Friday Evening Reading

"Oil is running out." Damn, I hate that media framing--it's not productive. And the reporter is amateurish at best. But otherwise, this is an interesting video discussion of the EWG report and other angles of the oil story.

When you're done with that, then go check out:

I can't see the video. I don't know why, but embedding YouTube videos are a real bandwidth hit, and sometimes they just don't play at all when you embed them. (Probably YouTube's proprietary player to blame.)

For those who may be having similar problems...

Part 1

Part 2

(I think the first one is the same video embedded above, as best I can tell from the URL.)

Anyways, if you're having trouble with the video looking really jerky or not playing at all, going to YouTube and viewing them there will probably work better than trying to watch it embedded here.

To view the video you need to install the flash plugin available for download here.


I have the Flash plugin installed. I was referring to the well-known issue with embedded YouTube videos. They often don't run as well embedded as they do if you watch them at YouTube. Especially when traffic is heavy.

If you are reading this Leanan, here is the ultimate abiotic oil scam for your next drum beat:-)

Absolutely worth reading in full. Snippet here:

From The Times
October 27, 2007
‘Miracle’ fuel that made a mockery of Mugabe

Jan Raath in Harare
When Nomatter Tagarira, a spirit medium, claimed that she could conjure refined diesel out of a rock by striking it with her staff, ministers in Robert Mugabe’s Government believed that they might have found the solution to Zimbabwe’s perennial fuel shortage.
After witnessing her apparently miraculous gift they gave her five billion Zimbabwean dollars in cash (worth £1.7 million at the start of the year but now worth one seven-hundredth of that) in return for the fuel. Ms Tagarira was also given a farm, said to have been seized from its white owner during Mr Mugabe’s lawless land grab, as well as food and services that included a round-the-clock armed guard on the rock in the district of Chinhoyi 60 miles (100km) from Harare, the capital.
More than a year later officials realised they had been duped.

That's a pretty old story. I think they knew they were duped last year when it happened. At least, I remember reading (and posting) it. It was one of those "odd news" items.

The world's petroleum was formed 60 million plus years ago and now, in a geologic wink of an eye, is half gone. Do we have to wait another interminable 20 years to say it is running out?

No. But maybe 5.

I am not sure which programme that came from but, that is the first time i have seen 2 guys arguing the same PO point.

So, in a nutshell.............we're boned?

The videos are from a show that aired on Al-Jazeera.

Good videos!

Let's see what the response from the IEA will be in their next Oil Market Report on 13 November.

The World Bank consultant, Mamdouh Salama, in part 1 of the video said that he did a peak oil report for the World Bank in April 2007. Does anyone have this report?

Apparently, another spelling of Mamdouh Salama is Mamdouh Salameh.

Salameh thinks that OPEC's proven reserves are overstated by 300 billion barrels and stated in his 2004 article that "Global oil production will probably reach a peak sometime during this decade".

Also found this feedback by Salameh, in May 2007, to ExxonMobil's belief that peak oil is unlikely in the next 25 years. (bolding is mine)

Exxon Mobil Says Peak Oil Unlikely in the Next 25 Years – Feedback (Dr Mamdouh Salameh, Mon 07 May)

Dr Mamdouh Salameh sent the following comment in response to Exxon Mobil’s position peak oil.

Feedback: The governments of the major oil-consuming countries as well as Exxon Mobil and the other multi-national oil companies and some international organizations such as the International Energy Agency (IEA) are in a state of denial about the reality and implications of peak oil.

Global conventional oil production peaked in 2006. However, my own research indicates that the peak may have already been reached in 2004 if we factor in what I describe as “OPEC’s inflated proven oil reserves”. My research indicates that OPEC’s proven oil reserves are overstated by some 300 billion barrels (bb). The current price fluctuations for crude oil are a manifestation of the peak.

A peak in oil production would manifest itself by rapidly escalating prices, a slowdown in production, a growing supply deficit, declining discovery rate of new oil and also a declining Energy Return on Investment ratio. All these characteristics exist today.

A delay or even a reversal of the peaking of conventional oil production could have been achieved by two pivotal factors: New major crude oil discoveries and an improvement in oil recovery rates. However, world oil discovery peaked in 1962 and production of conventional oil peaked in 2006. This means that sizeable reserves could only be added through a major improvement of the oil recovery rates.

