Will,

That's an interesting thought, here are just a few comments.

The predatory military response requires the mobilization of hostility. To the Japanese, the Americans were just racists and hypocrites when at least to a large extent they were trying to contain Japanese expansion. Every possibility to demonize Saddam Hussein was exploited in the run-up to the 2003 war, while more reconciliatory views tended to disappear into the background. After peak oil, we should expect to see more of that.

The Cuban-style response is also called "mobilization of local solidarity", and despite the hardship people tend to perceive this as a community moment. As one inhabitant of a vulnerable neighbourhood put it, the crisis brought people closer together because it forced them to rely on one another. As another Habanero put it, “When the Special Period started, horticultural clubs were organized by farmers themselves. (…) Special emphasis was made to involve the whole family in these activities. (…) We wanted also to develop more collaboration and mutual help among ourselves; we exchanged seeds, varieties, and experiences. We achieved a sense and spirit of mutual help, solidarity, and we learned about agricultural production” (both quoted in my original article).

As for totalitarian retrenchment, it is really hard to tell. There are by definition no reliable opinion surveys for North Korea, and ethnographic research (which can be done places like Cuba) is hardly possible. Some scholars rely on refugees for information, but they are a notoriously unreliable source. In any case, the perceptions of common people under totalitarian retrenchment tend not to count for much. Elite perceptions count. And elites are either complicit, or they leave the country and become whistleblowers and therefore of limited reliability as a source. In short, there is the methodological problem that it is difficult to know how people feel in totalitarian system. The closest you can get is probably studies on Stalinist Russia or Pol Pot's Cambodia which are typically done after the fact.

As for the US South, we know a lot. There has been proud defiance against the new social order, and a widespread obstinacy to cling to obsolete ideals. Mark Twain, a highly perceptive observer of Life in the post-Civil-War South, wrote in 1883 that cultural life on the Mississippi was characterized by “practical, common-sense, progressive ideas, and progressive works, mixed up with the duel, the inflated speech, and the jejune romanticism of an absurd past that is dead, and out of charity ought to be buried” (quoted in my original article).

I do not anticipate a "national" response to the hard realities of peak oil that would mirror the historic experiences offered. As the process becomes truly entrenched it most likely will set off politically seismic events that will ultimately fracture the United States into a jumble of autonomous and semi autonomous parts. Large industrial nations, such as the U.S., are absolutely dependent on a ready supply of cheap energy to maintain political cohesion. A deindustrialization will set off a disintegration of the nation. How we will disintegrate is the real question. Some sections of the former U.S. will likely fare much better than others, although hardship and chaos are likely to affect every state and region. A number of states seem prime candidates to seek separation from a dysfunctional union. These include Alaska, Hawaii, Utah and the upper New England states. Several of the southwestern states could become extremely unstable. California could fracture into at least three parts. The northwestern states of Washington and Oregon could join forces to form a single nation. This disintegration could play out over a period of two or more decades, but it could begin rather quickly depending on the rate of economic/political decline as peak oil takes hold and reduces energy supplies.

Proposition number five:

This is the way the world ends

This is the way the world ends

This is the way the world ends

Not with a bang, but with a whimper.

Seems most likely to me.

Art is prescient.

Yes, Hyp3/Japan parallel is particularly interesting

"From 1894, Japan built an extensive empire that included Taiwan, Korea, Manchuria, and parts of northern China. The Japanese regarded this sphere of influence as a political and economic necessity, which prevented foreign states from strangling Japan by blocking its access to raw materials and crucial sea-lanes. Japan's large military force was regarded as essential to the empire's defense and prosperity by obtaining natural resources that the Japanese islands lacked." (wikipedia - Empire of Japan)

Sort of chilling sitting here next door in Canada with our tar, fresh water n' whatnot.

Kingfish,

Thank you very much for your kind words.

