out the size of this reservoir and production/flow characteristics. To my knowledge there just aren't that many gulf reservoirs capable of producing 30+ kbpd on a sustained basis.
1) Are there any guesstimates as to the size for deepwater overpressured reservoirs in this area of the gulf? Are they fault-bounded, or lenticular reservoirs that taper off horizontally? What is the dip?
2) What is the thickness of the reservoir, can it be determined from the drilling data previously made available?
3) What is the porosity of the reservoir rocks? 5-10%?
4) What is the permeability of the reservoir rocks > 2 D'Arcy?
5) Are the core plugs available?
6) Are any seismics available?
7) Can the lease agreements be revoked by the government? Has there ever been an instance where this has happened?
8) If a lease agreement is revoked or suspended, can the government require that all pertinent information that would otherwise be proprietary be turned over to government agencies (seismics, core plugs, well logs, etc.)?

In reply to today's TOD post,

I think it's just inevitable - on the demise of curriculum - dirty energy and the mad-dog capitalist mentality that heavily influences those "cyclic" boom and bust cycles are dying. It's a long, slow and now so obviously painful process. Be strong, and remember this is only the beginning of the end. Short of divine intervention, it's bound to get even uglier.

We are not only under attack by a gushing torrent of oil in the waters of the Gulf of Mexico, but we also are under attack by largely unseen forces determined to undermine US civilian and military authority. It appears they are succeeding. Given the scale of the emergency before us, it would seem this usurpation of command by a foreign corporate entity should really worry the President and senior US military. Maybe it's just me but there appears a disturbing perception of more official corruption, divided loyalties, or even perhaps mutinous intentions. The US military is the largest consumer of petroleum in the US. The world's most advanced military force can't move an inch without oil. This is not lost upon the likes of AlQadia and other extremists groups and individuals who wish us harm. Transporting oil is the deadliest job in the military.

So far Obama has surrendered the GOM to BP. Will he also surrender our national security to suspect commanders?

speaker: Heh! Heh! I commend Green for having the chain of authority correct!

Google and thread following lead me to this article on a blog. This seems nothing new. The beaurocracy is always most protective of itself, and the larger and more "activist" it is, the more obdurate it becomes.

http://www.floppingaces.net/2010/06/11/bureaucracy-epa-napolitano-stop-u...

I, too, am baffled why every last means of attempting to stop/catch/mitigate/clean/trap/remove the crude and/or broken down components isn't being employed and the results of each well documented.

Is this even plausible? (photos in the link)

Piece of Deepwater Horizon

Piece of Deepwater Horizon washes ashore on PCB
June 12, 2010 03:03:00 PM
NEWS HERALD STAFF REPORT

PANAMA CITY BEACH — Bay County's first tangible landfall from the Deepwater Horizon accident is not tar balls or oil plumes. Instead, it was a suspected piece of the Deepwater Horizon oil rig that exploded and sank off the coast of Louisiana in April.

According to U.S. Coast Guard Lt. Steve Caskey, a tank weighing 5,000 pounds with a 550-gallon capacity washed ashore near 14th Street and Front Beach Road in Laguna Beach.

“It was leaking when it washed up on the beach,” Caskey said. “There is some oil in it. There was sheen created from the tank leaking.”

Caskey said there were BP markings on the tank and other evidence that it came from the Deepwater Horizon rig.

The Coast Guard pulled it from the surf and has taken the tank to the Coast Guard station at Naval Support Activity Panama City.

Crews Saturday afternoon were driving posts into the shoreline and stringing absorbent boom for about 100 yards along the shore.

Caskey said that part of the beach and shoreline is closed “until the threat is mitigated.”

Hazmat trucks were on the scene cleaning up and making sure residents and visitors are safe.

The Coast Guard also was driving up and down the beach looking for anything else that might have washed up.

This is a developing story. Check back with The News Herald for more details.

rainyday: OMG!

If you had unlimited skimmer boats, how would you control an oil spill? Aerial pictures show skimmer boats cruising through slicks, and the slick closing up behind them, only thinner and less easily skimmed. This is not effective.

The big problem is, oil spreads, so you must skim it faster than it spreads, while it is still thick and effectively skimmed.

Diagram A shows a skimmer boat width W travelling around an oil spill diameter D spreading outwards with speed S. What velocity V must the skimmer boat travel at to complete a circuit in the time it takes the oil to spread width W?

Making some wild-ass guesses:

On May 7 after 16 days the slick had formed an area equal to a circle 190 km across.
From the centre, spread velocity S = 190 x 1000 / 2 x 16 x 24 = 250 m/hr

Assume the skimmer width = 12 m

Then oil takes 12/250 = 0.0048 hours = 3 min approx to spread width of boat.