And despite the great technological strides by the oil industry, the average global oil recovery rate has been stuck at 32% of the oil in place since the early 1990s. However, rates of 50% and even 55% have been achieved in the North Sea and also in the most recently-developed, state-of-the-art “Shaybah oilfield” in Saudi Arabia respectively. But I hasten to add that 90% of Saudi oil production comes from four giant oilfields (Ghawar, Safaniya, Hanifa and Khafji), all of which are more than 50 years oil and are being kept flowing by a huge injection of water. Oil recovery rate from these four oilfields ranges between 25% and 30%. They are on the verge of seeing a collapse of 30%-40% of their production in the imminent future and imminent means sometime in the next 3-5 years – but it could even be tomorrow. The same logic and the same oil recovery rates apply to the ageing giant oilfields in Iran, UAE, Kuwait and the rest of the Arab Gulf.

Peak oil is not only a reality but is already impacting on oil prices, the world economy and the global energy security. The almost quadrupling of oil prices since 2002 is not an anomaly but a picture of the future. With the peaking of global conventional oil production, geopolitics and market economics will result in even more significant price increases and security risks. Oil wars are certainly not out of the question. Moreover, the days of inexpensive, convenient and abundant energy sources are quickly drawing to a close.

Maybe Salameh could do a guest post on TOD and explain his low recovery rates 0f 25-30% for Ghawar and Safaniya.

Dr. Mamdouh Salameh has considerable experience and expertise spanning 30 years in the oil and chemical industries and has held several senior management posts in the Middle East, Europe, and the UK. Dr. Salameh is currently Director of the Oil Market Consultancy Service, based in the UK, and a consultant for the World Bank.

He has written two books on oil: Is A Third Oil Crisis Inevitable? (published in London, April 1990), and Jordan's Energy Prospects & Needs to the Year 2010: The Economic Viability of Extracting Oil from Shale (published in London, October 1998), in addition to numerous research papers published in international oil and energy journals.

Dr. Salameh has a Doctorate in Economics specializing in the economics of oil and energy and a post-graduate degree in Industrial Management and Marketing.

Someone at TOD who shall remain nameless complained today about my "alarmist" warnings about Net Exports. How does one not become alarmed by the fact that the top five net exporters are, based on our models, all more than 50% depleted, with rapidly increasing domestic consumption?

Hey WT. I'm alarmed. Decision makers and stakeholders need to get alarmed too. Please keep up the good work.

I wouldn't let it affect you. This is the internet after all.

And compared to the Chimp, you aren't even slightly alarmist :-)

Hey hey Westexas,

I had a question about your model. In your presentation at ASPO you said that in 10 years the net exports from the top five would be equal to US imports. I was wondering how long until the total world exports are equal to US imports?


Once again, some details. We showed a low case, middle case and high case for net exports from the top five. Our middle case for 10 years hence showed that total net exports from the top five (half of current world net exports) would be equal to current US total petroleum imports.

In regard to the bottom half, we have some countries like Mexico with high levels of consumption, which will probably result in net export crashes, and some countries like Angola, showing higher net exports. We also have the nonconventional production from Canada, although the net energy exports from Canada may not be that impressive. Venezuela has lots of nonconventional potential, but their production appears to be drifting downward, while consumption is exploding, up 9%/year for the past five years.

We haven't tried to model the bottom half, but my guess is that total net world exports will be down by at least 75% by 2031, at which point total net exports would equal current US total petroleum imports. (Our middle case shows the top five hitting zero net exports in 2031).

Interesting Sept 2007 paper about Iran by Dr. Salameh. He discusses Iran possibly needing nuclear power to offset its net oil exports.

In this paper, he thinks that Iran will not be able to export any oil starting between 2015 and 2020.

He also believes that Iran's remaining proven oil reserves are about 35 Gb, unlike BP Statistical Review figure of about 138 Gb. He also states that "two retired National Iranian Oil Company (NIOC) experts: Dr Samsan Bakhtiari and Dr Ali Muhammed Saidi, estimated Iran’s proven reserves at 35-45 Gb and 37 Gb respectively".

I've emailed Dr. Salameh about his recovery factor of 30% for Ghawar, based on an assumed 190 Gb oil in place
30% would give only 57 Gb.