As I see it, the US oscillates between two roles/poles. America’s free-trade ideology militates against the open recourse to military coercion. In fact, the US tends to support the free market for oil as long as it is convenient. When the oil market comes under pressure due to tightening supply, the US will continue to defend it for a while. But when soaring prices start crippling the national economy, US leaders may find that coercive diplomacy is more effective than free-trade rhetoric. The US is then likely to put the blame on foreigners and pursue a geopolitical strategy of “energy security” to protect the American way of life. Why keep negotiating with recalcitrant leaders such as Chavez if there is a military option? This is not to say that the military option is easy, as the Iraq war has shown. However, military coercion is likely to gain ascendancy relative to free-market rhetoric as energy supplies become scarcer. In short, in a situation of chronic energy scarcity the US may be tempted more often than ever before to use its unrivalled power projection capacity to secure privileged access to oil. It has happened sometimes in the past, and may happen more often in the future, that US decision makers find military coercion more effective than trade.

China is no match for the US, but it would be capable of using its military muscle to secure access to oil and gas in Central Asia. Elsewhere the PRC would be unlikely to use a predatory strategy because, for the foreseeable future, its maritime forces and air power are not strong enough. Countries like India, Brazil or Israel have even more limited military clout, but might be tempted to engage in geopolitical operations in their regional neighbourhood.

Most countries, at any rate, do not really have a credible military option. This does not mean that their response will be uniform. In my model there are at least two possible responses for them, the mobilization of local solidarity and totalitarian retrenchment.

You are right in mentioning climate as an important difference between Korea and Cuba, and some other differences can be mentioned (revenue from tourism, remittances, foreign investment, and international aid). However I do believe that the key difference between the two cases is the one captured by Hypotheses 1 and 2. Just read a speech by Castro. The man has mostly acted as a moralist and humanist rather than a socialist or communist. Cuba is not just a cosy place. However they are far less totalitarian than North Korea. Pyongyang relies on the atomization of society for control, while Habana relies on grassroots communities. One should not idealize this. The regime has invested in community development not so much to create social glue but rather to increase political control. But be that as it may, most Cubans can rely on their families, friends, and neighbours. This local solidarity, or social capital, has helped them to make ends meet during the “Special Period”.

On the industrialism/mass consumerism scale, it is significant to note that North Korea became communist about 10 years earlier and almost entirely abolished private property of land. In Cuba, about 4% of family farmers kept their plots. Another 11% was organized in private cooperatives. The survival of traditional family farms alongside industrial agriculture turned out to be an important asset in the 1990s. Independent farms were more resilient to the crisis than state farms because they operated with less fuel and agrochemical inputs. Cuba’s remaining family farmers kept important traditional knowledge that could be recovered. Other formerly independent farmers had moved to state farms or urban areas, where they provided valuable know-how for self-provisioning and urban agriculture.

An interesting question you pose is how the three hypotheses are related. I'd suggest that the military option (Hypothesis 3) comes first. If a country has a credible military option, it is likely to use it. However this does not tell us if the regime will at the same time retrench or if local solidarity will be mobilized at the same time. Both of these reactions are sometimes observed in times of war. The likelihood of finding either of the two, or both, depends on where a country is with regard to Hypotheses 2 and 3. In short: you are right, the hypotheses are not mutually exclusive and one should always ask how a country "scores" on any of them to get the full picture.

Finally, let me reiterate that the three hypotheses are not exhaustive. This is just as much as I could glean from easily available historical evidence. It is not hard to imagine other possible reactions, such as the mobilization of national sentiment by populist regimes.

Situatins of siege (as well as neutral countries surrounded by war that is not of their own making) are very interesting to study from a survivalist viewpoint. Many lessons can be gleaned from them. However I have not included them in my analysis as, so far, there is little to indicate that peak oil must be seen in the context of a global conflagration such as World War II. Peak Oil seems more likely to occur in peacetime, and military operations are more likely as responses than triggers.