Assume we want to confine the spill to a slick diameter D = 5 km

Then distance boat must travel to complete one circumference = pi D = pi x 5000 = 15,700 m = 15.7 km

Therefore, required velocity of boat V = 15.7/0.0048 = 327 km/hr

Since skimmer boats only travel at say 25 km/hr (16 mph), 327/25 = 13 boats are needed, spaced evenly around the slick.

(More boats will be needed to fill in for boats leaving station to offload their cargo of oil.)

Diagram B shows a preferable scenario.

Two skimmer boats control the open ends of an oil boom, while other skimmer boats line up side-by-side and gulp oil.

They do not move. they hold their station while oil comes to them.

Of course, they would have to leave station to offload their cargo as they fill up so it's a bit more complicated, but I think this is the pattern to aim for.

I saw on another site that Oil Drum had posted the below anonymous comment about the cause of the Gulf Oil Spill. Any follow up on this and what say you?

Anonymous Source)
The following is my theory on what happened on April 20th. I have listed factual information to the best of my knowledge, and base this theory on 33 years of experience working on these rigs, with 16 years working as a consultant worldwide. The contractor (Transocean in this case) typically does not do anything without direction and approval from the operator (BP in this case). I believe that there was nothing wrong with the BOP, or the conduct of the crews prior to the catastrophic failure. If any operator drills a similar well using the same flawed casing and cement program, the same results will be very possible.
The well was drilled to 18,360 ft and final mud weight was 14.0 ppg. The last casing long string was 16 inch and there were 3 drilling liners (13 5/8?, 11 7/8? and 9 7/8?) with 3 liner tops. A 9-7/8? X 7? tapered casing long string was run to TD. The bottom section of casing was cemented with only 51 barrels of light weight cement containing nitrogen, a tricky procedure, especially in these conditions.
The casing seal assembly was set in wellhead and pressure tested from above to 10,000 psi. Reportedly, a lock down ring was not run on the casing hanger. The casing string was pressure tested against the Shear rams, only 16.5 hours after primary cement job. A negative test on the wellhead packoff was performed.
The rig crew was likely lead to believe that the well was successfully cemented, capped and secured. Normally a responsible operator will not remove the primary source of well control (14.0 ppg drilling mud) until such conditions were met. However, the crews were given the order to displace heavy mud from riser with seawater, prior to setting the final cement plugs. They were pumping seawater down the drill string and sending returns overboard to workboat, so there was limited ability to directly detect influx via pit level. This is the fastest way to perform the displacement operation, and the method was likely directed and certainly approved by operator. There was a sudden casing failure during this displacement procedure that allowed the well to unload, with ignition of gas and oil. Evidently, the crew was able to get the diverter closed based on initial photographs, showing flames coming out of diverter lines.