Saleri's presentation, Feb 2004, said that the "Ghawar field has produced 55 billion barrels as of year end 2003".

Dr. Salameh's figures would indicate that Ghawar's production is about to fall steeply.

Dr. Salameh's figures would indicate that Ghawar's production is about to fall steeply.

Otherwise known as the "Yibal Effect," where Shell was gearing up their surface production facilities to handle an expected flood of new oil, when they encountered an unexpected flood of new water, which was principally responsible for a huge reduction in proven oil reserves.

This is a case of a major oil company overestimating their own oil reserves. Perhaps they might not be doing such a hot job of evaluating worldwide reserves, especially in the Middle East.

My working theory is that we should assume that the HL estimates are the best estimate that we can get, until proven otherwise, since the method allows us to derive an estimate of URR using the two numbers we have the most confidence in, annual production and cumulative production to date.

Who knows what the future will bring, but the 2006 and 2007 (to date) Saudi HL points are falling along the slope of the line that we showed in the Texas/Lower 48 paper, published in May, 2006. Contrary to a recurring myth at TOD, we (Khebab/Brown) used the 1991 to 2005 data, inclusive, to warn of a near term decline in Saudi oil production. What refutes a peak is a new peak. Time will tell, but IMO 2005 was the final peak for Saudi Arabia.

The Saudi HL plot, from the Texas/Lower 48 paper (May, 2006):

Note that the 186 Gb estimate is for C+C.

What was the outcome of your debate with Economides at A&M just before the ASPO conference?

As far as the audience was concerned, of those responding about half voted for at or near peak and half voted for decades in the future.

He was expecting another he said/he said debate, where we exchanged opinions. I hit him with a hard nosed quantitative case, including the Brown/Khebab May, 2006 warning (using Saudi production from 1991 to 2005, which contrary to the impression left by some people on TOD, discounted nothing) that Saudi Arabia was on the verge of a long term decline.

I've previously described our memorable discussion regarding Saudi production

He claimed that Saudi production was up. I said it was down. He produced a slide showing production up in 2006. I told him the data tables showed it down. I offered to bet him $1,000 that I could produce a table showing Saudi production down over 2005. He then admitted that he was talking about "productive capacity," not actual production.

I then told the audience that while I had the theoretical capacity to date Julia Roberts, it was not a realistic expectation. To which Economides replied that he had actually dated Julia Roberts (general laughter in regard to both remarks).

I hit him with a hard nosed quantitative case, including the Brown/Khebab May, 2006 warning (using Saudi production from 1991 to 2005, which contrary to the impression left by some people on TOD, discounted nothing) that Saudi Arabia was on the verge of a long term decline.

I let this go once, but since Jeff is perpetuating a myth, I want to set the record straight.

Via e-mail last night, Jeff called both Stuart and me intellectually dishonest. Why? We had both accused him of cherry-picking data to support a conclusion, and gave several examples. None of those examples were the example Jeff mentions above. In response, Jeff did not address the examples we gave, but instead asked not once, not twice, but at least 5 times now for Stuart and me to admit that he didn't discount data in that paper. We both said, repeatedly, that we never said otherwise. Each time, Jeff said "Why can't you just answer the question?" It was just a baffling exchange. He would ask the question, we would answer, and he would ask it again. It was a complete Red Herring, but he couldn't let it go. And then after numerous exchanges, he had the nerve to write: "Now, in regard to the Texas/Lower 48 article, what still amazes me is that you [Stuart] and Robert don't have the intellectual honesty to admit to a fact."

And now here he is further perpetuating the myth that he was accused of discounting data in that paper. It's not true Jeff, and it is unbecoming of you to continue to assert otherwise. What you have done - and Stuart provided a perfect example - is cherry-pick data in support of, or during the discussion of your conclusions.

Finally, I want to point out that when Jeff has been challenged, he likes to pull out the Khebab card. He starts to refer more frequently to the Khebab/Brown work, as if Khebab backs him up. The funny thing about that? Khebab 1). Sharply disagrees with Jeff's interpretation of the Saudi HL; 2). Thinks the case Jeff is making is not scientifically strong, and 3). In contrast to Jeff, thinks Saudi could produce between 9 and 10 mbpd until at least 2012. But Jeff uses Khebab's name as if he agrees with Jeff's conclusions. He does not. Stuart does not. And I do not. But Jeff does not take the criticism that goes along with scientific discourse very well.