That's a fair point. However historical analogues to Peak Oil are rare. I've studied about all straightforward cases that are available. There are some more, but with very few exceptions (Gaza Strip?) they are far less straightforward analogues. The best alternative to my historical method is formal modelling. Make assumptions, develop a model, plug data into it, and see what happens. They have tried this with climate change, where the application is much easier but even there I see is as quite speculative. Others may disagree, so let them do their formal modelling. What would you suggest? Refrain from asking what would happen in different parts of the world after peak oil? This seems to be exactly what most of my scientific colleagues are doing. But will it get us any further?

Ok, say from 1940 to 2010:

Differences:
1) Today there are several credible nuclear weapons arsenals, at least three of which assure retaliatory destruction.
2) Today mass media operates as an extremely powerfull propaganda medium.
3) Today large numbers of military casualties of self-identified "our side" people on foreign soil are much more difficult to conceal.
4) In most locations, a more humanist spirit is considered de rigeure, eg. one could never get half the people of a large developed nation to fight for race-based slavery or extermination of a religious sect.

Similarities:
1) The same elites are in control.
2) The motivations of the controlling elites are the same.
3) The same political system is still considered "state-of-the-art".

Joule,

We seem to be in almost full agreement. So here are just a few comments on your comments.

1. North Korea

This was of course a brutal Stalinist regime from the inception. However, there was an important change in the 1990s which I try to capture with the term "totalitarian retrenchment". In line with the ideology of "juche" (self reliance), up until the 1980s the regime had heavily invested in coalmines and hydropower to satisfy North Korea’s enormous energy needs. Furthermore, Pyongyang had developed a toxic industrialized agriculture to feed the highly urbanized North Korean population. Farming in North Korea was based on irrigation, mechanization, electrification, and the prodigious use of chemicals. In 1990, estimated per capita energy use was twice as large in North Korea as in China and over half that of Japan.

In a way, they tried to keep the population happy. But this was over when fuel became scarce in the early 1990s. Nevertheless, Pyongyang’s performance is a failure only when measured against the standards of liberal democracy. On its own (cynical) terms, the regime has been incredibly successful. The crisis prompted North Korean elites to abandon the Stalinist path of wasteful industrialism, and allocate systemic scarcity instead. This negative policy choice made it possible to avoid an economic and political opening, thus preserving cherished elite privileges. While Pyongyang's brinkmanship may be morally repugnant, Korean-style totalitarian retrenchment is without doubt one possible response to a severe energy supply disruption.

2. Japan

What you suggest is exactly my position, as I have pointed out in a previous comment further above.

3. Confederacy

Let me elaborate a bit more.

The socioeconomic backbone resource of the Old South was slaves. Precisely because the slave economy worked, white Southerners were willing to defend it in the bloody War of Secession of 1861-1865. The abolition of slavery after the War plunged the South into a deep crisis. The War was followed by the Reconstruction Era (1865-1877), when the victorious North tried to enlist dissident elites and former slaves to impose its political and socio-economic institutions on a reluctant South. Despite the introduction of representation and suffrage for former slaves, reconstruction was mostly thwarted by the recalcitrance of traditionalist Southern elites. Heavy subsidization of railroads by Republican state governments in the South did not lead to the hoped-for modernization but rather to corruption, making a few investors rich and otherwise contributing to soaring public deficits. After the withdrawal of the last federal troops from the South, race inequality was re-established under the banner of white supremacy.

Later in the Nineteenth Century, Southern elites were not prevented by their conservative values from embracing industrial capitalism. Initially, this amounted to an uneasy compromise between cherished industrialization and dreaded modernization. On the one hand, Southern elites became obsessed with the idea that an industrializing “New South” would rise like phoenix from the ashes of the “Old South”. On the other hand, they remained loyal to time-honoured values of agrarianism and patriarchal society.

This was reflected in a quasi-colonial economy. While railroads were finally built on a massive scale, often with Northern capital, Southern industrialization was initially dominated by low-wage and labour-intensive manufacturing. Most industries were dedicated to the processing of agricultural goods (e.g. cotton mills) or natural resources (e.g. blast furnaces). The real industrial takeoff came much later, after several generations of socio-economic backwardness, and after the New Deal of the 1930s (electrification) and the war economy of World War II. In the mid-20th Century, Dixieland finally became a growth region and came to be seen as part of the American “Sunbelt”. The Civil Rights Act of 1964 put an end to official race segregation in the South, although some race issues remain until the present day.