It is likely that pressure built up between the 9 7/8? and 16? casing under the casing hanger, due to gas migration from the pay zone. Based on reported mud weight, the reservoir formation pressure is in excess of 13,000 psi. The pressure building in the cross sectional area below the casing hanger would have increased casing tension and caused casing to collapse and part (rapidly separate) at a connection, probably a joint or two (50' or 90') below wellhead. The collapse pressure for 62.8 ppf 9-7/8? casing is +/- 10,300 psi. However, the collapse resistance of casing is considerably reduced in presence of axial stress (i.e. tension). Engineers – see formula from API bulletin 5C3, section 2.1.5 and run the math. The well then came in violently through parted casing and caused the blowout. Without lockdown ring on hanger, the casing hanger and joint(s) were slingshot up into BOP. That would explain why all components of the BOP are unable to seal or shear. The parted casing section remains across all BOP ram cavities and probably all the way up into the riser.
Shortcut #1: Running a tapered long string rather than a liner with 9-7/8? liner top packer, followed by tieback string and pumping heavy cement all the way to seabed. Perhaps the original permits for this casing program were based on a planned appraisal well, and changed midstream to a producer well, then hastily approved by the complacent or under-staffed MMS. This tragic shortcut may have saved about 1.5 rig days.
Shortcut #2: Insufficient time was used to cure the mud losses prior to cementing the open hole reservoir section, depending instead on using lightweight cement to prevent losses to the formation.
Shortcut #3: The nitrified primary cement job. This is difficult to pull off, even under ideal conditions.
Shortcut #4: Hanger without lock ring may have used due to the previously unplanned long string, and to avoid waiting for hanger with lock ring to be fabricated or prepared.
Shortcut #5: No cement evaluation logs were performed after a job with known high calculated risk (mud losses to formation). This shortcut may have saved 8 hours of rig time.
Shortcut #6: Pressure testing casing less than 24 hours after cement in place can expand the casing before the cement is fully set. This shortcut can “crack” the cement and create a micro annulus which will allow gas migration.
Shortcut #7: Displacing 14 ppg mud from 8000 ft MDRT with 8.7 ppg seawater, less than 20 hours after primary cement is in place. How many tested and proven barriers can you count? I count zero satisfactory barriers. Industry standards dictate that at least two tested (to maximum anticipated pressure) barriers are in place prior to removing the primary source of well control (weighted mud or brine).
There was a response to this report in the same thread from aliilaali, which answers some of the above questions. He goes down the points, which is a nice counter-view, cool stuff if you are trying to really understand what is happening.
aliilaali on June 10, 2010 – 2:15pm Permalink | Subthread | Parent | Parent subthread | Comments top
it is a good analysis but then again hindsight is 20-20 …..but most of these points can be argued both ways…..
shortcut#1 – there is really nothing wrong with running a tapered string long as cement is pumped all the way down….similar approaches have been used all over the GOM …a cheaper approach YES …but not wrong from an engineering perspective
SC # 2 — this is correct
SC # 3 – there is nothing wrong with using nitrified cement…it is used all over again ….what has not come to light is what excess was used…cmt calculations need to account for nitrified cmt delivery ….simply put 30-40% excess is used….but this is a tested approach and not cause for concern in itself..infact in highly deviated holes it is the preferred option…why it was used in a vertical hole is a pause for thought but then nothing that is wrong here..
SC # 5 — again this has been misunderstood…..talk has focused on the CBL log….now a CBL log only proves zonal isolation for a completion job….NOT to check for cmt integrity and if used the results are always ambigious …..because here a nirtified cmt delivery was used…the problem with this process is a higher than normal chance of micro-annuls forming…a CBL log DOES NOT check for micro-annulus ….so how a CBL log would have helped here I dont understand….a leak-off test is the only correct option here….would have been a good practice to run a CBL here but not a requirement…
SC # 6 — this is correct and the major cause for concern….nitrifed cmt delivery requires a longer WOC time (waiting on cmt) than the normal cmt approach ….the small WOC time is what started a hain reaction of problems IMHO
SC # 7 – correct but again ties into WOC times…the displacement of the mud without good WOC times again was not the best idea but the returns should have been monitored …especially since the company man knew he was cutting it close …the company man should have been HIMSELF watching returns …anything bubbling downhole could have been countered if needed
most of the things are bad judgment calls with nothing to do with bad processes being employed …just my 2 cents ….once a well blows and leaks like this one…looking back every decision seems like the worst possible decision …
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aliilaali on June 10, 2010 – 3:23pm Permalink | Subthread | Parent | Parent subthread | Comments top
good centering is important because it minimizes axial loading on the casing ….this was a vertical hole and I am not surprised BP did not agree to 30 ….10-15 is what most operators would agree to in vertical holes …..also it makes sense since nitrified cmt delivery takes care of tighter clearances …..the way nitrified cmt delivery works is …nitrogen is added to fluff out the slurry ….this make the slurry more mobile and can move well through tight spots and find its way along ziggy zag flow paths ……
I would bet my 5 bucks …if the caliper log is released ….it will show a crappy hole …combine that with the 7 centralizers ….nitrified cmt would really make sense here then …
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aliilaali on June 10, 2010 – 3:57pm Permalink | Subthread | Parent | Parent subthread | Comments top
just ran a quick calculation …..out of 1,192' of open hole drilled with @ 8 3/4?, running a 7? csg, volumetircs come to 0.0268 bbls/ft so running up a total of 1,192' the volume of cmt needed is or a total of 31.9456 bbls (32 bbl) of cement required to fill “newest hole dug” annulus.
so 32 bbl of cmt required and 51 bbl of cmt were pumped in ….equates of excess of 19 bbl or 59% excess……now this is plenty of excess cmt by any standards ….atleast on paper things seem right……
in real life drilling —- the caliper log is needed here to see what the actual avg dia of the open hole was ….this calculation assumes a good consistent caliper log which is hard to imagine given the well history in march and april ……so if the caliper log is not available more than likely this whole calculation is not worth putting any comfort in ……same caulcuations need to be run with using the avg hole dia from the caliper log to work out if enough cmt with enough excess was pumped in …..
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tollertwins on June 10, 2010 – 4:06pm Permalink | Subthread | Parent | Parent subthread | Comments top
Halliburton apparently documented their disagreement w/ BP on this point saying that ‘they could (would?) have SEVERE gas flow issues’ w/ the fewer number of centralizers.
Media reports of the hearings said that:
a) yes – very small clearance between hole and casing (something like 3/8 – 3/4?).
b) HBT recommended 21 centralizers. There were only 6 of the right configuration on the ship – so they went w/ 6. So HBT covered it’s hind assets w/ the above documented statement.
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aliilaali on June 10, 2010 – 4:40pm Permalink | Subthread | Parent | Parent subthread | Comments top
TTwin –
3/8 – 3/4? seems like a little exaggerated …and i dont really see how anyone can come up with this number or even this tight range without looking at the caliper log ……
given halliburton advised 21 centralizers …..again points to a high chance that the caliper log showed a hole in bad shape ….now the only way for a csg to run in hole is a hole that is wider than what is expected and not narrower …..so IMHO i can say with a high degree of confidence that 3/8? – 3/4 sounds unreasonable and probably something CNN would report given their outstanding job of pulling information out of their ass interms of this whole incident ….
a disagreement on centralizers between operators and contractors is very common really…….if I was the drill engg and halliburton wanted 21 on a vertical hole….i would need some convincing too…. not to say its not happened…I ran 38 centralizers as recent as 4 months ago on a less deeper hole but i needed to be convinced by schlumberger …took not their field techs but a senior engineer to convince me …point being such instances are common and in itself nothing thats not part of routine work…thats why there are techs , engineers and senior engineers to provide many heads and levels of knowledge to counter such problems at different levels just like any other industry