In conclusion, I want to share something that someone wrote that I think hit the nail on the head:

I think the issue with Jeff is that he has a very bad case of confirmation bias, and he's totally unconscious of it. He deploys it under all circumstances without the slightest awareness that that is what he's doing.

I agree. I don't think it is malicious, and I told Jeff (when he asked) that I don't consider it to be misconduct. But I do think it leads to sloppy conclusions, and I am not alone in that opinion. I pointed out to Jeffrey it isn't personal. But to him, criticisms of his work are personal. That makes it difficult to have a critical discussion about his work.

Now, I am really trying to bow out of the debate for a while, so I don't intend to engage in a lengthy exchange. But I suspect if I hadn't addressed this now, that myth would have continued to grow.

Following are excerpts, slightly edited for names, from my first and last e-mails to Stuart and Robert, et al, on this subject. My beef is that Stuart and Robert have used terms like "Cherry Picked" so often that some people think that it is my middle name.

I simply asked Stuart and Robert to confirm, for the record, that we used all of the post-1990 Saudi production data in the Texas/Lower 48 article. To date, despite multiple e-mail requests, both have refused to do so.

(Please answer two questions for me)
Texas and the Lower 48 as a Model for Saudi Arabia and the World (May, 2006)

(1) What part of the (post-1990) Saudi production data set did we ignore in the captioned paper?

(2) Is it true that the 2006 and 2007 (to date) P/Q versus Q data points are falling back toward the slope of the HL line that Khebab showed in the captioned paper?

Jeffrey Brown

The following comment from Robert, following my post of the link to our Texas/Lower 48 paper, is what started this exchange:

"If you use a shoddy methodology in which you cherry-pick data, and you end up being wrong, a lot of credibility is going to go up in smoke. If you turn out to be right, then it ultimately won't matter much, but that's the question, isn't it? But WT is so convinced that he is correct, that he spends absolutely zero time and effort examining contradictory or inconvenient data."

I simply asked Robert and Stuart to confirm that Sam I used all post-1990 Saudi data in the Texas/Lower 48 article. Not to put too fine a point on it, but neither Robert nor Stuart have yet been able to bring themselves to admit to a fact which is self evident. Why is that so hard?

We can go round and round on this forever, but the best course of action is for me to exit the scene. With the possible exception of the Net Exports paper, I don't plan to do any additional guest posts for The Oil Drum. Regarding the Net Exports paper, I would prefer not to post in TOD, but I'll leave that up to Khebab and PG.

Jeffrey J. Brown

Various answers that were provide in response to Jeff's question:

Uh Jeff, I wasn't complaining about the data you used in that specific paper.

Jeff, the issue wasn't that paper.

Jeff, where did we say there was a problem with the paper?

Jeff, the paper wasn't the issue. Here were the issues.

Your questions were answered, just not in the way you liked.

For the 4th time now - as I just told you in another e-mail - I have not said "You cherry-picked data in that specific report." I have told you this multiple times, and your response is consistently "Show me where I cherry-picked data in that report." Give me a break. That's very annoying.

Each time, Jeff just repeated his question. I will let the reader judge whether they think you are being reasonable.

If your beef was the cherry-picking, Jeff, perhaps you should have addressed the actual examples given, instead of trying to change the subject to one that wasn't.

Why won't you answer the two questions?

I rest my case. You got answers to both questions, on multiple occasions. In fact, on the second one I told you in no uncertain terms that I have done the Saudi HL for 2006 and 2007, and 2006 is still hanging out there, and 2007 came down. That is what it should have done, given that production was reduced.

How about you answer a couple of questions. Does Khebab agree with your URR estimates for Saudi?

Does Khebab agree with you that Saudi has peaked?

It would be more accurate to say that I agree with Khebab's URR (C+C) estimate for Saudi Arabia that we used in the 2006 paper. My input into the Texas and Saudi HL plots was exactly zero.

Khebab has recently adopted the very sensible method of showing a 95% probability range for HL estimates, which is what we used for the ASPO-USA net exports paper.

I'll have to let Khebab answer the second question.

So, refresh my memory. What was your answer to my Question #1?