I was a child in Texas during WWII. It is said that the gasoline rationing was primarily designed to save rubber. My father had a B card for our single car but we drove very little and never over 35 mph. 1941 was the last year of full automobile production. I traveled around Amarillo mostly on a light weight "Victory" bike or on foot. Occasionally on a bus. Though some food was rationed I don't recall going hungry. For me personally the single greatest impact of rationing and shortages involved basketball shoes. I don't recall the populace being particularly unhappy. There was extreme solidarity. Amarillo had a busy air base and a bomb factory. Pantex, the bomb factory is now dismantling atomic weapons.

Joule: You and several other of those commenting above are correct that The Confederacy example is much more complex than just the loss of slave power energy. Both poor whites, and poor blacks were available for work. Many poor blacks were soon back at agricultural work as sharecroppers or hired hands under conditions quite similar to slavery. Poor whites went to work in the new textile mills that were in full-growth mode within decades of the end or the war. And the devastation of the war was only a part of the problem.

A thick soup of myth and historical apology mixes with negative cliches to obscure the reality.

A truly eye-opening book on a lost aspect of the era is an out-of-print 1971 book: THE CONFEDERACY AS A REVOLUTIONARY EXPERIENCE by Emory M. Thomas, a University of Georgia historian writing for "The New Insights in History" Series. If you think you have read all there is to know about the era, dig up a copy of this.

Dr. Friedrichs has written a thought-provoking work. Preservation of American car craziness (to use Kunstler's term)may prove more important than civil liberties. Neither our vaunted free press, nor our enlightened cultural values were much protection against the scheming neo-con lies that propelled us into the recent U.S.-U.K. petro-adventure. And didn't Dr. Samsam Bhaktiar tell us before he died that Iran is already past Peak?

Cap'n Daddy

WNC Observer,

I'd be delighted if that became accepted wisdom among decision makers in powerful countries. Even if we assume a military solution works for those wielding it, it's at best a temporary fix to gain time. It wastes resources that would be better used to build rather than destroy. If decision makers and common people see this, the necessary transition after peak oil will be far more manageable.

That is what I would wish to happen, not what I expect to happen given the historical record.

"The one thing about the military option, though, is that it doesn't really work"

Unfortunately, it works very well -- as long as both adversaries do not possess nuclear weapons.

During WWII, Hitler attacked Stalingrad to protect his flank while trying to grab the Caucasus oil fields. Japan attacked Pearl Harbor so it could grab Manila harbor, to protect its flanks while seizing the oil fields in the Dutch Indies (Indonesia).

The US invaded and occupied Iraq, and now the proceeds from oil sales largely go to supporting a nascent democracy, rather than Saddam's military machine. Which is probably what President Cheney intended.

And who can forget what the US gained from the Mexican war?

The reason we've had so many wars in the past and present is because, even though they are destructive, they *can* pay off handsomely for the victor.

If I lose 2 units to take 5 units from you, I'm 3 units ahead. If you are out 10 units, so what? That means you'll be too devastated to challenge me. So I win two ways. (not that I condone such things, being as I'm presently a Buddhist, but that is how it works).

Deanfa,

1) Agreed. Maybe my article spurs formal modelers to do precisely this kind of analysis. I have simply done what I do best, and hope others with different skill-sets will complement my analysis.

2) In the turbulent world depicted in my article, terrorism and "forward defense" in Afghanistan would soon become really minor concerns to the US. The real killing and dying probably happen for far more tangible motives. Iraq may now be seen as an asset in terms of energy supplies, but this is hardly true about Afghanistan. A concentration of US military power on the Western hemisphere plus sea-lanes and countries that are (a) not landlocked and (b) offer important strategic assets would probably impose itself. The USA may eventually lose some of its interest in its current military presence in Europe and Japan and redeploy troops to strategically more salient areas.