So how does one install a different attitude in those who work to produce the fuel that we all need? To a degree, it has to be done through the imposition of regulations...

When they broke up the Bell System back in the 1980s, the newly-created regional telephone companies took a rather cavalier attitude towards the restrictions on their actions included in the settlement. Violations came to a screeching halt when the presiding judge threatened (quite believably) to start putting everyone in the chain of command from the employee guilty of the actual violation up through the CEO in jail for six months for contempt.

Incentives matter. Fines will be paid by the corporation. Jail time is done by actual people. Once Mr. Hayward (for example) realizes that platform managers can act in ways that result in Mr. Hayward doing 3-6 months in a real jail, company procedures will immediately change to guarantee compliance, and the corporate culture will change very, very quickly to ensure compliance with procedures.

mcain: it's called accountability. Yeah? From bottom to top. I don't believe one can teach this in an academic setting.There are good people's lives at stake, no matter what your endeavor in life. let alone the good stewardship of our lands and livelihoods that have been bestowed upon us.Callousness permeates the corporate culture of the world today.Workmanship and Service! I say!

Just an observation, the offshore surface oil seems to be expanding significantly just the last couple days. On the 10th I saw what appeared to be a large slick on the most recent AQUA MODIS image, around 25N 88.5W (south of the MS/AL border, west of the FL Keys):

http://rapidfire.sci.gsfc.nasa.gov/subsets/?subset=USA7.2010161.aqua.1km...

However at the time the NOAA offshore forecast did not show any oil even close to that location:

http://response.restoration.noaa.gov/book_shelf/2159_SOFM24-2010-06-09-1...

Their more recent updated map expands the offshore area significantly and notes the spill there:

http://response.restoration.noaa.gov/book_shelf/2174_SOFM24-2010-06-11-1...

But there seemed to be nothing in the daily briefings to take note of this.

BP control over Nat'l Incident Mngt Systems data? Indicates withholding of data vital to DWH remediation.

See "BP GIS and the Mysterious VanishingOpen Letter", available at:

http://www.scientificblogging.com/chatter_box/bp_gis_and_mysterious_vani...

Where is the sense of urgency for the "new cap"??????????????????????????????????????????????????????

The first cap is a sorry excuse.

I am very confused that both BP and the federal govt havent provided a newer cap by now.

What are they waiting on? Between BP and the federal govt, they should have the resouces available to collect 90% of the oil coming out.

The news is not good from Gulf Shores, Alabama. I went to the main beach today and saw oil for miles and miles. Hardly no one in sight. Reminded me of that Don Henley song, 'Boys of Summer'. I was so disgusted I went to Hooter's. The Hooter's girls were even getting BP checks. You know it is bad when the Hooter's girls do not have work. I have today's video and photos in my photobucket. Please visit. If my count gets high enough a local media company may give me a local web job. Very cool to blog and report my way to gainful employment during this disaster.
http://s892.photobucket.com/albums/ac126/tinfoilhatguy/Gulf%20Shores%206...

All sexism aside, these girls have bills too.

I have read that the flow is suspected of coming mainly from around the drill pipe rather than up the drill pipe. If this is the case, might it be possible to force a connector pipe onto the top of the cut drill pipe, maybe using a sleeve with o-rings, then pump mud down through the drill pipe for a bottom kill?