BTW, insofar as I know Stuart's last TOD post on Saudi Arabia was on why the decline in production was not voluntary:

(Please answer two questions for me)
Texas and the Lower 48 as a Model for Saudi Arabia and the World (May, 2006)

(1) What part of the (post-1990) Saudi production data set did we ignore in the captioned paper?

(2) Is it true that the 2006 and 2007 (to date) P/Q versus Q data points are falling back toward the slope of the HL line that Khebab showed in the captioned paper?

Jeffrey Brown

Which brings us back to where we started many posts and e-mails ago.

As best that I can tell, Robert appears to be physically incapable of acknowledging that we did not "cherry pick" the data for the Texas/Lower 48 article.

I think every reader of this exchange, and all the people you copied on the e-mails, could all see that your questions were answered. You were never accused of cherry-picking data in that article. How much simpler can I put it? You were given examples where you did cherry-pick data, and you chose not to address those, but instead try to play the victim and deflect attention to something entirely different. You don't address the inconvenient data, you present something else you would rather discuss. As Stuart said, you are now cherry-picking the questions you want answered. The sad thing is, they have been answered, and I think you are the only one who can't see it. Frankly, it's pathetic and childish. And the people who feel the same way go far beyond just me. Khebab even thinks the criticisms of cherry-picking are valid.

Furthermore, regarding your answer to the Khebab question. More cherry-picking. You answered a different question than I asked. You ignored my question, posed a different question that suited you, and answered that one. Your answer boils down to, "I agree with the position that Khebab used to have." But what you omit is that with Khebab, he continued to research the issue, looked at more data, and came up with different conclusions. But you don't acknowledge this, and you couldn't even acknowledge it above. With you, the HL was the gospel. With him, it was a tool, but one with great uncertainty attached to it. One that he didn't feel was scientifically strong, but one that you have become dogmatic over.

So here are the answers to those questions I asked. Khebab, whom you constantly lean on for credibility, believes the URR for Saudi may be as much as 300 Gb, which is much greater than what you have argued for. He also believes Saudi can produce 9 to 10 mbpd until "as least 2012", which is a far different conclusion than you have presented. Yet you keep presenting things as if your conclusions are backed by him and supported by the Khebab/Brown paper. You want to talk about intellectual dishonesty? That's it, mister. You are knowingly implying an inaccurate picture of Khebab's position; a position that agrees with you when in fact he sharply disagrees with you regarding Saudi.

I know that I am not the only one who has expressed concern about your behavior when your arguments are criticized. A number of us are bewildered at your responses to criticisms; that a criticism of Jeff's argument is a personal criticism of Jeff. And you frequently respond by deflecting attention away from the argument, and onto the person. Or as I pointed out, you assume the position of the victim, and claim that the people criticizing your ideas must have ulterior motives. If you are going to make the arguments, you have to cope with and address the criticisms.

Now, I expect you to once again ask why I haven't answered a question I have already answered 10 times, but I think we are done here.


The fact that Saudi Arabia is going to show two years of year over year declines in production does not prove that 2005 was the final peak, although in my opinion (based on the HL plot) Saudi Arabia is in long term decline. However it--like other post peak regions--can and almost certainly will show some production rebounds to levels below the 2005 peak, but time will tell.

And I have acknowledged that there was some degree of luck in publishing a paper in early 2006 warning of an imminent decline in Saudi production.

In any case, the URR (C+C) estimate in the Texas/Lower 48 paper looks interesting in light of Ace's posts. And as I noted up the thread, given the vast number of things that we don't know, there is a lot of value in being able to derive a mathematical estimate of URR based on the two numbers that we have the most confidence in, annual production and cumulative production to date. And as Khebab and I demonstrated, the post-1970 and post-1984 cumulative Lower 48 and Russian production numbers respectively are basically exactly what the HL models predicted, using production data through 1970 and 1984 to construct the models.

But what has driven me over the edge are these constant allegations of "cherry picking" of the data, most recently Robert's post which I copied up the thread, which he posted directly following a link to our Texas/Lower 48 paper.

And for your information, I had no specific opinion regarding the proximity of a Saudi production peak until I saw the Saudi HL plots. As I noted in the comment about my debate with Dr. Economides I am trying to base my Peak Oil/Peak Export arguments on quantitative arguments, rather than on personal opinions.

But what has driven me over the edge are these constant allegations of "cherry picking" of the data, most recently Robert's post which I copied up the thread, which he posted directly following a link to our Texas/Lower 48 paper.