As mentioned in an earlier comment, I agree that military operations tend to create nasty side-effects. I also agree that from a religious and moral point of view, and for the sake of the future of mankind, wars will be part of the problem rather than part of the solution. Nevertheless, do you really believe the US will keep discussing with people like Chavez when "artificially inflated Oil prices" (according to the propaganda you'd expect) endanger "freedom" or the "American way of life"?

If you look at my first two hypotheses, you get a further clue why I believe that the US is unlikely to renounce the military option: US society has been uniquely exposed to humanism, pluralism and liberal democracy; as well as to individualism, industrialism and mass consumerism. Unless patriotism and/or community spirit can be garnered to an absolutely incredible and unprecedented extent, and directed inwards to the mobilization of national cohesion and local solidarity rather than against external enemies, I frankly do not see very much choice for US leaders other than to play the military card. When you have an ace in an otherwise poor hand, you are likely to play it.

Farmwork will be rather a shock for many, and not easy for farmers to supervise.

No kidding! Unless one could select the most reliable and smart, it would require an increased effort in training and supervision rather than helping out. Though i suppose a lot would depend on motivational factors.

Backstop,

My father-in-law is a dairy farmer in North-Western Germany. He's had a very hard time over the last couple of years due to the low prices for milk. However he has all the knowledge and skills to revert to traditional farming if need be. His son already has lost much of that knowledge, especially the subsistence mindset, but he could still re-adjust with relative ease.

A farm of that size in the past would have fed about 15 people, and have provided food for another 25 or so townsfolk. Currently my father in law is running the farm with his wife and one daughter who lives also on the farm. They could train another twelve people and revert to a post-peak adaptation of traditional farming, taking into account a trough period of about ten years when the land would yield much less due to a lack of chemical inputs. Because that trough is dreadful on yields, a slow energy descent and rising prices for fertilizers would be better. Farms like theirs would then also become (again) more competitive vis-a-vis larger and more industrialized farms.

But how many such farmers are left, even in Europe, as a percentage of the population? Many of those who are left are struggling or about to throw the towel. Let's hope the descent after peak oil is very very smooth indeed. As I mention in the article, Europe does not seem to have a credible military option. Totalitarian retrenchment is neither desirable nor likely, at least for the first decade or so. And communal solidarity is in short supply after fifty years of unfettered consumerism.

Here is what I've writen on Europe in the original article (you can freely download the pre-print version at http://www.qeh.ox.ac.uk/pdf/pdf-research/Global%20Energy%20Crunch.pdf). I think you can recognize the first three of my hypotheses behind what I say in the next couple of paragraphs.

After peak oil, Western Europe would be in a difficult quandary. Although in principle Germany and France could easily arm, a credible military option is not available. Europeans have good historical reasons to dread predatory militarism, and the social consensus necessary for this strategy would not be forthcoming at the decisive initial stages of geopolitical positioning. In most of Western Europe, the path of totalitarian retrenchment does not seem to be available either. Concomitantly, Western European countries would be forced to strike opportunistic “bargains” with Russia and the oil exporting countries of North Africa. Unfortunately, however, such deals are inherently fragile and subject to constant renegotiation. Investment in renewable energy and innovative technologies might somewhat mitigate the transition, but ultimately Europeans could hardly avoid a transition to a more community-based lifestyle. Despite the present affluence of Western European societies (or precisely because of it), this would be extremely painful and last for several generations.

As a result, people would be forced to rely on local communities for their welfare if not their survival. However a regression to community-based values and a subsistence lifestyle would be difficult because the habits of industrial society are deeply rooted. Western Europe’s problems would be compounded by social segregation along immigrant groups and/or religious fault lines which, on the one hand, might enhance communal support for specific groups but, on the other, would conjure up severe conflict in Europe’s multiethnic societies.

"Sadly modern, mostly urban, youth is not best suited for this given the prevalence of an entitlement culture and very soft work ethic. Farmwork will be rather a shock for many, and not easy for farmers to supervise."