Well, at least you recognize that you went over the edge. But I want to say this one more time, because I see the possibility of clarity. I have told you many times it was not the paper that was the issue, it was what followed. Now, you said something very pertinent to this point:

And for your information, I had no specific opinion regarding the proximity of a Saudi production peak until I saw the Saudi HL plots.

There. We are so close a breakthrough. As I have said now, a dozen times, it wasn't the paper. As a result of the paper, you formed a conclusion. This is when the cherry-picking started. Subsequent data was, perhaps unconsciously, subjected to a filter. It either confirmed the conclusion or it was generally ignored. A perfect example – and I think an event that really hardened you into this position – was when Saudi production actually dropped. That sealed the deal for you, and therefore contradictory data had to be wrong. You couldn't even comprehend the possibility that their production was being managed, because one explanation confirmed your conclusion, and that was that. And it doesn't matter if your arguments are quantitative, if you aren't taking all available data into account.

Occasionally you did address contradictory data, but you would come up with an ad hoc argument to support the conclusion. When you say, "Well, if you discount this dogleg, or throw out these 3 points, the conclusion is preserved." That whole argument about whether Saudi is 70% depleted is a perfect example of this. You are letting the conclusion influence the data that you use, which is why it is cherry-picking. I have seen you do the same regarding your exports argument (which I generally agree with). You search for confirmation (any story that says exports are down), and either ignore contradictory information, or again come up with an excuse to avoid a different conclusion (well, that story says their exports are up, but their exports to Africa may be down, therefore we can't say that net exports were up).

In science, conclusions are tentative. They are subject to change, pending additional data. I think others were correct when they said you have a bad case of confirmation bias, but aren't really aware of it. This is why you and Khebab are no longer on the same page. His conclusions were tentative, and were influenced by additional data. Yours were firm, with no room for alternative explanations or contradictory data. But you have to take the data you are given, and not massage it until it fits the already formed conclusion.

Now, I truly don't think there is anything else to be said on the subject. If what I just wrote doesn't sink in, nothing ever will.

We could have avoided this entire exchange across two different threads and countless e-mails, if you had simply answered the following question, which you are still refusing to answer.

(1) What part of the (post-1990) Saudi production data set did we ignore in the captioned paper?

We could have avoided this entire exchange across two different threads and countless e-mails, if you had simply answered the following question

Or, it could have been avoided if you had stopped asking it after the first time I answered it. Or the 5th. Or the 12th.

It is really hard for me to believe that you did it again (but I am guessing you will do it again). I tried to help you by explaining very clearly what the issues were. I can see that it was a wasted effort, but I thought you were worth that effort. I have changed my mind, so by all means continue to make an ass of yourself.

BTW, Khebab's latest HL plot for Saudi Arabia shows an estimated URR of 224 Gb, with the 95% probability range being between 200 Gb and 248 Gb. Note that this is for C+C + NGL. The Saudi HL plot in the Texas/Lower 48 paper was for C+C.

I believe that the possible 300 Gb number is based on OOIP and recovery factor assumptions, which as I pointed is the result of using two different estimates. In contrast, the HL method derives an UUR estimate using two knowns, or at least two numbers that we have the most confidence in.

As I pointed out up the thread, given the vast number of unknowns, my working theory is that the HL estimate is the best we have, until proven otherwise--especially given what we have demonstrated with the Lower 48 and Russian data sets. And the 2006 and 2007 Saudi production data points will fit the Saudi C+C HL plot that Khebab did, based on production data through 2005.

While the evidence is certainly not definitive beyond a reasonable doubt, the 2006 and 2007 data points are supporting the Saudi 2005 peak projection that we showed in the Texas/Lower 48 paper. This may change. Time will tell.

But none of that is really relevant to the question I asked is it?

Well I tried. I can't do much more than that. You are completely off your rocker. Take your question, and the dozen times I have answered it, and shove it.

(1) What part of the (post-1990) Saudi production data set did we ignore in the captioned paper?

Does this mean that you are not going to answer this question?

Let me help you out.

You go to the link I provided.

You look at the Saudi HL plot that Khebab did (which I had nothing to do with).

You check out the color coded dots. The ones in green are the ones that Khebab used to construct the model.