Ouch, that rings true. I have a fellow peak-oiler who helps on our farm, and his 13 year old son helped me yesterday. It was a hot and humid day, and while dad sweated to do some (of his typically outstanding) work on our weatherboard siding, son and I found a relatively shady spot and repainted a bush hog I'd primed the week before.

The kid was in a flannel shirt. He soon pooped out, tired by the heat, and scared of...ticks.

Something similar has happened to every kid we've had help on the farm as we cleared stormfall, stacked wood, and similar tasks that I, an old geezer, can do all day long.

I'm not encouraged that younger Americans can do hard physical work without a lot of reality adjustment. At 13 I had good wind, ran and played outside, and was half-way decent at soccer. All the way home in my truck, this young man could talk about one thing: the car he was going to buy when he turned 16.

Dad agreed that he and his son--who lives with mom--would be outside more and he'd "toughen the boy up."

I hope so, because he's a nice kid who can follow instructions. But he's got hard lessons ahead of him. I'm honestly glad that I'm not his age. I plan to be dead when the worst effects of post-Peak life come to my part of the world.

It's interesting to compare the parallels between Canada's relationship to the US (vis. oil sands) with Australia's relationship to China (coal) and perhaps even Russia's relationship to Europe (natural gas)?

Majorian,

I'm glad you bring this on. It gives me a nice opportunity to offer my thoughts on "energy alternatives" (you can freely download the pre-print version of my full article at http://www.qeh.ox.ac.uk/pdf/pdf-research/Global%20Energy%20Crunch.pdf).

A key assumption of my article is that, in the event of peak oil, no obvious alternate resource and technology would be at hand to replace oil as the backbone resource of industrial society. To mitigate the impact of peak oil, a massive crash program to develop a mix of substitute resources and implement adequate technologies would be desperately needed. The program would have to start early, as it would come to fruition only after much more than a decade. In the absence of such a crash program, and after the onset of the crisis, rather than grandiose designs we should expect haphazard moves to make the best of a very difficult situation.

The most attractive resource to mitigate the impact of peak oil is NATURAL GAS as a transition fuel. Although gas reserves are limited, they are relatively more abundant than oil reserves. Recently, there have been encouraging developments in the extraction of unconventional gas, and notably shale gas. However, it remains to be seen if reports of an “unconventional glut” can be trusted. As always, technology and infrastructure are major challenges. The exploration and exploitation of shale gas takes time. While oil is easily traded and transported as a liquid fuel, gas requires pipelines or needs to be liquefied. In any case the world’s vehicle fleet runs on oil, not gas. Compensating a decline of 2-5% of oil production per year with gas would be a tall order.

At least for a couple of decades, COAL would become a more important energy source. Coal is still fairly abundant in Asia, Australasia, and the United States. Increased carbon emissions would lead to very harmful consequences for the environment and global climate, not least because heavy investment in clean coal technologies is unlikely under crisis conditions. Rising oil prices would make coal mining and transport more difficult, but coal-rich countries are highly motivated to tackle such challenges as long as coal production makes financial and energetic sense.

To gain access to available OIL RESERVES, protected areas from the Arctic to Antarctica would be cleared for exploitation. Unconventional oil from tar sands and oil shale would be exploited, regardless of the harmful environmental consequences. As in the case of clean coal technologies, heavy investment of scarce financial resources in environmentally friendly technologies is unlikely under crisis conditions. Another downside of these otherwise desirable technologies is that they tend to reduce the energy return on energy invested (EROEI), which would be hardly acceptable in a situation of soaring energy scarcity.

In the unlikely event that massive financial resources and planning horizons of more than fifteen years were still available after peak oil, NUCLEAR REACTORS would be rushed through regardless of the risks involved. However, this can never do the trick. The current share of nuclear power in world energy production is only a few per cent, and it could hardly expand much under crisis conditions. Moreover, uranium is as finite as any other energy source.

To the extent possible in times of economic turmoil, there would be further investment in RENEWABLE ENERGY. But alas, this could hardly make up for the losses. As in the case of nuclear power, the share of renewable energy in world energy production is only a few per cent, and it is not clear how much and how quickly it could expand under crisis conditions. As any other energy source, renewable energy requires inputs of energy, raw materials, and investment. Nevertheless, the odds for renewable energy are better than for nuclear energy. From an ecological viewpoint, the greatest hope for the mitigation of peak oil is a combination of conservation, energy efficiency, and renewable energy.

If a mix of substitute fuels can be found, and if alternate technologies are developed in time, this may mitigate the impact of peak oil and postpone the decline of overall world energy consumption for a while. But there’s always another time, as infinite growth on a finite planet is impossible. At some point, industrial society will start crumbling and free trade will begin to disintegrate.

Thomas Deplume,

This is a fascinating idea. It is indeed how default on debt was often handled in pre-modern times. For example, ancient Greek and Roman history is full of examples of "debt-slavery".

On the other hand, what you suggest presumes that (a) banks would not themselves fall victims, (b) their loans would remain enforceable, and (c) the legal system would make the necessary adjustments.

These assumptions are perhaps a little bit far-fetched. But who knows, maybe something along the lines of what you suggest would be conceivable somewhere in the world at some point in the future.

The OPEC embargo was caused by publicly traded oil companies? I guess you learn something new every day.

Tinfoil hats could have prevented the conclusions you've reached. Dang it, WaitJustASecond, had you contacted me earlier I'd have sent one by parcel post or uploaded the easy-to-follow instructions so you could use your own foil.

Seems, to my faulty and aged memory, that OPEC began something called an embargo after the 1973 war with Israel, but I may be getting old and dotty.

but then what?

is obviously war, but I'll be shocked if it takes 30 years from now to happen, with or without oil peaking into severe shortage.

My prediction finally occurred. The mystery to me is why it did not plunge earlier.

Cramer says someone hit a "b" when they meant an "m". Funny how that works.

Writerman, I don't think these countries had any better ability to read the sea than the US, in fact, probably worse, as they do not have the information gathering network the US does.
I will agree that what worked for them may not work for the US, but that does not mean that we can;t learn anything from it.

The simplest, but most important point, is that they all found a way to cope with much reduced oil availability. At present the US policy is to do whatever it takes to keep the oil available - a totally different approach, because it is deemed that reduced availability is unacceptable.

If we take an alternate view, that a major reduction in living standard is unacceptable, so all we have to do is find ways to maintain this living standard with dramatically reduced oil consumption. Given that many countries have similar living standards with 50% less oil use per capita, I'd say it can be done.

The problem is, as you say, social organisation, because any hint of that, in America, is viewed as creeping socialism and an erosion of individual freedoms. Can a dramatic change on oil use be achieved without increased social organisation? Possibly, but I haven;t seen any examples of it.
There is a hard choice ahead for America, either live with increased social organisation, or have a lot less people, like about 1/3rd, living in the country so there are enough resources per capita to maintain the social disconnect. But I don;t think that is an acceptable scenario,, either.

Nick,
While I agree with your points, we probably have to get to the point where at least one EV or PHEV is on each block( about 0.5% of vehicles)before people really understand the vehicle transport revolution that is about to happen. Until that point SUV owners will bitch about $10/gallon or even $3/gallon fuel at BBQ's. After that point they will be embarrassed to admit that they are flushing $500 a month fuel costs down the drain, while their neighbor is paying <$50/month for electric transportation. Actually they will probably be still bitching about the 6month back-orders for EVs, or having to car pool, or walk to the local shops.

Gail is probably right that people will try to hand onto their way of life, after all it did take a generation for horse transportation to be replaced by street cars and ICE vehicles, and will certainly take a generation for all ICE vehicles to be replaced by EV. Fortunately we dont have to build an entire electric charging infrastructure from scratch as was required when ICE replaced horse power.

nurmagister,

In fact, I was compelled to make a few simplifying moves. One is that I am talking about the first two decades after peak oil only, assuming a 2-5% decline per annum. You are quite right that, after this, all bets are off.