Then you type four letters in response to the my question: N-O-N-E

Let's see, we have spent an untold amount of time, countless posts and countless e-mails on this because you refuse to type four letters?

Just a placeholder in case you come to your senses and try to edit these. I want to show these to a few people.

Hey Robert,

I have an idea. Perhaps we can make less painful for you. Since I had nothing to do with constructing the Saudi HL plot in the Texas/Lower 48 article, how about if we word the question as follows:

(1) What part of the (post-1990) Saudi production data set did Khebab ignore in the captioned paper?

Ditto. Just a placeholder to lock from editing.

I think that it would be pretty hard to edit out how many requests (?) that you answer a question.

But just to clarify for the record, in in this thread you directly answered question #2, but you still refuse to directly answer question #1. All it takes is four letters, and some degree of intellectual honesty.

This whole exchange does remind me of my debate with Dr. Economides. He flat out refused to acknowledge the fact that Saudi Arabia is currently showing lower crude oil production over 2005--again, we were not arguing "why," we were arguing "whether"--until he was faced with the hard reality of having to pay off on a $1000 bet.

Like my debate with Economides, this is not a debate over facts. Khebab honored all of the post-1990 production data in the Texas/Lower 48 paper. You just refuse to acknowledge it.

Regarding the presumed 2005 Saudi peak, the advantage you have is that you just have to be able to demonstrate average annual production of 9.6 mbpd or more (C+C) in order to refute the 2005 peak argument, whereas you could argue that a production level of 5 mbpd is just a sign of ongoing "voluntary" cutbacks.

You may ultimately be right about 2005 not being the peak, although I doubt it. In any case, as I said up the thread that's really not relevant to the question at hand.


I meant to add that I agree with Khebab that a URR of 300 Gb (C+C + NGL) is possible, but IMO, it's possible in the same sense that Julia Roberts will accept if I call her up and ask for a date.

If you ask me if it's a realistic possibility that the Saudis will produce 300 Gb or that I will be dating Julia Roberts next week, I think that the answer is no.

And while I can't speak for Khebab, I suspect that he would say that 300 Gb is unlikely, but not impossible.

But as I said, none of this is really relevant to the question at hand.

Some comments/opinions made by Dr. Salameh email response

* Saudi Arabia’s oil production is about to decline. The speed of decline, however, will depend on Ghawar.

* Ghawar, the world’s largest oilfield, peaked in April 2006 and is now declining at a rate of 8% per annum.

* Saudi oil production is projected to peak at 12 mbd. However, it is very doubtful as to whether Saudi production capacity could even be sustained at 9.5-10 mbd.

Mamdouh's tics are freaking me out...a little bit Dr. Strangelove?

But snarkiness aside...that was some of the best coverage of the situation I've ever seen in the TV news. Too bad it was (horrors) Al Jazeera. Yeah, strange the way they had two experts appearing to be taking different sides but actually taking the same side. ??

Energy consultant, writer, blogger

I was watching the video and thinking of the propaganda discussion from the other day. People don't want expertise from boring geniuses, they need to hear it from attractive spokesmodels with perfect hair and perfect bodies!


As Duncan Clarke, Chairman and CEO of Global Pacific & Partners, the author of a new book, “The Battle for Barrels” points out regarding America’s continental shelf, “The undiscovered oil potential in the areas demarcated for possible offshore (exploration) in the Pacific, Atlantic and Gulf of Mexico could allow the tapping of up to 85 billion barrels of oil that technically could be recoverable awaits the political passage of bills through the legislature”, i.e., Congress. snip

Has anyone read the book? Have there been posts that I missed? What does TOD think of this?
I haven't seen the book, but would like some input before ordering it. Murray

I see that they noticed Greenspan's "naked emperor" moment from a few weeks back.

The problem will solve itself.
But not in a nice way.

Great video .....

Someone said there was something on the Major Media about this and also maybe something about Crude Awakening . Anyone see it ??

The war for resources goes to Iran next ??

If given the choice of $10 gas or bombing Iran , I am afraid the vote will be to bomb.

I see. So $10 gas means bomb so we can get $20 gas!?

From Levittown to McMansion and back again.

Suburbs attacked because middle-class hates plumbers in big houses...

It comes down to self-interest. First, jobs: most of the criticism of sprawl is used to justify an alternative vision of the city where intellectuals of various kinds would play a strong role in planning and regulation. The media is happy to promote this view because a planned city, with all the reports and regulations and formalised disputes this entails, is much easier to report on than a city made of the spontaneous decisions of thousands of individuals.

Another reason for the persistent anger is middle-class status anxiety. Most intellectuals are members of the middle class, which defines itself in part by possession of an old inner-city pad or a nice house and garden in an inner-ring suburb. To see mere tradesmen in the 1980s acquiring bigger houses than those owned by many lawyers and academics sent a shiver through the middle class, and helped create an audience for absurd criticisms of prole housing, of the sort embodied in the term McMansion.

Does any of this matter? I suspect it does. I believe that over time the relentless criticism of the new suburbs helped create the intellectual and then the political environment in which governments were able to impose massive levies and taxes on new homes for the first time in history. This was one of the worst cases of intergenerational inequity this country has seen, and did much to produce the housing affordability crisis we face today. I suspect governments were able to get away with this only because the intellectuals had denigrated new suburbs to the point where they had almost no defenders among the ranks of the powerful and the influential.

Just another reason why I dislike the Marxist intelligentsia.

One of the expected events to accompany declining oil supply and increased oil demand is a decline in days of oil stocks.

The 11 October 2007 IEAOil Market Report
shows this graph which shows a decrease in OECD days of forward demand, based on average demand over the next three months. It shows the days of stock in Aug 2007 breaking below its 5 year average.

click to enlarge

When I first clicked on the "Inside Story - The End of Oil?" link my first thought was "Oh my god- this was on BBC World". But no - it's Al Jazeera - but they seem to have very closely copied BBC's World's backdrop, styling and music, And they've got Darren Jordon as a presenter, who until 2006 was one of BBC World's main presenters. Not sure whether to conclude that Al Jazeera are trying to pass themselves off as something they're not, or whether they've just decided that emulation is the sincerest form of flattery!


Something they're not!?

Perhaps Al Jazeera really is a respectable news outlet. Or is rapidly becoming one. They could hardly make less sense than Murdoch's Right Wing Noise Machine (TM)

Also please note that money and (near-future) history is on their side.

The problem will solve itself.
But not in a nice way.

History is on their side. I think I agree. And I like your Murdoch RWNM acronym (copyright DIYer, 2007)!!!!


It was always the intention of the founders of Al Jazeera (The Island) to emulate the BBC.

Sadly, the real BBC is planning to cut a lot of its excellent programming. The worst cuts will be in "Wildlife/Nature"

Ironically, some years ago, the BBC cut savagely its Arabic and Farsi/Persian/Iranian programming. More recently, they have increased funding in this area. I guess they realized that they needed "soft power" after all.

However, it is clear to anyone who listens to it regularly that it is a shadow of what it was before Tony Blair tore into it.

Personally, I do wish they would bring Lord Reith back. :=)

Not surprised. Imitation (or emulation!) is the sincerest form of flattery!

The Middle East has had a love/hate affair with Britain for nearly as long as my native country has!

Still, paying Jonathan Ross £16 million and then sacking lots of hard-working support staff stniks to high heavens. If you're not a fully commercial organzation with shareholders who stand to lose money, your management has no mandate to make the kind of decision implicit in paying Jonathan Ross £16 million....


That's because the people making up al-Jazeera are pretty much people from the BBC Mideast newsdesk.

Really sad to read all the Al Jazeera snipes. Amateurish, horrors, something they are not, etc.

I think it is sad that the world news is so dominated by CNN and the rest of the usual culprits (with BBC in diminishing role) that the English speaking audience has totally forgotten, that there are other equally valid points of view and high quality news organizations.

Now, did I just imply CNN might pass as a high quality news organization. Scratch that...

You should get the point by now.

Al Jazeera was formed in the first place when the BBC was banned by many countries in the region - most importantly Saudi Arabia. Since then it has been consistently demonised, for nothing. Al Jazeera always had the same news values, much better ones - imo - than anything CNN or the BBC could come up with, it also actually reports from some of the areas other news organisations wont even go into...

The reasons it threatens/has threatened governments - both local and western - is because it is one of the few media organisations with any standards at all. And Al Jazeera is not radical in any way, it's really very mainstream but it adheres to basic sceptical journalistic standards...