2-5% over two decades amounts to, very roughly, around 50%. In a way, you can therefore view the North Korean and Cuban cases as the equivalent of the first twenty years after peak oil in fast motion. The disadvantage is that certain systemic feedback mechanisms such as the effects of changing birth rates or slow migration processes are thereby taken off the table. However, the shorter time span has the advantage that we can see the effects much more clearly. In a chain of events that takes over twenty years, it can be very difficult to attribute causality because there are many perturbing factors. For example, you can interpret resource wars as consequences of peak oil but you can also see them as contingencies having independent effects. A Volcano may break out, and then you don't know what is due to the Volcano and what is due to peak oil. In the Cuban and North Korean cases, by contrast, there are fairly clear chains of causality. I see that as an important analytical advantage. It may also help us to have a better gaze and make more accurate diagnoses. In fact, people who do not have the mental frame of peak oil thinking will be prone to resort to superficial interpretations of events, e.g. taking financial crises or armed conflictes as the cause of the mailaisse when they are rather symptoms. Again: I am talking about the first two decades after peak oil only. For the longer-term view see John Michael Greer (2009) The Ecotechnic Future, Gabriola Island: New Society Publishers.

Another factor to it is that those problems were with two countries only and not with the entire world. So, even in worst days there was some hope that some help would come from somewhere or oil prices would fall enough to be affordable again or these countries would be able to earn enough foreign exchange to import sufficient quantities of oil. In case of all out global decline situation would be much more worse. An analogy is one person getting ill and able to use some hospital or get some charity from neighbours (like in case of north korea getting food aids from other countries) and entire city getting ill all at the same time leaving no person to help.

You need to get people to do productive things, hiering four people to do one persons job makes for three people not finding a niche were they can add value to the economy and someone has to pay taxes or get inflation to pay for this wich further hinders the market adaptations to the new situation.

Things will also never ever be in order, they are not even perfect in good times. Having one clumsy system that stays in control and power until things are well and then disbands itself when the dictator no longer is needed is an old formula for continued political disaster. You got to have the same basic policies and roles for your government both in good times, bad times and during disasters where the governments role allways is to support the people and the peoples volontary businesses with each other creating value, markets and constructive change.

Spot on, WisdomfromPakistan. I hope Oelewapperke reads your comment.

Nick,

In fact the South is not a direct Peak Oil model. Japan, North Korea and Cuba are models for different possible reactions to peak oil (see my Hypotheses 1-3 in the original post). The South is not a direct model. Instead, it serves to bring home the point that people do not give up their livestyles easily (see my Hypothesis 4 in the original post). THIS is what would also apply if oil became a very scarce and expensive commodity so that societies would have to adjust their industrialist modes of production and transportation, and people their consumerist lifestyles.

Dixie is a cautionary tale for those who believe that, after peak oil, there will be an easy technological upgrade. If even in the US South, despite uniquely favourable circumstances, adaptation took a full century, then a technological upgrade will be even harder under the more challenging circumstances of a global energy crunch. The world would be struggling with an energetic downgrade, rather than an industrial upgrade as in the case of the American South. Developing energy technologies is never fast and easy, and even less so in times of crisis. After peak oil, we should expect extremely slow and painful processes of social and technological adjustment that may last for a century or more.

Nick and I agree on a variety of points but have a long running disagreement on the desirability (as opposed to technical feasibility) of electric cars

Actually, we agree pretty closely on the desirability (or lack thereof) of primary reliance on personal transportation (e.g., EVs). We both have chosen to live in very walkable dense urban areas, rely on electric rail, and keep our cars for decades and use them relatively little. I'm simply aware that 1) this is a much more expensive approach overall than suburban living, and 2) conversion from ICE to EV transportation is much, much faster and cheaper than a transition to urban rail and Transit Oriented Development.

I agree with the rest of what you said (except for the likelihood of high-quality life post-PO). I think people in general, and people in the US in particular, have gotten stuck on a low rung of the Maslow hierarchy, trying to find emotional rewards and meaning in life from...material consumption.

Thanks - I've enjoyed it too.